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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Barbara A 11 en Kuzio for the Master 
of Arts in History presented December 5, 1996. 
Title: President Abelardo Rodriguez (1932-34): From 
Maxi ma to to Carden i smo. 
The 1 920s and 1930s in Mexico were character1 zed by a 
per1 od of soc i a 1, po 1itica1 and economic reconstruction 
following the military phase of the Mexican Revolution from 
1 91 O to 1920. The Sonoran Dynasty, dominated by mi 1 i tary 
generals Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Elias Calles, ruled the 
Mexican government from 1920 to 1934. More specifically, 
dur·ing the period known as the Maximato ( 1928-34), Calles, 
U-1e Jef e Maxi mo, attempted to contro 1 three different 
presidents from behind the scenes. It was not until December 
1934, when Lazaro Cardenas began his six year term as 
President of Mexico, that the Sonoran Dynasty off i c i a 11 y ended. 
This thesis focuses on Abelardo Rodriguez, the third 
president of the Maximato from September 1932 to December 
1, 1934. Historians have written little about Rodrlguez's 
presidency because he is viewed strictly as a puppet president 
under Ca 11 es. The 1 ntent of this research is first to extract 
Rodr\guez from obscurity and shed some light on his 
substantial contributions to Mexico's post revolutionary 
economic and social reconstruction as interim President. And 
second, to reveal his role not as puppet number three of the 
Maximato but as a political leader with his own agenda. 
Rodriguez was chosen by Calles to be Interim President. 
However, while in office he gradually shifted his allegiance 
from Calles to Cardenas as Cardenas wielded more power, 
replacing Calles collaborators in his administration with 
Cardenas proponents. From that perspective the Rodriguez 
administration became a transitional government which 
peacefully shifted power from the Maximato to Cardeni smo. 
The Mexican Six Year Plan developed in 1933 reflected 
this new shift in power. My research will show that Abelardo 
Rodriguez aggressively pursued the implementation of the Six 
Year Plan during 1934. More importantly, he interjected his 
own interpretation, which included federal policies that 
reflected a mix of capitalist economic philosophy and New 
Deal social policies, learned from his U.S.-Mexican border 
relationships while governor of Baja California. As a result, 
this research concludes that Rodriguizmo, acting as an 
independent force, laid most of the foundations for the 
successes President Cardenas achieved between 1935 and 
1937, something historians totally credit to Cardenas. 
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Introduction 
The 1920s and 1930s in Mexico \"/ere characterized by a 
period of social, political and economic reconstruction 
f o 11 O\N i ng the military phase of the Me xi can Revolution from 
191 O to 1 920. The Sonoran Dynasty, dominated by military 
1jenera ls Alvaro Obregon and P1 utarco El 1 as Ca 11 es from the 
State of Sonora, ruled tr1e Mexican government from 1920 to 
1934. Pre=,1dent of Mexico from 1920 to 1924, Obregon handed 
over the presidency to Ca11es from 1924 to 1928 and returned 
for a second term in 1928. His assassination, the day after 
takin1j office, created a political vacuum for the Sonoran 
power Rather than reassume the presidency himself, Ca1les 
filled Obregon's six year term from 1928 to 1934 with three 
CJlf f erent pre=.1 dents-- Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio, and .A.be l ardo 
Rodriguez-- a 11 whom he attempted to contra l fr~om behind the 
scenes. Because General Ca 11 es was ref erred to as the "Jef e 
ivlaximo c1e la Revoluci6n" beginning with the Rubio 
administration, the period became known as the Ma~'.imato. It 
was not until Decernber 1 934, when Lazaro Cardenas from the 
central state of M1choacan began his six year term as 
President of Me xi co, that the Sonoran Dynasty officially ended. 
My research focuses on Abelardo Rodriquez, tr1e third 
presi\jent of the Maximato from September 1932 to December 
1, 1934. The standard textbook currently used in teaching a 
course on Me xi can h1 story, Michael Meyer's and Wi 11 i am 
,. ' 
Sherman's 781 page volume, The Course of Mexican History 
rnent ior:s Abelardo Rodr·i guez three ti rnes, twice in a 11 st rng of 
presidents of the period, and once as "a man with 1 ess 
adrnrn1strat1\1e talent than relish for power, as puppet number 
niree of the Maxi rnato." 1 The pur·pose of my researcr1 is first 
to extrac.t President Rodriguez frorn obscurity and shed some 
l 1gr1t on his substantial contributions to Mexico's post 
revo 1ut1 onarv econorn i c and social reconstruction as i nter1 m 
President A.nd second, to reveal his role not as puppet number 
trwee of the ivia/1mato tiut as a political leader with his own 
a1;ienda 
Unknown to the larger vvorld, Abelardo Rodriguez was 
vve 11-knovvn to NorHwvestern Mexico, California businessmen 
along the US -fvlexican border and Me.xi can President Plutarco 
Ca 11 es rn tr1e 1 920s. A.s Governor of Baj a California from 1 923 
to 1930, Rodri(;iuez acquired adrninistrative skills and 
f mane i a 1 e><pert i se that a 11 owed him to survive future 
political challenges. He provided Baja California with six 
years of po 1it1ca1 stab i 1 i ty and econorn i c deve 1 opment and 
brou1;iht th 1 s isolated periphery of Me xi co under tighter control 
of the Me:xican government During these years, he 
(jernons trateij consistent loyalty to the Jef e Maxi rno which 
earned r, i rn Ca 11 es' trust and free reign to adrn in i st er BaJ a 
Ca11forn1a. A.long the way, r1e established himself as the 
1M1cr1ae1 C Meyer and \villiam L. Sherman, The Course of r'1e/ican 
Histor-y 0-~ew York Oxford University Press, 1991 ), p 591. 
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Caudillo of Mexico's West and accumulated enormous personal 
\/\!ea 1 tri. 
Rodriguez reproduced tJ·1 is f ormu 1 a when he became 
interim President of Mexico in September 1932. By cr1oosing 
to work within the party system, Rodriguez demonstrated 
loyalty to Cal1es and the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), 
11\iho reciprocated by giving him the freedom to administer 
Mexico's centra 1 government. Yet within this parameter, 
Rodr1guez developed his own distinct brand of economic and 
socia1 policies He created federal policies that reflected a 
mix of capital 1st economic philosophy and New Deal social 
policies, something he had learned in his U.S.-Mexican border 
re 1at1ons.h1 ps To that, he added the 1deo1 ogi ca 1 prescription of 
Obreg(5n 's and Ca 11 es' Sonoran dynasty. 
Rodriguez was insta11ed as third president of the 
l'··1ax i mat o. However, wh i 1 e in office tw gradually shifted his 
allegiance from Calles to Cardenas, as Cardenas wielded more 
pow·er. From tJ1at perspective the Rodr1 guez adm mi strati on 
became a trans it i ona 1 government which peacefully sr1 i fted 
power from the Maximato to Cardenismo. The Mexican Six Year 
P 1 an deve 1 oped in 1 933 ref 1 ected this new shift in power. My 
researcr1 w i 11 st·rnw that Abe 1 ardo Rodr1 guez aggressive 1 y 
pursued the implementation of the Six Year Plan during 1934 
More importantly, he interjected his ovvn interpretation, and 
laid rnost of tJ1e foundations for the successes President 
L8zaro Cardenas achieved between 1935 and 1937. 
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The research for my thesis is primarily taken from the 
u.~; State Department Mexican Internal Affairs documents.2 
Little r1as been written by historians concerning Rodriguez's 
presidency. While Lorenzo Meyer has written him off as simply 
anotrier puppet of the Maxi ma to, 3 tr1e State Department sources 
reveal his importance from the U.S. diplomatic viewpoint. 
Tr·1ese primary documents and tr1e John F.W. Dul les4 book paint a 
very favoratJle picture of Rodriguez as an administrator, 
confirmrng tr1at Rodriguizmo did e;.'.1st and that it served as the 
trans~ ti ona 1 government from the Maxi ma to to Carden i smo. 
Tr1e first cr1apter est ab 1 i shes AtJe 1 ardo Rodriguez as a 
very capab 1 e governor who 1itera11 y carved an econom i ca 11 y 
v 1at'1 e and po 1 it i cal ly stab 1 e Me;-: i can state out of nothing. .At 
the same ti me he cemented the confidence of both Ca 11 es and 
the US and created his vast persona 1 \A/ea 1th and po 1itica1 
poiNer in Northern Mexico. Cr1apter two describes the po 1itica1 
povver ·3truggle at the national level which revolved around the 
upco1-n i f"HJ 1 934 president i a 1 e 1 ect ion and how Rodriguez was 
p 1 ac eel t1y Ca 11 es as third president of the Maxi mato. .A.ft er trw 
stage is set, cr1apter tr1ree separates Rodriguez from tr1e 
2~~AUS Diplomatic Record Group 59, Records of the Departmer1t of State 
Re1atmg to Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930-1939. Microfilm Ed M1370 
Hereafter cited Nf'.US 
?Lor-enzo Meyer, Historia De La Pevoluci6n Mexicana 1928-1934 
Vol 12 Los I nicios De La I nstituc ional izac1on La Politi ca Del Max1mato. and Vol 
13 El Ccmflicto Social y los Gobiernos del Maximato (Mexico City El Colegio De 
11exi co. 1978) 
"1Jol-ir1 F.W Dulles, Yesterday in f'1ex1co .A. Chronicle of n1e Revolution 
1919-1936 (.Austrn University of Texas Press, 1961) 
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1''1a::x.imato and highlights his administrative qualities and the 
·::;.trcng US influence he brought to the Mexican presidency. 
Cr1apter four answers trie centra 1 question of who ran the 
Rodriguez government Both Rodriguez and Ca 11 es strugg 1 ed to 
dominate the government but Rodriguez prevailed wr1en r1e 
rep 1 aced several of Call es' co 11 aborators with men of his own 
rn his cabinet Important l·y, from the outset he contained the 
nat i ona 1 rn i 1 itary power Chapter five moves beyond who 
c or,tro 11 ed the Rodriguez acJm in i strati on to sr1ow triat 
Ro1jri10uez was actively involved in the transition to 
Caroenismo It describes tr1e power struggle between Car,jenas 
and Ca 11 es and Rodriguez's role in tr1 is strugg 1 e during tr1e 
1jev·e1opment of the Mexican Six Year Plan in 1933. 
Cr1apter six, seven, and eight focus on Rodriguez's 
concrete accomp 1 i shments in the areas of finance, and agrarian 
ana labor reform whicr1 set the groundwork for the Cardenas 
administration's social reforms. Here the question of who ran 
tr1e government is answered cone l us i ve 1 y as Rodr\ guez and r11 s 
f rn an c e m 1 n 1 st er s set f i s ca 1 po 1 ic y f or t he country, Rod r· i g u e z 
u 1t i mate 1y usurped a 11 power from the states and congress and 
01ctated agrarian reform as head of the .Agrarian Commission 
and regulated labor through personal control of the national 
Arbitration Board . .A.t the same time he promoted consumption 
throu10r1 minimum wage legislation which he also strong-armed 
througr1 Congress over States' interests. 
5 
Chapter nine returns to the power strugg1e between 
Cardenas and Ca1 ies, no'vv set m 1934 When Ca11es reignited 
Hie r·e1igious issue to create a po11tica1 crisis for Cardenas, 
Podri guez s tab111 zed the situation for Cardenas. Fina 11 y, the 
cone 1 us ions reconsider trie Rodr1 guez administration based on 
tr·,1~ nevv information. 
6 
7 
Chapter I: Education of a Northern Politician 
A.tlelardo Lu1s Rodriguez was born in Guaymas on May 
12, 1 E\89. He vvorke1j in Sonora for the Cananea Copper Co. after 
a minimal primary education before Joining the Constitution-
al 1st Army in 1913 at age twenty two. Between 1913 and 
1915, tw rose from lieutenant to divisional general, the 
Me>-'ican .Army's ri1gr1est rank, as a participant in almost every 
major revolutionary battle. From 1916 to 1920 Rodriguez 
served e/clusi·v·ely in a Sonoran unit \/\/here he fought the Yaqui 
Indians for the Carranza administration. It was during this 
t i me tr; at r·1 e ,j eve 1 oped a fr 1 ends r1 i p w i t h P l u tar co E l i as ca 11 es 
vv·ho vvas Chief of Yaqui Operations. Rather than use violence, 
C:clonel Rodriguez proposed to settle tr1e Yaqui problem through 
ei~uitable land 1jistribut1on. By the end of 1916, he had 
organized tr1e first Indian camp under his custody and pacified 
an important point of unrest.1 
In r··1ay 1920 Rodriguez became Brigadier General under 
President Obregon and devoted himself to army administration, 
serv mg as a zone commander, adjutant genera 1 of 1'1exi co City, 
cr11ef of cavalry and chief of staff. In .July, Obregon directed 
Rodriguez to organize an expedition to reestab 1 i sh federal 
control over BaJa California since the northern area remained 
1,Ja·vier F. Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodriguez ( 1932-341 (Me;,;1co 
Ei:i1tc1r1a1 Cu1tura. 1938), p 62 
e 
outside of federal authority. It was an independent state under 
u-·,e persona 1 contra l of Co 1 one l Esteban Cantu In 1 923, after 
def eating Cantu, Rodriguez becarne chief of Operations and 
Gover·nor of U-·1e Norther·n District of BaJ a Ca 1 lf orn i a. 2 
Northern District Governor: 1923-1930 
Tr1e primary task of Rodriguez's administration was to 
def end 1v1e::-'.ico's sovereignty against the encroachment of the 
United States by estab1ishin1;i permanent military and 
comrnun i cation bases and pro vi ding rnteroceani c 
communication which linked BaJa California more closely with 
tr1e Mexican Republic. 3 He al so concentrated on the 
development of public serv 1 ces and education in his carnpai gn 
to keep the Nortr1ern District under Mexican control. What he 
achieved was far greater. He l itera11y created a Mexican state 
\Nhere none had e:-,; i sted . 
. As a state administrator, Governor Rodriguez bui 1t up the 
1oca1 treasury to deve 1 op pub 1 ic works. In the 1920s, the 
Northern District was subsidized 900,000 pesos annua1 ly by 
tr1e F edera 1 Department of Pub 1 i c Education and '-Justice. By 
1 924 Rodriguez had reduced ha 1f of the subsidy and in 1 925 he 
~.urren,jered the other r1alf. Soon the treasury of the Northern 
2Jbld,p65 
3 Ibid., p 65-66 
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District furnished the Central Government the amount of 
900,000 pesos to help defray' the large expenses created by the 
'delar1uertista' rebellion.4 By the end of his governorship in 
1930, Baja California had established an impressive balance of 
4 8 O O, O O O pesos f i nan c in g a 11 of i ts own pub l i c s e rv i c es, 
especially the educational branch. It provided additional funds 
to the Federal government to fight the Escobar Rebe 11 ion in 
1929.'.::· 
In the early 1920s, Baja California public employees 
often 1 ived on the U.S. side of the border because services \Nere 
available there that did not exist in Mexico. Governor 
Podr1 guez order·ed them to 1 ive w 1th in the nation ta l territory. 
He (jevelope(j Tijuana an(j Mexicali as principal population and 
touri :rn centers by pro vi d mg neccessary mun i ci pal services 
such as sewa(;ie, lighting, electricity and paved roa(js. He built 
schoo 1 s, residences and other public buildings like stores and 
theaters. He provided irrigation and drinkable water througr1 
tr1e construction of the Rodriguez Dam. It harnessed the 
Ti Juana River vvaters and challenged the idea that the United 
Stat es was tr1e on 1y one to profit from it. Rodrf guez bui 1 t 
roa(js between Mexicali and Tijuana, Tijuana to Ensenada, 
rvie/1cali to .Algodones and Tijuana to La Paz. He developed new 
4~~.A,U'.:· e 12.00/29793, ~~o. 1 e45, Excelsior, September 5, 1932, Reel 
r;. 
s Javier F. Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodrlauez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
Ed1tor1a1 Cultura, 193e), p 69-70. Rodriguez also provided arms against the 
Escobar Rebellion by organizing the 21st infantry Batallion and two voluntary 
corp~. to invade Sonora 
in1ju·3tri es in the Northern District including soap, seeders, 
flour, distilleries., \.\;ine, ice and beer. Eventually r1igher 
salaries and the e levateij standard of living of the workers 
attracted new residents .. As a result, the population of Baja 
California increase1j from 23,537 inhabitants in 1921 to 
48,327 in 1930.f. 
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Gover·nor Rodriguez's education policies in the Northern 
District paralleled those of Presidents Obregon and Calles on 
tr1e nat i ona 1 1 eve l. During r1 is pres 1 dency, Obregon named .Jose 
\/as.concelos secretary of education to implement .Article 3 of 
tr·,e 1917 Constitution. Backed by increased federal funds, 
vas.concelos became the patron of the rural school. Over a 
trwusan1j rural schools \fv'ere built in Mexico between 1920 and 
I 924, more than during the previous fifty years. By 1928 
Calles r1ad arjrjed two triousand rur·al schools.7 Witr1in this 
conte'<t, Gover·nor Rodr·iguez put an emphasis on rural education 
in his District. He estimated that the Revolution had: 
"acqu i rea a national and human compromise that cannot 
be re ct lf i ed without the fundamental change and 
immediate construction of pub 1 i c education, and for 
sincere revolutionaries to boast of the Revolution solidly 
contradicts this compromise which must consist of 
educ at in'J the people. "C. 
t ltil•j, p70 
.. lli0-1at-l C 1-ieyer and W1lliarn L. Sherman, Hie Course of 1-iexican 
His tc·rv U·Je w York: Oxford ur-ii vers i tv Press, 1 991 ), p S 72-584 
: Ja111er F Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodrigue7 ( 1932-34) (Me:<ico 
Edltoria1 Cultura, 1938l, p 71 
Governor Rodriguez devote(j 46% of his State's total 
put1l1c \NOrks budget to education to sustain 55 schools 
11 
incl u1ji ng r11 gh schoo 1 s, e 1 ementary schoo 1 s and night schoo 1 s 
which consisted of one industrial and another normal and 
p1~eparatory schoo 1. He constructed more than 35 bu i 1 dings 
1N1th mo(jern facilities and educational materials. His special 
focus \A/as on teacher's pay who received 1 Oto 15 pesos a da·/.9 
In regard to agrarian reform, on the national level 
i=1resi den ts Obregon and Ca 1 l es divided agri cu 1tura1 1 ands into 
communal e 1 i1jos rather than individual parcels. However, 
1:Jo.,/ernor Rodri1~uez exper·imented with both individual 
parce 1 at ion and communa 1 efforts. He redeemed nat i ona 1 1 ands 
\Nhicr1 had been in the hands of foreign companies and 
distributed them to small in1j1vidual Mexican agriculturalists. 
He tiougr1t closed colonies \Nr1ose lands were a part of the 
Co 1 ora1jo P iv er De 1 ta an1j o·wned by U.S. companies according to 
the Commission on International 'Waters. 'With these he formed 
Mexican colonies but gave indn1i1jual financing to the colonists. 
Governcr Rodriguez a 1 so est ab 1 i shed a cooperative system of 
colonization, tr1e Colonia Progreso y .A.nexas, which involved 
:230 families and over 5,300 hectares of land under the total 
contro 1 of the District government as an experi men ta 1 
proJect.10 
91t,1d,p71. 
101t)J•j, p 72-73. 
12 
Nationally, President Calles initiated a series of 
i rri gat ion pro J ects and agricultural schools and began to 
exten1j credit to small farmers to help curb the decline in 
aqr1cultural productivity as a result of confiscation of land 
from the hacienda system. Likewise, Rodr\guez sought 
agricultural productivity for the Northern District over mere 
social reform and knew this could only be realized with credit, 
:rr1 gat ion, supplies and education. .Agricultural development 
required fun1jing and the Governor founded the .Agricola 
Peninsu1ar Banco with his O\Nn money and half a million pesos 
in capital to lend money for provisions, seed, and irrigation 
water. 11 
Lat.or was neither organized in the Northern District nor 
incorporated vv· i th the 1 ab or movement in the rest of the 
ccuntr/ There were on1·; four unions wltr1 a total of 173 
members prior to 1924. During Rodr\guez's governorship, it 
gre\·V to 35 syndications with 3, 350 members. Most of the 
gro1.Ntr1 vvas due to day laborers transported to the Northern 
District from Sinoloa and Sonora, repatriated nationals, and 
U'1e accord that obligated Mexican businesses to hire 50% 
rviexican workers. Eventually the District required businesses 
to hire 90% nationals which was before the establishment of 
the Federal Lavv which required the same .. A personal 
preoccupation of Governor Rodr\ guez was the establishment of 
a minimum wage, a policy he carried with him to the 
11 1b1d, p 74 
Pres i (jency. He es tab 1 i shed the Board of Conci 1 i at ion and 
.A.rt,itration in r,1ay 1925. The eigr1t hour work day, double pay 
for overtime an1j the minimum wage of four pesos a day 
fonowe 1j sr1ortly.1:: 
13 
Governor Rodriguez s rngl er1andedly carved a pol it i ca 11 y 
stable, economically viable Northern State in Mexico where 
none had e;.:i~.ted in 1e~;s than a five year period. A Mexico City 
paper put r11 s achievements into perspective: 
"(3enera 1 !=~odri guez devoted hi mse 1f who 1ehearte 1j1 y to 
the economic reorganization of the district. 
f"iagn if 1cent1 y equipped schoo 1 s, agri cu 1tura l colonies, 
r·1 i gr1v11ay~, modern mun i c i pa 1 services, and what is the 
most noteworthy of mention, perfect order throughout 
the region, 1Nere the results of an administrative labor 
over a period of 1 ess than five years. The capita 1 of the 
District, Mexicali, came to be the on1y city a1ong the 
r·~ortr·1ern tior,jer more important than its neighbor of the 
.Arneri can side. Trave 1 ers crossing the border received 
the impression of being in a progressive, rich and 
ind us t r·i ous town." 13 
Prosperous Businessman 
V/rii le Rodriguez's goa1 as governor of Baja Cal lfornia 
was to bring the northern periphery into closer po 1itica1 
l:21t11d' p 74 
1 3t~t..US 812 00/29793, i'Jc1 1245, E\Celsior, Septe1-nt1er 5, 1932, Reel ,.., 
control by the Mexican Republic, his success was achieved by 
forging close ties \A/lth the A.merican economy which not only 
enriched tr1e l~orthern District but also enriched Rodriguez 
personal 1y. This in turn increased hi'.::. need to remain in 
control of this region so that his holdings would not be 
Jeopardized. 
14 
By 1930, Rodriguez was already a prosperous business 
rnan with a variety of interests. These included almost 
compiete ovvnersr1ip of the Compania Productos Marinos, S.A 
\Nhich ha1j fish packing plants at El Sauzal, near Ensenada, at 
Cedros Island, and at Cape San Lucas, Lower California, as well 
a'.::. a fl oat i ng cannery - the C.ALMEX; interest in the Bancari a 
iJe1 Pac1f1co, S.A, the only bank operating rn the Ensenada 
consular district; a vvinery at Santo Tomas, Lower Cal if ornia; 
otr1er rancr" and agricultural lands in the municipality of 
Ensenada; and a twenty-five percent interest in the A.gua 
Caliente Hotel Company which he shared primarily with 
A.meri can investors. 14 The Compani a Me xi can a de l Agua 
Ca 11 ente, 5. A was organized under Mexican 1 aws on September 
1 3, 1 92'8 for the purpose of operating a hotel and resort. A 
maJor1ty of the company's officers and directors were 
American citizens forfeiting rights under Mexican law. is "To 
1 4~MUS 8 12 00 Lower Calif ornia/91, Smale, ~~ovember 1 O, 1931, Reel 
13 
1 :=t~.AUS ("12.5034/ 1 14, May 12, 1 931, Reel 51 
these interests General Rodrlguez later added large holdings 
an 1j rndustr·1 al enterprises on tr1e mainland of Me xi co." 1 e 
15 
Governor Ro1jri guez established a reputation of be mg 
friendl\' tovvard the United States. He was popular with the 
officials and U1e people of Southern California.17 During his 
adm1nistrat1on, the Northern District government was known 
for prompt payment of its obligations, so that business 
1nterest5 in nearby cities and towns of Southern Cal if ornia 
became very eager to do business with him. Rodrlguez often 
coc,perated \Nlth the commercial interests on the U.S. side to 
tr1e extent that Mexicali residents could purchase merchandise 
on in5.tallment plans and bring merchandise, especially cars, 
into r1ex. 1 co. If a resident of Mex i ca 1 i def au 1 ted, pressure 
1Nou 1 d be e:<erc i sed through tr,e District Government Po 1 ice 
.A.uU1or1 ti es. i::: 
Political 1r·,tr1gue in the Northern District 
Gene1-al Rodriguez acted as Caudi 1 lo of the Northern 
D1str1ct The only maJCir political challenge to his position 
came vvhen Pre'3 i dent Ortiz Rubio attempted to usurp local 
power and economic prof its from Rodriguez's interests in BaJa 
1 Gt~A.US·212 00/29744, Smale, .August 5, 1932, Reel 2. 
17t·JAUS 812 002/3'.':·3. t·Jo i 727, R Clark, August 1, 1932, Reel 25. 
13NAUS 812.00 Lower California, Frank Bohr, April 13, 1931, Reel 13 
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California. While the World Depression affected the growing 
tour·1st trade, the frontier to\Nns continued to receive an 
enormous quantity of visitors. Prohibition in the U.S. and the 
existence of numerous casinos brought enough tourists for big 
econom 1 c returns. 19 This led to a struggle for contra l of the 
pol it 1 c1 an 's bonanza \Nh1 ch the development of the American 
tour1 st traffic had made of the region. The Rodriguez forces, 
'vVhich followed a friendly policy with the Americans, were on 
one side fighting to hold their own while Rubio and his allies 
sougr1t to oust them with claims they would return the 
t\Jortt1ern District to greater Mexican control. 20 
First to come under attack by the Rubio fore es was 
r3overnor .Jose Mari a Tapia After being in power for six years 
rn tr1e Nortr1ern District, Rodriguez had resigned from the army 
an1j the 1Jovernorsh1p at the end of 1929 and spent eight months 
w1 Europe studyrng the r1otel rndustry. Rodriguez handed off the 
governorship to General Tapia, his long time protege. Tapia 
r·1a1j served in various government positions in Lower 
California, first as a military officer under General Rodriguez, 
Hien Chief of Staff to Rodriguez until 1926 when he was 
elected Congressman to Lower California. As President, Emilio 
Portes G i 1 appointed Tapia as his Chief of Staff, then 
19Lorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Revoluci6n Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol 
12 Los lnic10s De La lnstitucionalizac10n La Politica Del Ma:><imato (Mexico City 
El Cole,~io De Me><ico, 1978), p 271. 
20t\JAU5 812.00 Lower Ca1ifornia/59, Harper/5ma1e/Ensenada, 
December 1 930, Ree 1 13 
Provisional Governor of the Northern District and finally Civil 
and Mil ltary Governor of tr1e t~orthern District about two 
rnontr1s before tr1e latter retired from office. 21 
Soon after Ortiz Pubio took office as President on 
February 5, 1930, he pursued replacing Tapia with a governor 
1oya1 to himse1f and one who \Nould share the large profits 
f rorn tr1e d lf f erent Rodriguez garnb ling and racing concessions 
17 
1 ocateij in Tijuana and A(~ua Ca 1 i ente. Senor Manuel Hernandez 
Cr1azaro, Private Secretary to President Rubio, vis lted Agua 
Caliente and made a passionate report to Mexico City that the 
border \.~as completely .Americanized, so much so that Mexican 
money vvas not being allo\Ned to circulate and blamed the 
conditions on Tapia. Tapia resigned and led demonstrations 
tr1roughout the district General Calles, vvho had always 
supported Tapia, tried to prevent him from being removed from 
off ice t)ut Cr1azaro's influence at the time was too great. Next 
Calles met with several Cabinet members including Portes Gil 
\:,:r·10 trweatened resignation lf Cr1azaro did not step down. As a 
result Chazaro was removed from off ice but given the more 
1mportant position as Governor of the Federal District. Calles 
protested and after Chazaro held the position of Governor for 
on 1 y 48 hours r·endered his resignation and left for· Europe "on 
account of riis health." 22 
? 1 lt11d 
22 lt1Jrj 
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General .Arturo Bernal, who was in the Rubio camp, 
replaced Tapia for three short months from September 3 to 
December 24, 1930 until Rodriquez, who had scarcely landed 
from Europe, rushed off to the Capital to rectify tr1e situation. 
Rodr\guez's considerable influence with Calles led to the quick 
removal of General Bernal. Bernal had earned Rodr1 guez's 
displeasure by temporarily closing Rodriguez's Foreign Club 
Gambling Casino at Tijuana, adding to his difficulties with the 
AB.\ll Casino at Mexicali, and stopping construction on the 
Podr\ guez Dam. Bernal al so incurred tr1e displeasure of the 
commercial and industrial interests by initiating high road 
constuct ion ta:xes and exact rng contributions during a ti me of 
l ovv cotton prices and considerably reduced income from the 
American tourist trade.23 
Carlos Tre Jo 'y' Lerdo de Tejada replaced Bernal from 
December 27, 1930 until November 1, 1931. Tejada's political 
sympathies were with the Rodriguez faction, and his selection 
was attributed to Rodriguez's influence in Mexico City. 
General Tapia came back as military commander of the 
peninsula, a 11 of which indicated that Rodriguez was st i 11 
powerful in this section of Mexico. This pro'."""Rodriguez 
political change also gave rise to a general feeling of 
optimism among American business concerns.24 
23 ~~.AUS 812.00 Lower California./60, Frank Bohr, December 20, 
1930, Peel 13 
24~MUS 812 00 Lo 1Ner California/59, Harper/Smale./Ensenada, 
Decemtier 1930, Reel 13. 
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Even tr1ough Rodriguez succeeded in placing his own men 
1n trie governorsr11p, Rubio tried other measures to gain control 
of the gambling profits. In July 1931, Rubio took control of 
tr'1e gamb1 ing concessions in Mexico from the Department of 
Gobernaci6n. The contention was that many games and 
gambling devices were being operated which were not 
perm1ssable in accordance with Mexican Federal Law. Tr1e 
outcome \Nas that nevv' legislation on gambling permits would 
nee,j to be enacted in the near future. Meanwhile, the only 
char.ge was that the s 1 ot machines at Mex1ca11, wh1 ch had been 
suppressed for some five or six weeks, were now again being 
operated by means of permits that were issued directly by tr1e 
1oca1 Di strict Government instead of by the Department of 
Gobernaci 1:)n in Mexico City.:::::= Tr11s was an obvious victory for 
Rodriguez. 
The \t/orl d Depression negative 1 y affected Rodriguez's 
holdings along \Nith tr1e local and national economy. Profits 
from grain commerce and cotton and subs i diaries shrank w 1th 
the c 1 os ing of the e::<port markets, and income from the North 
.American tourist trade at hotels, casinos and horse racing 
decrease,j.::?t The econom>1 was exceedingly depressed in view 
of tr1e continued scare i ty of work and the 1 ow exchange va 1 ue 
cf the Me>-'1can currency. This resulted in the closing either 
25~~.A.u:;, 812.00 Lower Ca1 iforn1a, Frank Bohr/.American Consul, ,.July 9, 
1931, Ree 1 1 3. 
26~~1\IJS s 12 00/29744, Sma1e .. August 5, 1932, Reel 2. 
temporari 1y or indefinite1y, of a 1arge number of the 1oca1 
sci loons and cabarets. 21 The Ow1 or· AB.W. Gambling Casino, 
the on1y licensed gambling casino in Mexicali, was closed on 
20 
.A. u gust 3 1 for an ind e f in i t e per i o d I ts con c es s i on was 
surrendered to the Mexican Government because the owners, 
\Nh1ch rnclu,jed Rodriguez, were said to have been losing about 
$10,000 during each of the three previous months due to the 
,jepress 1 on, the C:as ino 's considerable overhead, and $30,000 
."ie:><'.1can Federal Government taxes and contributions.2e In 
otr·1er wor,js, Rodriguez r1anded off his gamb 1 ing concessions to 
the government when they were losing money and took them 
back \Nhen they were profitab1e. 
A. 1tr1ough throughout the Rubio adm in i strati on attempts 
to acquire gamb1ing profits from Rodriguez's concerns 
continued, during his cabinet crisis in October 1931, Rubio was 
suo,jenly more lenient. The AB.W. Gambling Casino at Mexica1i 
v,,1 as again opened for business on October 1 . More f avorab 1 e 
concession terms were extended by the Government. On the 
same date, tr1e competing four small er gamb 1 i ng concessions 
that had been extended during the past month to 1 oca l sa 1 oons 
\Nere revoked and the gambling in these was suppressed. Each 
concession was required to pay $250 per~ day in taxes. All of 
triis gave monopoly control to the AB.vl. Casino. In addition, 
'.27~~.AUS 812.00 Lower Califomia/83, Report for August, September 
1931, Ree1 13 
:=:::r-~.AUS 81200 Lower California, Octot,er 14, 1931, Peel 13 
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Cr1apter II: Rodr\guez and National Politics 
From 1930-32 e><-governor Rodriguez moved into tr1e 
inner circles of government in Mexico City in conjunction with 
his politica1 partnership with Genera1 Cal1es. As ear1y as 
January 30, 1932 Genera1 Rodr\guez was being groomed for tr1e 
Pre~idency of Mexico. During this period, 1eading politicians 
and Cabinet ministers in Mexico City were in a power strugg1e 
revolving around the domrnant po1itical figure Calles and the 
upcoming Presidentia1 election in 1934. Rodriguez 
co i 1 at.orat e1j with Ca 11 es against the po 1itica1 intrigue of 
President Ortiz Rubio and his al1ies as each side strove to 
form ai 1 iances in an effort to shift the ba1ance of power at the 
nat1onai level. 
Cabinet Crisis 
President Rubio counted on four active generals in his 
Cati met, .Juan Andreu A 1 mazan, Joaquin .Amaro, Lazaro Cardenas 
and Saturnino Cedil1o, to back him against any dissent from 
otr1er leg is 1 at i ve and Party 1 eaders. However, Rubio was 
concerned that War Minister Amaro was trying to usurp his 
presidential powers. Like his secretary Chazaro, Rubio 
be1ieved Amaro cou1d take sides with Calles against rnm lf 
necessary.1 Calles also thought General Amaro was becoming 
c1ictatorial but rn oppostion to Calles.2 In addition 
') r""") 
LL 
Comm urn cations Mini st er Almazan, felt Ca 11 es had robbed him 
of much of his glory and that Calles allies Perez Trevino and 
Carlos Riva Palacio were conspiring for the presidency. 3 .AJ l 
of this political intrigue led to a radical cabinet change in 
October 1931 w1tr1 ex-governor Rodriguez siding with Calles 
against .Amaro. 
During events leading to the Cabinet crisis, General 
Cai les. 1-1ad sent for General Rodriguez in September, wr10 was 
tr1en in i ow er California attend mg to his private bus messes. 
Lt. Miguel R Navarett, who was m charge of the Mi 1 itary radio 
station in Ensenada, stated that when Rodriquez arrived in 
Mexico City General Calles, " had his bags packed, ready to 
,jepart," i no 1 cat i ng that a very serious pol it i ca 1 condition 
prevailed in ~1e><1co City at the time of his arrival and it was a 
cl ear rnf erence that General Rodriguez was instrumental in 
clarifying tr1e situation."4 Sr. Miguel Gandara, one of General 
Roar1guez's closest friends and a partner in a number of the 
Genera 1 's Lower Ca 1 if orn i a enterprises, said Rodriguez had 
communicated to him from Mexico City that Rubio was being 
1'"'1ohn F.'v'I Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 CAustin: University of Texas Press .. 1961 ), p 522-527. 
2~~AUS 812.00 Lower Cal ifornia/91, Smale, November 10, 1931. Reel 
13. 
:'.'.John F.W Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p 522-527. 
4NA.US 812.00/29744, Smale, August 5, 1932, Reel 2 
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dominated by General Amaro especially in recent months. At 
the ~.ame time the press reported that General Ca1 les was 
about to depart for the United States for health reasons.'.:· 
Calles was leery about leaving the country with Rubio in 
charge and Amaro on the move. Calles wanted Rodriguez in a 
Cabinet position to represent his interests wh i 1 e he was 
absent from Mexico City. 
General Amaro challenged Rodriguez's authority in the 
Northern District as part of his offensive against the 
Calles/Rodriguez partnersh1p Coronel Cortez, Commanding 
Officer of the Military forces at Ensenada reported that 
or1;ianized agrarians in the district were a threat and that 
.A.maro military men r1ad been lending very active support to 
tr1e organized agrar·1 an movement.t. Thus, one of the ob J ect i ves 
of Rodriguez's trip to Mexico City was to settle the agrarian 
troub 1 es created by Amaro in the Northern District. 
In addition, Gandara told Rodriguez that Coronel Aleman 
Vazquez, Commanding Officer of the Military forces at Tijuana 
r·1ad reported General Rodriguez's every movement to Amaro. 
Tr1at General Rodriguez and General Amaro were not friendly 
·vvas common knowledge. One reason was Amaro's opposition to 
Rodriguez as a cabinet appointee following the 1929 Escobar 
insurrection. Another reason was Rodriguez's friendship with 
13 
SNA.U~· e12.00 Lower California.191, Smale, November 10, 1931, Reel 
61bid. 
Ca 11 es. Whether the dislike for each other antedated General 
.A.rnarc.'s opposition to his appointment to the cabinet was not 
known 7 
24 
In connection with the agrarian issue, the question was 
raised as to why Baja California Governor Tejada, a Rodriguez 
appointee, had taken no action to suppress the agrar1 ans in the 
Northern District. Military and civil authorities had been 
opposed to each other rn the District and Tejada as a c iv1 l i an 
vvas povverless to correct the agrarian situation which was 
being fostered by General Arnaro. Rodriguez had tried to 
rernam inconspicuous during the Tejada rule, neither siding 
\A/~tr1 the Military or the Governor but Amaro had forced hirn to 
step in. c 
Frorn Mexico City Rodriguez hinted that the agrarian 
troubles, were not confined to Lower Cal if ornia. The Mexico 
City press of October 5, 1931 reported that four Mexican 
state·~ r1ad proposed the creation of a vast reserve arrny arnong 
the carnpe~. mos, which if extended to the entire Republic would 
furnish a reserve arrny of sorne 500,000 persons. Therefore, 
Rodriguez wanted to rernove a very serious local threat against 
tr1e Calles national faction. 9 
The Rodriguez/Calles faction asserted its power and 
tr1urnphed over A.rnaro and Rubio at the national level. The 
71 tnd 
31 t>id 
?Ibid. 
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L..., 
outcome of the Cabinet crisis was the resignation of the four 
'Jenerais, w1tr1 Ca11es becoming Minister of War and Rodr\guez 
taking over as Undersecretary on October 14, 1 931. On January 
20.1932 further cabinet changes e1iminated Montes de Oca 
(Finance), Genero Estrada <Foreign Re1ations), and Aaron Saenz 
(I naustry, Commerce, and Labor), three part i cu1 ar1y 1oya1 to 
Rub 1 o. Rodriguez became the new Mini st er of Industry, 
C ornmerce and Labor which p 1 aced Ca 11 es and Rodriguez in key 
Cat; in et positions. 1 o 
.A. De 1 iberate Path To The Presidency 
Rodriguez's objective was the presidency, not a key 
CatJrnet post. In May 1932, Genera1 Rodriguez stated that he 
vvould not be the Secretary of Commerce for 1ong, that he 
w 1 sr·1ed to 1 ay the foundation for cert a in changes in the 1 ab or 
1aws, inc1uding a four peso minimum wage, and wou1d be 
prepared to 1 eave the work mg out of detai 1 s to a successor. He 
vvanted to return North to his commerci a 1 enterprises because 
he ·wa5. disgusted with po11tics. But when asked what he wou1d 
do if it was decided that the country needed him in the 
Pres 1 dency, he rep 1 i ed: "you a 1 ready know (the answer) "11 
l')John F.W. Dulles, Yesterday m Mexico A Chronicle of tr1e Revolution 
1919-1936(Austin University of Texas Press, 1961) .. p. 527. 
11 t·MUS 812.00/29744, Smale, August 5, 1932, Reel 2. 
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Gener·al Rodriguez could have returned to the governorship of 
n-·,e Northern Territory but his attitude was that if he could not 
occupy a high position in Mexico City he would simply remain 
an officer in the Mexican Army and concentrate his efforts to 
further his private interests in Lower Califor·nia. 12 
The next rung on the ladder for Rodriguez was Minister of 
War Ca 11 es had been absent for a month during the spring of 
1932 \Nhen, as his second wlf e's health was fai 1 ing fast, he 
took twr to Boston. Upon his return to Mexico, since neither his 
01Nn health nor r11s vvlf e's would permit him to run the War 
r~1 in i stry, he dee i ded to resign and suggested Abe 1 ardo 
Roar1quez, Pedro Almada or Andres Figuera as a replacement. 
Pedro .. J Almada described the trip made to inform President 
Rub10. He was in the car with Rodriguez, to whom he remarked: 
"You'11 be Minister of War. But what crazy chance made 
F 110ueroa and me opponents'? They cou 1 dn 't have chosen worse 
opponents. I think tr1is was something that was planned so as 
to r1ave you grouped with some of us who would not outshine 
you." .A 1 mada goes on to say that "Abe 1 ardo 1 aughed, but my 
prophecy came true." Calles told Ambassador Puig Casauranc 
not only to advise the President of his decision to resign from 
tr·1e "liar Min1str'y, but also, not to leave his study, "even lf it 
l2~MUS 812.00 Lower California/91, Smale, November 10, 1931, Reel 
13 
13John F.W. Dulles, Vesterdav m Mexico. A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1 919-1 936 (Aust m Un1vers i ty of Texas Press, 1 961 ), p. 233. 
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took hours to convince him," unti1 Rubio agreed to make 
Rodriguez the next War Minister. In five minutes Ortiz Rubio 
agreed to his appointment.13 Within somewhat more than a 
year General Rodriguez's military rank had been raised from 
Sub-Secretary of War to Secretary of Commerce, Industry and 
Labor, and f rna 11 y Secretary of War. 
Already at that time, rumors circulated that Rodriguez 
wa~. berng groomed for the Presidency. In June 1932, three 
rnonths before Pub i o resigned, Sr. A.1 berto V. Aldrete, Genera 1 
Manager of the C1s. Mexicana de1 Agua Ca1 iente, S.A attended a 
gatr1errng in r1onor of General Juan Andreu Almazan with ten 
high-ranking generals in the Mexican Army. He told U.S 
Consular Smale that General A1mazan had given a toast which 
enoed t)y saying, " I would 1 i ke you gentlemen to drink with me 
a toast to the next President of the Repub 1 i c, ,Abe 1ardo."14 
\'v'lth the completion of the first three years of the six-
year presidential term to which murdered General Obregon had 
tJeen elected, a change in the presidency of the Pepub 11 c did not 
require triat a Substitute Pres1 dent be f o 11 owed in office by 
an o tr1 er Const it u t i on a 1 Pres l dent pop u 1 a r l y chosen in a spec i a 1 
election. Late in 1930 1egis1ators had fixed this matter by 
amending Const itut i ona 1 Art i c 1 e 84. It was now poss i t 1 le under 
14N.A.US 812 00/29744, Srnale, August 5, 1932, Reel 2. 
the Constitution, for Congress simply to name an Interim 
President to complete the term. 1: 
Calles forced Rubia's resignation on August 22, 1932 
after a hospita1 administrator scandal. In an obvious 
28 
cone i 11 atory move, President Rubio sought to name as head of 
the F edera 1 District, Genera 1 Jose Mari a Tapia. Instead, 
General Tapia and Llc F.J. Gaxio1a were sent to notify Rubio of 
Ca11es' dec1~.1on not to support him further. Calles did seek 
o:upport from Genera1 A.mar·o on his decision and .Amaro 
agr-·ee(J 1 c Now the door was open for Rodriguez to move from 
tr·1e catirnet to the presidency. 
Likewise, Rodriguez remained in control in the Northern 
Di strict. He inf 1 uenced the rep 1 acement of Te Jada w lth 
Genera 1 o 1 acr·1ea as governor on November 7, 1 931. With 
c! 1 acr1ea as head of the m 11 itary and c iv11 government and 
t)acked by Rodriguez, the agrarian problem promised to be 
reso1ved soon. 01achea governed unti1 August 16, 1932 when 
Governor Arturo M. E 1 i as came on board. The appointment of a 
pers.on c 1 ose to ex-President Ca 11 es as Governor was seen as a 
po 1ltica1 move to 1 ine-up the Territory we 11 in advance of the 
approaching 11ex i can president i a 1 e 1 ect ions. The hope \A/as that 
Governor E1ias, who was fami1iar with border conditions, 
\A/Ould be as S'/mpathetic \Nith the efforts to improve this vast 
15,Jor1r1 F.'d Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico. A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 533. 
lCltiid, p 538 
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and undeveloped region as r1as been his predecessor in office. 17 
However, Genera 1 O 1 achea was reappointed Governor of tr1e 
~~orthern Distrct as soon as Rodriguez replaced Rubio in the 
Presidency a few weeks later. 15 
Rodriguez had run Baja California as governor for over 
six years From January 1 930 unt i 1 September 1 932, six 
cr1anges took p 1 ace in the governorship. Rodr\ guez inf 1 uenced 
each change. He remained the Strong Man of the Northern 
D1str1ct protecting his business interests as he moved on to 
U1e Pre·31 dency. 
1-;-
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17NAUS 2, 12 00 Lower Cal iforn1a/91, Smale, November 1 O, 1931, Reel 
18NA.IJS 812.00/29792, No. 1851, R Clark, September~ 9, 1932, Reel 
Ill: Northern Politician in Mexico City: Rodr1guizmo 
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From the outset of his presidency, Rodriguizmo existed 
an•j wouid distinguish itself from the Maximato as Rodr1guez's 
term in off ice progressed. The new interim President of 
Mexico brougr1t strong adm ini st rat ive ski 11 s to Me xi co City as 
witnessed by r1is impressive accomplishments as governor in 
BaJa California and as a cabinet minister. Both the Mexican 
Pre:s and U.S. D1p1 omats a ck now 1edged these sk 111 s which 
added immediate prestige to his office. In addition, his 
favorable dea1rngs with the US. as a northern politician 
carTiea over to his presidency. Most importantly, his border 
experience greatly influenced his national policies as he 
orche:, trated tr1e soc1a1 and economic reconstruction or Me xi co. 
Tr1e culmination, Rodriguizmo, was not supplanted by either 
tr"1e belier:. or the Maximato or Cardenismo. 
Accolades as an Administrator 
U.S. Diplomats and the Mexican Press recognized 
Rodriguez's administrative skills from the beginning. The PNR 
da11y newspaper, El Nacional, as we11 as the Excels10r, El 
Universal and La Prensa unanimously praised the character and 
ab 11 i ty or tr1e new President: "Rodr1 guez is an ab 1 e 1 eader, a 
cap ab le businessman and honest." i Excelsior, Sept 5, 1 932 
1~eported: 
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"Ever s rnce General Rodriguez d1 st i ngu1 shed hi mse 1 f 
notably in the Government of the Northern District of 
Lower Cal lf orn i a, we r1ave thought tr1at we had a citizen 
who was of good administrative timber; a man of action, 
of clear and calm Judgment, a champion of law and order; 
a man who says little, but who gives real significance to 
what he does sa)i, as if they were al ready accomp 11 shed 
facts, an enemy of vain promises and of delusions ... He 
is, above a 11 e 1 se, a man of action and of great enterpr1 se 
1 ook mg to rndustri a 1 and econorn i c i mprovernent. .. is 
seen in his first statements to the press after tak mg 
office as President of the Reput111 c: I dee l are that I sha 11 
make every effort possible and necessary to comply 
with my duties, constituting a serious national 
Government, in vvh i ch there will be unity of action and 
which will bring confidence and tranquility to the 
Republic, in order that all sections of the country may 
devote themselves to their labors, thereby attaining the 
economic reconstruction and development of the Nation." 
Tr1e Press gave prominence to his statements that he intended 
to 1jevote himself to work and thus set an example for the 
:·,1e:x:1can people:? 
In contrast to tr1is positive press, Rodriguez attracted 
little public attention during his first months in office. In 
September 1932, Rodriguez remained in Mexico City and 
devoted himself to his administrative duties, maintaining a 
lovv profile with both the public and the d1plornatic corps. He 
spent long hours at the National Palace working quietly and 
1 ~JAUS, f, 12 00/29793, ~~o 1845, R. Clark, Septemt1er '.::', 1 932, Ree 1 ~. 
'.:'r'-J.A.US 812 00/29792, t'Jo 1851, R. Clark, September~ 9, 1932 .. Reel 2 
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serious. ly, and very seldom made speeches or gave statements 
to U-·1e press 3 Instead, Pres i ,jent Rodriguez focused on runn mg 
hi·:; a1jministrat1on, implementing his social and economic 
po 11 c i es., and genera 1 ly setting Rodr1 guezmo into motion. 
Us. diplomats also felt confident of Rodriguez's 
leadership. As early as January 1933, the U.S. Military Attache 
in 11ex1co observed: "General Rodriguez is doing a good JOb as 
President and is assuming more and more the responsib1lit1es 
and decisions., wr11ch were formerly left to General Calles 
,jur·rng the Ortiz Rubio a1jm in 1st ration 4 .A.nd U.S. Ambassador 
Reuben Cl ark reported that the peso had strengthened with 
Rodriguez, ind1 cat ing tr1e confidence in him in f i nanc i a 1 
c ire less and that the po 11 cy of tr1e United Stat es was one of 
cor 1j1al friendsr1ip6 Wi 11 iam A Smale, American Consul in 
BaJ a. consistent 1 y praised Rodriguez, stating that "The 
President has impressed me as being a person intensely 
courageous in his convictions. "7 Such praise by U.S. diplomats 
inclicate U-1at U.S.-Mexican relations were favorable. They 
knevv tr1ey could work successfully with Rodriguez JUSt as 
.A.rnerican t1usrnessmen had done wr11le he was governor of Baja 
3~J.A.US 812.00/29792, No. 1851, R Clark, September 9, 1932, Reel 2. 
Also NAU'.:, 812 00129799, No. 1959, R Clark, General Political Report. 
C:>c tober 20, 1 932, Reel 2 
4N.AUS 8 12.00/29828, Robert E. Cummings, Acting Mi 1 i tary Attache. G-
2 Report. '-January 1 933, Reel 2 
=·t'1.AUS 812.00/29792, No 1851, R. Clark, September 9, 1932, Reel 2. 
6N,A.US 812.00/29793, No. 1845·, R Clark, September 5, 1932, Reel 2 
7NA.US 812 00/29937, Smale, October 1933, Reel 2. 
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California. He had an established reputation as a capable 
adm in i ::,trator and for positive dea 1 ings with the United States. 
Sma 1 e a 1 so reported tr1at Rodriguez spoke with 
directness and candor, espec i a 11 y in a statement he made in 
Ensenada in the fal 1 of 1931: 
"I thought that during my tr·ip abroad (to various 
European countr1 es) I wou 1 d find some country in a 
worse condition than ours. I was disappointed; we are 
1ower than any one of triem, and we \Ni11 continue to t)e 
the 1 owest country on earth unt i 1 there is e 1ected as the 
Pre:: 1 aent of our Re pub 1 ic a person chosen by the peop 1 e, 
\Nr10 vvi11 govern honestly and fear1ess1y and not with a 
vievv to enriching himse1f and about 200 of his closest 
friends." E 
Of course, Rodriguez was not chosen by the people, nor did he 
break vv itr1 the Mexican patronage system of enriching hi mse 1f 
and r1 i s co 11 ab orators w h i 1 e he \V as in power. st i 11 , r1 e was 
couraqeous in his convictions to run his administration 
1ndependent1y of the Maximato. 
U.S. Inf 1 uence on Rodriguez 
In ad,jition to r1is administrative ski11s, Rodriguez 
brought both his procapita1ist economics and his New Deal 
po 1 lt i cs to Mexico city from r11 s U.S. border experience. As a 
po1itician r1e envisioned soc1a1 reform and an economic system 
3r·~i\US 812.00 Lower California. Smale, .August 1932, Reel 13 
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like the United States. William A Smale, American Consul in 
BaJ a, assessed Rodr\ guez: "From conversations which I r1ave 
1-1ad with General Rodriguez, upheld by others who know r1im 
we 11, I have cone l uded that he a 1 most passionate 1y desires for 
Mexico a system of Government in practice as we 11 as theory 
as nearly possible 1 ike tr1at of the Federal Government of the 
United States. "9 
Rodriguez's minimum wage plan to boost consumption by 
the masses and generate more interna 1 i ndustri a 1 i zat ion and 
agr1cu1tura1 proauct1on was s1m11ar to President Roosevelt's 
New Deal policies with it's 'trickle up' philosophy. Likewise, 
Rodriguez so 1 icited vo 1 untary cooperation from his 
industrialists Just as Rooseve 1t received from his U.S. 
:n 1Justr·1al an 1J agricultural enterpr1ses.10 In return for their 
cooperation, President Rodriguez sought to assist capita 1 by 
c ontro 11 i ng 1 a ti or through government arbitration. His mixed 
economic phi 1 osophy app 11 ed his procap ital ism to a country 
vv 1 tr1out pr1 vate capita 1 by st i mu 1 at mg industry trwough both 
pr1 vate and pub 1 i c funding. This phi 1 osophy a 1 so p 1 aced 
Rodriguez squarely in the m1da1e between Ca11es and Cardenas. 
Ca11es was strictly procapita1 supporting the "trickle down" 
trieory whi 1e Cardenas was a radical social reformer who 
strongly supported labor over capital. 
·?~J.AUS 812 00/29937, Smale, October 1933, Reel 2. 
1 Or~A.US 812.5041 /57, W1ll1arn Cochran, .American Vice Consul, ,August 
29. 1933. l~c, 541. Reel 58 
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Rodriguez also had r11s own brand of agricultural reform 
1Nr11ch comt)ined small private ownership within communal land 
distribution. This was unlike both Calles' model which 
promoted large commercial land ownership, and Cardenas who 
favored non-privatized communa 1 1 and di stri but ion. 
President Rodriguez was influenced by r1is U.S. neighbor· 
beyond economic po 1 i c1 es. He believed in separation of Churcr1 
ancJ State. He f e 1 t that public education contributed strongly 
tc\ the cr1osen sys tern of po 1 it i cs and he supported a form of 1 ay 
educ at 1 on wh1 ch corresponded to a country ruled by a l i bera 1 
and democratic pol lt 1ca1 constitution like tr1e United States. 
In d 1 rec t contrast, Ca 1 i es and Cardenas both favored "soc i a ii st 
education," Ca 11 es as a means to contro 1 the Catho 1 i c Church 
ancJ Cardenas as a strong e 1 ement of his soci a 1 reform po 1 icy. 
Finally, Rodriguizmo was interested in tr1e development 
cf .A.meri can f ootba 11 and he provided f inanci a 1 support bringing 
tvvo .A.merican co11ege f ootbal 1 teams to play the National 
University of l"'lex i co In addition, Rodriguez di sp 1 ayed a strong 
interest in tr1e development of Mexican athletics in qeneral. He 
issued an Executive Order in October 1 932 creating a Nati ona 1 
Federation of .Athletics and had a council made up of 
represent at iv es of the /"'Ii n i stri es of Education and War, the 
F edera 1 District and tr1e PNR 11 
11 ~·J.A.US 812 00/29799, No 19:;,9, R Clark, General Pc,11t1cal Report, 
Octot,er 20. 1 932, Reel 2 
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Cr1apte1- I\/: Rodriguez vs. Ca 11 es: Wr10 Ran the Governrnent? 
At;e l ardo Rodr 1 guez rn it i ally agreed to be Genera 1 Ca 11 es· 
interim P1~esident with the fundamental mission to keep the 
Pt·~P unified, provide political stability and peacefully hand off 
the next presidency to tr1e cr1osen PNP candidate. In exchange 
for loyalty to Calles until the next presidential election rn 
1 934, Pcdr i guez was granted adm rn i st rat ive control to proceed 
v1..1itr1 the social and economic reconstruction of the country rn 
tr1 e t w o ye a rs a 11 o t e d to r1 i m. Because Pod r i g u e z d i d not r1 ave 
r1is O\Nn po1itical base, this necessitated his relationship or 
"partnersr11p" \11/ith Ca1les. Their common accord was to leave 
the po 1 it i cs to Ca 11 es an1j the adm in i strati on of the government 
to Podr i 1~uez i In rea 1 lty, tr·1ey were each involved in both 
realms . 
. At tr1e beginning of the Rodriguez presidency, Cal Jes was 
preoccup i e1j w lth family and health concerns. His wife d1 ed rn 
r~ o v e rn be r 1 9 3 2 and ca 11 es, h i s o \/\/ n he a l th not good, cont i nu e d 
to r-esicJe almost continuously rn Cuernavaca2 Calles felt r1e 
1Nas leaving the Go\;ernment in safe, capable hands with 
Rodriguez.:'. As a result, Rodriguez had the opportunity to 
take tr1e control of his administration into his own hands as 
1,.John V/F Du1les, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austm University of Texas Press, 1961), p 573. 
2~~AUS 81 2 00/29326, No. 2293, General Poli ti cal Report, February 
16, 1933, Reel 2 
3~~AUS 81200/29805, Robert E. Cummings, Captain, Infantry, .Acting 
r~1111tary Attacr1e, Sept 17, 1932. Reel 2. 
\Nell as become more involved with political issues as his 
term in off ice proceeded His first objective vvas to isolate 
both Calles and the military, the power brokers of the 1920s, 
from day to day contro 1 of his government. Gradually he 
disarmed Ca 11 es with successful countertact i cs and p 1 aced 
r1imself fully in tr1e leadership role. 
President Rodr\guez's first problem was the reporting 
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i s·::ue. Podr i guez r1ad d 1f f i culty be mg f u 11 y respected because 
General Calles was generally referred to as tr1e "Jefe f'·1a:x.imo 
ae lc. Revoluci6n" beginning w1tr1 tr1e Rubio administration. 
Tl11s title, wr1ich was not very r1elpful to the prestige of the 
presi1jency, was attributed to Luis L. Leon, tr1e El lv3c1onal 
manager. .A.ct iv it i es seemed to confirm the tit 1 e. The press 
reported important commissions first ca 11 rng on the " . )ef e 
1·1a:x:irno" and peri-1aps tr1en calling on the President. The 
Cat)inet in May 1931, adopted a resolution prohibiting members 
of the Administration from consulting with Cal.les unless so 
ordered by the President Hovvever, there \A/as a lack of 
comp 1 i ance with any such agreement during the Rubio 
adrnmistr·ation . ....) 
A.s soon as Rodr\guez took off ice he sent around a 
c i rcu 1 a1~ to his cabinet members in an attempt to cha 11 enge the 
report mg issue. He wanted to deve 1 op a new i rnage of the 
Presidency. In dire ct contrast to the system of 'acuerdos 
4 '"Johr1 \/l.F. Dulles, 'r'esterdav in Mexico. A Cr1ronicle of the Revolution 
1 9 1 9- 1 9 3 6 ( Aust rn U r1 i v er s i t y of Te x as Pr es s, 1 9 6 1 ) , p 5 2 1 - 2 2 
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colectivos' which had been established by Ortiz Rubio, 
Pre·; 1 dent Rodriquez made it c 1 ear that he d1 d not consider his 
Cabinet to be a group of persons collectively responsible for 
tr1e Adrn in i strati on. Tr·1e Chief Executive, said Rodriguez, was 
the bearer of the executive power. In a circular of November 
1932, he pointed out to his ministers, attorneys general and 
department heads that "the po 1itica1 Constitution of February 
5, 191 7, frankly es tab 11 sr1es the president i a 1 reg1 me of the 
i]overnment" and he vvent on to show that the President is 
con st itut 10na 1 ly author1 zed "to name and free 1 y remove r1 is 
ministers," and is "irnplicitly responsible for each and all of 
the act·:; which the different dependenc1es of the executive 
power deve1op." General Rodriguez told r1is subordinates that 
a 11 important matters shou 1 d first be submitted to his 
consideration, so that "it sha 11 be the President who di rec ts 
and or1 ent s tr1e po 11 cy of the government in the different 
realms of pub1ic administration which constitutiona1ly are 
'ncumbent on him." He conc1uded his circu1ar with these 
·vvcirds: "P1ease acknowled 1~e receipt"'=· This was his first 
c r1 a 11 en g e to the 1 e g it i mac y of the J e f e Max i rn o and the 
11ax1mato. 
:;. I t' 1 d , p 5 4 7 
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Problems With Pani 
In spite of such directives, problems remained. There 
\Nere ongoing problems of insubordination with Alberto Pani, 
the 1~1inister of Finance due to both professional differences of 
opmion and Pani's consu1tmg with Calles inspite of 
PocJr1guez's orders. lnltia11y, Podriguez supported Pani. First 
r1e stepped into a dispute between the Comptro 11 er Genera 1 ship 
Rafael A.guirre 1·1anJarrez an1j Pani. In claiming duplication of 
vvork and abo 1 i sh i n1j the Comptro 11 er Generalship, the functions 
cf U-·1e Comptr'C:;, 11 ersr1 i p were absorbe,j by tr1e Pub 1 i c Hae i enda. e. 
A. b 111 \Nas presented to Congress by President Rodrf guez and 
Pan 1 in October 1 932 an,j became effective January 1 1 933. 7 
Ne;.:t, a conflict between Education Minister Narciso Basso ls 
::rnci Pani over tr1e control of the construction of the Palacio de 
Be 11 as Art es became into 1 erab le in A.ugust 1 933. Rodriguez 
a·~a rn ru 1 e·j in favor of Pan i. E 
However, st-iort 1y thereafter, Rod1-1 guez and Pan i c 1 ashed 
over funciamental differences in opinion over economic pol icy. 
Wr1ile Podriguez was getting tr1e Labor Law amended to include 
~r-. 
/ 1 •• J 
t I t) id , p 5 48 
7NAIJ'"' n1~c;1''.-.,90R11-1-L f///r7"·-rc;::;;7 Cie--1--t-1- 17 103~ R--1 ' . :-, :::> 0 , .:'... ~ / I C· , , , ~ Cl r·,, - r I \! t' - c1 , Lt' II 1 t' , , L., t' t' 
?Jol-ir-1 w.F Dulles, Yester-dav rn 1·1exico A G1ror11c le of trie Revolution 
1 919-1936 (Austrn Ur11vers1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 552 He ordered 
tr1at tr1e Pa lac 10 would be turned over to the Education r1inistry only after the 
'.::rx1Strur:t1on vvo1-k was completed. Basso ls tr1reatened to r-esign t1ut instead ag1-eed 
tc. go on an official trip to trie United States to purcr1ase in,justrial scriool 
macr11nery, returning for tr1e opening of Congress on September 1, 1933 
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minimum wages on Septmember 12, 1933, Pani in an informa1 
vis.it to Ca11es discussed his be1ief that Rodr1guez's pet 
project and persona1 campaign for minimum wages was not the 
so1ut1on for the masses. He fe1t that increasing the workers' 
purchasing power, as distinct from nomina1 sa1aries, ·was the 
answer.9 Wr1en President Rodr1guez returned to Mexico City on 
September 27 from a meeting with Ca1 les, he instructed his 
private secretary Li c. Ga xi o 1 a, without consu1t i ng Ca 11 es, to 
obtain the resignation of the Finance Minister at once. Calles 
haij te1ephoned from Tehuacan stopping pub1 ication of news in 
the pr·ess w ltr1 a view to reconc i 1 iat ion. President Ro 1jr1 guez 
was reputeij to have said that he wou1d to1erate no 
interference in this matter and that he was "no Ortiz Rubio." 1 o 
Ca 11 es c 1 aimed he had not knovvn about the resignation 
request when Rodr1guez 1eft their meeting, and that the step 
haij been a surprise to him. Ca 11 es agreed to accept the Finance 
Mini st er position until the Pres l dent named a permanent 
1·1in1ster on .January 1, 1934. Rodr1guez, rea1izing the enormous 
break r1e had made \<\!1th Ca 11 es, inv lted Ca 11 es to rep 1 ace Pan i 
rn a cone i 11 atory rnove. i~onethe 1 ess, Rodr1 guez had prevai 1 ed 
over Calles. The message was that if Calles wanted to run the 
Puti1ic Hacienda, he wou1d need to do so as Minister. Not 
'Ni 11 i ng to serve as Rodriguez's cabinet mini st er, Ca 11 es agreed 
91t1id' p 554 
1 oi·j,AUS 812.00/29926, ,J Daniels, September 29, 1933, Reel 2 
to be only a temporary replacement. Rodriguez was able to 
place a man of r1is ovvn choosing in the position. 
President Rodriguez had also been displeased witr1 
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cr1 tic ism by Pan i's son wr10 had stated that the President was 
not governing the country but triat Calles was the real ruler.11 
Rodriguez exp 1 a med the resignation resu 1 ted because it was 
not right for Pani to continue occupying a post of confidence 
clo'.:.e to the President \Nhen his son was criticizing the 
Pres i ijent 's soc i a 1 manners and affirming that the Finance 
rv1in1ster did not recognize the authority of the President nor 
r·esolve with him the business of his office.12 
Nonetheless, Foreign .Affairs Minister Puig told U.S 
.Ambassador Josephus Danie 1 s tr1at the rea 1 reason why Pan i 
vvas asked to resign was tr1at his views on economic and fiscal 
policies were 1j1ametrica11y opposite to those of President 
Rodr1 quez. 13 F rnance Ministry profess i ona 1 s 11 ke Pan1 were 
eijucated in Europe. They were guided by the laws of economy, 
finance and e\'.Change rates. The po 1 i c1 es of the Mexican 
Presidents in the 1930s, whether conservative or radical, 
1Nere ba=.ed rncreas i ng ly on non-po 1itica1 patterns of capita 1 i st 
financing and budgeting.14 
1 l~~AUS 812 00/29927, '-J. Daniels, September 29, 1933, Reel 2. 
12Jol-ir1 'v'v' F Dulles, Yesterday in Me:".ico A G1ronicle of tr1e Revolution 
1919-1 936 CA.us t rn University of Texas Press, 1 961 ), p 554 
l 3NAUS 812.00/29927, J. Daniels, September 29, 1933, Reel 2 
1"1F1-e·j1-icr1 Scr1uler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt Me.x_1can 
Foreign Pol icy in the Age of Lazaro Cardenas ( l 934-40)(University of New 
f'1ex1co Press, 1998) 
Other Prob l er(ls of Authority 
4 '":) L 
AJ triougr1 tr1e agr·eement between Ca 11 es and Rodriguez 
vva2. to leave politics to Calles and the administration of the 
government to Rodriguez, a clear cut division of power was 
difficult if not impossible to adhere to as long as the 
strongrnan's collaborators continued to consult witr1 him. A. 
·y'ear after r1is initial circular, Rodriguez again asked his 
Cabinet to abstain from consulting Calles. On September 27, 
a!ong vvitr1 the Pani resignation, General Rodriguez sent a 
strong directive to his colleagues which had already been 
sr1own to Cali es. Rodriguez observed that ministers of state 
and department heads frequent 1 y consulted Ca 11 es about 
matter~. related to the adrn in i strati on of the goverment 's 
e><ecut i ve tiranch. The members of his government should 
abstain from calling on Calles. Rod1~1guez said r1e would not 
retain an appointee who felt the President was rncapable of 
directing tr-'1e put,il1c administration. If any colleague wanted to 
knovv the opinion of Calles about administrative questions, he 
cou 1 d 1 earr, of it trwough tr·1e President 1 s 
It was a continuous struggle. Following this directive, 
President Rodriguez had problems of dis l oya 1 ty fr·om r1 is 
Secretary of Education, Li c. Narciso Ba2.so ls. In pursuing the 
PNR socialist educational reform, Bassols was attacked in the 
15'-John \/IF. Dulle::., Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolutior1 
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 555 
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press for being a radical. These attacks became so strong U-1at 
rn Decernber 1933 the Presi(jent issued a statement which 
1jef ended the Secretary and expressed his support for 
Bassols.1 c On 11ay 9, 1934 urnverslty agitation rnade it 
necessary to shift Basso ls to another but higher ranking post, 
U-1at of 1'1i n1 s ter of Gobernac i 6n. However, sl1ort l y thereafter, 
Ba~. sols consu 1 ted w i tr1 Ca 11 es and Cardenas without 
perrn i ss ion from Rodriguez and tr1en at a Cabinet meeting w i tr1 
Pcdrl~1uez urge(j r1irn to take rnore drastic measures against the 
Cr1urct-1. Rodriguez ref used and Basso ls resigned, forced out by 
Podr·1,~uez for r11s disloyalty.11 Bassols had also acted a 1~ainst 
tr1e inte1-ests of President Rodriguez wr1en he proposed tr1e 
clo·srng cf tr1e recently inaugurated, Casino de la Selva en 
Cuffnavaca and tr1e F or·e i gn Club in the cap lta 1. 1 E· 
In a letter of E:)l:-Pres i dent Ro1jri guez wr1 tten late rn 
r·/1arc1-1 1936, Rodriguez tried to Justify Calles' role in 
a1Jrn1n1strat1\/e affairs: 
"Ca 11 es po rnte1J out to rne that he intervened on 1 y in 
those matters vvt1ere he was consulted, 'vVhich ·was 
perfectly true. Never when I was at the head of the 
government did he make any hint that I could interpret 
as the slightest indication that such and such a thing 
t'e done. It was the politicians and one or another of 
16~J.A.US 812 00/29826, ~40 2293, General Political Report, February 
16, 1934. Reel 2 
17~Jor1n '0/F Dulles, Yesterdav in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1 919-1 936 (Au::.t in University of Texas Press, 1 961 ), p. 560-61 
L'>Lorenzo Meyer, H1storia De La Revoluci6n Me.xicana 1928-1934 Vol 
12. Los lnicios Dt- La lnstitucionalizacion La Pol1tica Del Maximato (Mexico City 
El Coleg10 De Mexico, 1978), p 178 
rny collaborators who grovellingly requested his 
orders and are respons i b 1 e for the present situation of 
the General .. To Leon, General Calles owes the title 
of " Max i rn o " . . . I n rn y op rn i on it i s Le 6 n w r1 o t-1 as 
ind i sputab 1 y hurt the pub 1 i c character of Ca 11 es the 
rnost."19 
Podri guez b 1 arned Ca 11 es' co 11 aborators for tr1e i r 
d i s 1 o ya lt y t c r·1 irn r a tr1 er t ha n ca 11 es h i rn s e lf. Pod rig u e z 
admittedly consulted Ca 11 es frequently, and although Ca bi net 
members. 'vvere not suppose to cal 1 on Calles, he could ca11 on 
tr1er-i-1. In 0U-1er words, no matter what demands Rodriguez 
placed on his Cabinet rnembers, Calles remained a powerful 
autr1ority ber1ind tr1e presidency. However, Rodriguez's 
irnportant countertact i c was to increasingly rep 1 ace Ca 11 es' 
collaborators in his a1jministration as they challenged his 
po 11 c i es Pan 1 and Basso ls became prominent victims of this 
effort. 
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Tr1e issue vvas e><acerbated because f ore1gn countries 
cont 1 n1_Je1J to see Ca 11 es as the a 11 powerful unofficial 1 eader of 
f"1e::< 1 co. U. S. A.mbassador Josephus Danie 1 s came to Mexico 
·vv i tl1 the vv 1 desprea1j idea that Ca 11 es was the "Iron Man" of 
Me:x:1co. For e:x:ample, in Marcr1 1934 Rodriguez was informed of 
a 1 unch to be given in honor of Josephus Danie 1 s at the home of 
Calles in Cuernavaca. Foreign Minister Puig had already invited 
sorne foreign ambassadors and ministers and Ambassador 
Dan1e1s vvas to present Calles with a letter from President 
q'-John VIF. Dulles, Yesterdav in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Aust in. University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 673 
Roosevelt congratul at mg him on the "peace and growing 
pro·sperity of Me:xico." .After consulting \Nith the President, 
Gaxiola to1ij Fo1~eign l'1inister Puig t1-1at Rodr\guez refused to 
autr1orize him to i~.sue the invitation because Calles "was 
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simply a private citizen." Gener·al Rodriguez then ordered Dr. 
Puig to \Nithdraw the invitations and in the presence of Martes 
Gcimez and Gaxiola, tr1e President pr1oned Calles to let riim 
knovv tr1at if the party took place and if Roosevelt's letter was 
put:i1ciy an1j offically delivered to Calles, he vvould fire Puig 
an cJ any of h i s assoc i ates vv ho attended the fun ct i on. He a 1 so 
\Noula publiciy condemn the attitude of Calle~. and Puig, for he 
cou 1 d not permit his authority to be broken. Ca 11 es agreed to 
ca nee i tr1e 1 unch claim mg i 11 ness and received Roosevelt's 
1 etter pr 1vate1 y. Ca 11 es responded that he was not in any 
concrete government post, but r11s contribution had been 
1jeve I ope1j only a 1 ong I mes of genera 1 cooperation, "i nsp i re1j by 
my past re=.ponsibilities, m/ convictions and political 
commitments, my respect and affection for President 
Rc;dr 1 gue z, and my s rncere esteem for tr1e e:x:emp I ary 
1~overr1ment work wr1icr1 r1e is developing ... " :=:o In otr1er words, 
Ca 11 e·:; ga\1e rn comp 1 ete I y to Rodriguez's demands. 
Some montr1s later Ambassador Daniels, after an 
interview· with General Calles, was quoted in El National as 
calling r11m "tr1e Strong Man of 1"1exico." .Again, President 
Ro1jr \ guez wrote to tr1e Ambassador, exp 1 ai ni ng tr1at 
:2C11 r. · j cc:g ,_.L , p. ~>~'. 
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a1jmin1strative matters were not in the hands of Calles and 
tr1at "\Ne are living uncler a well-organized political regime in 
vvh i c1-1 a 11 (jemocrat i c 1 nst itut ions function norm a 1 ly." .After 
(JescritJing these two incidents Mr. Daniels added that Dr. Puig 
and General Ca 11 es "knevv that the man in Chapul tepee Cast 1 e 
was the President of Mexico. "21 
Controlling the Military 
.A.notr1er powerful faction that required Rodriguez's 
a\jrr1in1strative control was the military. One of former 
Pres11Jent Rubio·~, greatest problems had been his fa1 lure to 
contro1 tr1e military generals vvithin his cabinet which led to 
tr1 e cab i net er 1 s i s and r1 i s event u a l down fa 11. Rod r l g u e z 
addres·3ed tr11s th1~eat from tr1e outset, almost completely 
1jivorc 1 n1~ the Cabinet from the military department Only two 
cf tr1e ten members of the new Cabinet were from the military. 
One of triem \A.las Secretary of War Pablo Quiroga and the otr1er, 
Gener·al Miguel r·1 .. Acosta, was in charge of communications. 22 
Rodriguez also reorganized his personnel and military 
·::.taff. Gaxiola announced that the Executive Off ices would 
issue no letters of recornrnendat ion for persons desiring 
'.2 1 lbid) p 559 
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emp 1 oyment 1 n the various departments of government, 
permitting each cabinet minister and cr1ief to choos.e his own 
collaborators. Likewise, Rodriguez's office would handle only 
1 ts own business. .A.l l other matters wou 1 d be ref erred to the 
appropriate brancr1es of the government. This was interpreted 
to mean that the President desired that r1 is military staff 
would r·efr·ain from intervening in politics.23 His Chief of 
Staff, General .Juan Azcarate, told a mernber of the U.S 
Emtia:ssy Staff that it was the President's desire that his 
mi 1 ltary staff conf me itself to mi 1 i tary matters and the 
General ha1j (jismissed all civilian staff in the military and 
replaced triem w1tr1 officers and soldiers.:24 
By .January 1 9 3 3, tr1 e u. s. r··1 i l i ta ry Atta c r1 e to Mexico 
21ssessed tr1e m1l1tary situation under· President Rodriguez as 
po5.itive Former~ threats to the country's political stability 
\.Vere under control. General .Amaro had very little political 
influence, yet still had quite a following in the .Army because 
of h 1 s exce 11 ent v11ork as Secretary of War and now Di rector of 
r~ i 1 itary Education. He rernai ned ambitious but under contro 1. 
13enera1 Cedillo, seemed to have lost a great deal of his 
follovving, had very little influence, and in army circles it was 
ccw1si.jere·j tr1at r1e r1ad ver>1 little ability as we1i.2:. 
:2:Z~JAUS 812 00/29792, r~o 1851, R Clark, September 9, 1932, Reel 
~, 
2 4~jAUSf,1200/29799, ~Jc, 1959. R Clark, General Political Report, 
October 20, 1 932, Reel 2. 
:?S~jAU'.:· 812 00/29828, Robert E Curnrnir1gs, Acting Mil itar~y .:,ttacr1e, 
C·-2 Report, ,Jan 1933, Reel 2 
Governors of more "radical States" like Vet~acruz 
realized that Rodriguez was determined that certain state 
mi i itary should not control things as they had in some 
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ms tances under Pres l dent Rubio. Rodrf guez used forceful 
n1easures to disarm the agrarians in the State of Veracruz and 
divide the patrimonial ej idos witr1 the assistance of army 
officers, in tr1e face of opposition by the agrarians. Tr1is way 
ttw regional caudi 11 o .Alberto Tejeda cou 1 d not use the armed 
agrar1 ans 1jurrng the com rng presidential campaign. 26 
Rodr 1 guez continued to control the nat i ona 1 military 
H1rou(~hout r1 is tenure. On t~ovember 16, 1933, he sent a bi 11 to 
trie Chamber of Deputies with the purpose of enf ore i ng morale 
rn the rank and file of the Mexican Army. Tr1ose who 
participated in a rebellion and who had been discharged could 
ne\ier enter that service again. Officers e 1 ected to public 
off 1 ce cou 1 d aut om at i cal ly return to tr1e i r posts in the army at 
any t1me after tr1e termination of their tenure in office. This 
nevv m 11 itary 1 eg isl at ion was considered of great importance 
in further di'.:,ciplrnrng and professionalizing the Mexican 
army.:; 
"'7 
J 
26 Ibid. 
2 7~JAU5 812 00/::'9951, ~Jo. 807, J. Daniels, November 17, 1933, Reel 
Cl1apter V: Politi cs Behind The SD< Year Pl an: From Maxi ma to 
to Cardenismo 
President Rod r lg u e z was very much in v o 1 v e d i n U-1 e r is e 
of Carden1smo to power even though he had promised Ca11es 
that he wou1d 1eave traditiona1 po1itica1 concerns to him. 
From tr1at vantage point, tr1e Rodriguez administration 
ernbo1jied not the third puppet of the Maximato, but 
Podr1gu1zmo and its role rn the peacefu1 transition of power 
from tl1e l'1aximato to Cardenismo. The povver struggle p1ayed 
1t·=·e1f out tier·1 ind tr1e scenes during the f ormu 1 at ion of tr1e 
1·/1 e ;< 1 c an s i x Ye a r P 1 a r: i n 1 9 3 3. 
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A.s the Presidential election came to the forefront, 
Po,jr'.1~ue2 off1c1a1ly announced in Apri1 1933 that r1is 
governrnent vvould keep outside of po1itics and remain neutral, 
triat he hacJ reso1ved to administer the nation's business and 
leave tr1e "political nuisance" in Calles' hands. However, in 
or1jer to survive politically he had to remain deeply involved in 
all G·Ol1t1cal maneuvering. 
Portes Gi i believed Calles would support Perez Trevir10 
or Carlos Riva Palacio for the presidency in 1934. Gil 
supported Cardenas and s i nee 1 931 r1ad been gathering support 
from various reg i ona 1 1eaders--overa11 agrarians-- to bu i 1 d a 
Cardenas rnovernent so strong tr1at it wou1d be irnpossitJ1e for 
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Calles to get Trevir10 01· Palacio elected.1 Rodriguez supported 
1~11 's plan. Cardenas alone was r1olding a post in tr1e Rodriguez 
Cabinet of the four generals who had resigned from Rubia's 
Cab met. Rodriguez's f avorab 1 e op rn ion of Cardenas added 
important momentum to tr1e push for a Cardenas candidacy. 
President Rodri(Juez asked Calles wr1etr1er it would be 
a cJ v i s ab 1 e f or card en as to res i g n r1 i s War l'1 i n i st ry post and 
de(j1cate 1-11mself to the campaign and Calles agr·eed. 2 Tr1e 
o i s so 1 u t i on of tri e l'1 ax i m at o ri ad begun and Rod r· i g u e z was on 
board. 
The Mexican Six Year Plan 
The policies established in the Six Year Plan of Mexico 
reflect this transitional period of power from Calles to 
Cardenas. Tr1e Plan was credited to Calles, who wanted to 
contro 1 tr·1e Cardenas presidency w i tr1 it. 3 However, Ca 11 es on 1 y 
i n U o du c e d t 1·1 e i de a. I t was a c tu a 11 y form u l ate d by Rod r· i g u e z, 
Cardenas an(j a number of less conservative e 1ements w itriin 
trie Party . .A.s a result, it represented a compromise between 
1 Lorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Pevolucion Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol. 
12 Los lnicios De La lnstitucional1zac1on La Politica Del Maximato (Mexico City 
El Colegio De Mexico, 1978), p 274 
2John Vl.FDulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 573. 
3Tzvi fvledrn, El r1rn1mato Presidenc1al Historia Pol1tica Del f'1ax1mato, 
1928-1935 (f'1e:x1co City Ed1ciones Era, 1972), p 137. 
opposing ideologies that worked within the Party, since the 
Pt,~R, vv i th its control of the public treasury and the army, was 
the only instrument that could carry it out. 
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From outside Mexico City Calles was interviewed in June 
and introduced tr1e need for this plan publicly. "I am of the 
opinion that the ti me has come for the formation of a detailed 
p1an of action to cover the six years of the next presidential 
term, a program which should be based on statistics, 
estimates, and e.xperience." He felt that the Revolution's 
economic and social reconstructive proposals had faile(j due to 
a complete 1ack of coordination and to the failure of high 
p 1 ace1j persons to wor·k for tr1e undertaking. 4 
Fo11Cl'Wing Calles announcement to the public about the 
formation of a plan, Rodriguez provided a written statement to 
the press on July 1 8 in which r1e named members of the 
Technical Commission who would collaborate with the Party's 
Commission on the Program: Alberto Pani, Secretary of 
Treasury; Primo Vi 11 a Mi che 1, Secretary of National Econom·y; 
f'1i1Jue l Acosta, Secretary of Commerce; Narciso Basso ls, 
Se er et a ry of Educ at i on; and Juan de D i o s Bo j 6 r q u e z, C h i e f of 
the Department of Labor. 
"Tr1e ~~ational Revolutionary Party has officially 
communicated to me on June 12 the formation of the 
Commission on the Program of Government for the 
4John \tlF Du1les, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961), p 551 
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Presidential term of 1 934-40. The Secretaries of State 
and trie Criiefs of Departrnent are considered to belong as 
technical advisors, in order that triey may contribute 
their share of experience to the formulation of tr1e 
p1~ograrn." ::. 
In tr1e same press release Rodriguez identified trie four 
essent i a 1 prob 1 ems of the country: 
1. Provide public education to the masses to reduce illiteracy. 
2. The agrarian problem required not only redistribution of 
1an(j, but in order to assure the organization of agriculturists, 
the adequate deve 1 oprnent of the soi 1, and the deve 1 opment of 
agr1 cu ltura 1 tee hn i que, government must create corresponding 
institutions of credit, and construction of irrigation works. 
3. Labor ref or·m needed to put into practice .A.rt i c 1 e 1 23 of the 
Constitution, but a 1 so raise the standard of 1 iv i ng and 
harmonize interests of lat)or and capital to the benefit of the 
nat 1onal economy . 
.4 Internal communications \A/ere needed for transportation of 
goods to consumption centers and to be assured of a market, 
but also a network of commun1cat1ons was needed to increase 
so 1 i darity and conso 11 date the Mexican nation. 
As governor of BaJ a California, Rodriguez's primary 
focus had been on so 1 ut ions to these four prob 1 ems. He had 
greatly expanded access to public education in the Northern 
District. Rodriguez riad initiated irrigation works and provicJed 
funding opportunities in developing agriculture. Minimum \A/age 
=·~.)Al 1c::, P 1? 00/'JOP.89 Nn 3PS fvL~,67c;7·nr lrJ]\/ 19 19\\ npel 'J I,.,.._,,,_......,~. ,,__,,......, , v. v ........ , .'~ ..... ...._ ..... ,v'- I , .... v, hv ~· 
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had been a major reform issue and the development of a 
netvvork of com mun i cation and transportation had been centra 1 
to economic growth and 1inks betvveen the rest of Mexico and 
Ca11fornia. 
Rodriguez t)ecame very visib1e in tr1e press at tr1is point, 
stating his opinions about what the Six Year P1an sr1ou1d 
contain. His v1e\NS were more moderate than the radica1 
agrarian e1ement within tr1e PNR Rodriguez referred to the 
rad1ca1 elements and agrar1stas within the Part); and his 
resistance to their utopian idea1s: 
"Since, in my opinion, the 1abors of that Commission 
sr1ou 1 d not depart from tr1e rea 1 it i es of Me xi can 1 if e nor 
express Utopian purposes which wou1d convert the 
program into a e:xpression of good intentions, I deem it 
e:x:ped i ent to make knovvn my persona 1 viewpoint with 
respect to the fundamenta1 point that the program shou1d 
inc 1 ude the economic and f inane i a 1 capacity of the 
Federa1 Government, in determining what revenues the 
Con st i tut i ona 1 Government w i 11 have avai 1ab1 e during the 
coming term, taking into account the nature of taxes and 
the paying capacity of the constituents. Thus the 
Minister of Finance must be a direct consu1tant." 
In other words, reform cou1d not take p1ace outside of fisca1 
respons i bi 1 i ty. .As a US inf 1 uenced capita 1 i st, Rodriguez's 
social reform was based in economic reality not post-
revo i ut 1 onary idea 1 s. 
Rodriguez's ideas for the Six Year Plan a1so dlff ered 
from Ca11es' in a number of ways. First, Rodr~iguez promoted 
his pet project, minimum wage, which Calles seemed 
1ntere5ted in postponing. Calles had suggested an increase of 
the n1inimum wage but only after the profits were made thus 
not "to strangle at its birth an undertaking by demanding 
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tlef ore an assured prosperity, unsustainable minimum 
salaries." c Ro,jriguez saw minimum wage not only as a way of 
obtaining labor support, but also as a means of stimulating 
1rHJu·strial grovvth desired by Mexican capital. Second, Cal1es 
supported private capitalist agriculture in the form of large 
cooperatives and land sufficient to "stimulate men of 
ambition." He felt that small properties seldom lent 
ttwmse 1ves to modern agri cultural techniques and large profit. 
Rod r i g u e z a l so supported pr i vat e l and owners r1 i p but i n t t-1 e 
form of sma 11 property' ownersh 1 p \A/ itr1 in the protection of tr1e 
communal e1ido setting. At the same time, r1is agricultural 
model repre5.ented a compromise with the more radical 
391-aristas like Cardenas wr10 emphasized communal tenure as 
the key mst1tut1onal means to regenerate the agrarian 
economy. Tr1ird, Calles strongly sided with "socialistic" 
e1Jucat1on as tr1e vehicle to educate tr1e masses, vvhile 
Ro1Jri guez just as strongly promoted scientific lay education 
like that found in the U.S. 
Fourth, and most volatile to his relationship with Calles, 
\N as a central issue Rodriguez presented to the 1·1e:x: i can press 
vv r1 i c r1 had not been men t i one d earl i er by ca 11 es: 
t·~LA.IJS 812.00/29878, Excels.1or, ,.June 15, 1933, Reel '.?. 
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".A.ttention rnust t)e given, in rny opinion, to the fomenting 
of industries relating to ravv materials and to the 
utilization of the natural resources of the country. 
Especially mining is one of our sources of wealth which 
has not attained the development or the technical 
advance it should r1ave, working also, toward the 
coordrnation of all the factors contributing to the 
production of Me:xico, in order duly to organize the 
national economy. "7 
E ·J er1 tr1ou 1~ r1 Pr es i dent Rod r i g u e z s e 1 do m spoke to tr1 e 
press, Just a fevv days later, another article in the Excelsior 
quote1J him regarding this topic of the extractive industries: 
"I dvvelt especially upon the necessity of seeking the 
1Jevelopment of the extractive industries and the 
util1zat1on of the natural resources of the country 
The State must f ornent by every means to develop the 
mining industry and the improvement of its technical 
methods. \t./e rnust stu1jy the possibility of creating 
nat i ona 1 mi nera 1 reserves to prevent tr1e unrestricted 
exploitation by private individuals, to the immediate 
pre Judice of the econorn i c sys tern of the country ... I 
cons11jer of vital importance the solution of the problems 
vvhich I have set forth vvith respect to the mining 
industry of Mexico. "E 
In August, Rodriguez again stated to the press tr1at tr1e 
exploitation of extractive industries rnust be carried on by 
nat i ona 1 enterpr 1 se and capita 1. The President then ref erred to 
tr1e nat i ona 1 i zat ion of e 1 ectri cal energy, stating that a pl an for 
7~~.A.US 8 1 2.00/29389, ~.Jo 385, Excelsior, July 1 9, 1 933, Peel 2 
EN.AUS C.12.00/'.?9C.9S·, l·Jo 397, E\C2ls1c1r, .July 25, 1933, Peel 2 
the nat i ona 1 i zat ion of a 11 free resources of e 1 ectri ca 1 energy 
·vvas novv t 1ef ore tr1e Mex1can Senate for approval.9 
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President Rodrl guez sided on this issue with Cardenas 
and the more nat1ona11st1c and radica1 elements within the 
revo 1 ut i onary f am i 1 y who demanded the nat i ona 1 i zat ion of the 
subsoil and the amplification of the national petroleum 
reserves to break the foreign company monopo 1y. In the wake 
of the \'lorl\j Depression, they wanted the Mexican State to be 
tr1e agent to promote antj control al 1 the vital processes of the 
country, es.pee 1a1 ly the economy and not to simply be the 
custoij i ans of the order and rntegri ty of the territory. 1 o 
F o 11 ow rng Rodriguez's statements to the press, Ca 11 es 
returned to Mexico City on the morning of July 30, 1933 after a 
four montri atJsence. Apparent1y Rodriguez's focus on the 
e><tract ive industries had st i rre,j the waters. Upon his return, 
ca11es made a speech which \A/as interpreted by the Mexico City 
press as making it plain that Mexico would cooperate with the 
un1ted States in economic matters and spoke briefly of the 
economic p 1 an of President Rodriguez. 11 
'?~~AUS 812.00/29906, Excelsior, August 9, 1933, Reel 2 
1 Cto1-enzo Meyer, His tor ia De La Revo luc i6n Mexican a 1928- 1934Vo1 
12 Los lnic10s De La lnstitucior1alizacion La Politica Del Ma.x:1mato (Mexico City 
E 1 Co legio De f"1ex i co, 1978:" p 234 
11 ~~A.US 812 00/29897, No 426, A.ugust 1, 1933, Reel 2 
Conflict and Compromise 
In Octot)er, .A.merican Consul Smale reported the 
possibility of a political disturbance brewing at the summer 
home of General Calles The basis of the disturbance was 
attributed to Cardenas an(j like minded officials of the Pt~R 
1ivantinq to free themselves from what they termed a virtual 
dictatorship t)y Ca 11 es.. This sub J ect brought about a heated 
altercation between Generals Calles an(j Cardenas during tr1e 
vi·31t of the latter to Calles summer home. In the cas;e of any 
serious de·3ertions from the ranks of high Calles adherents, 
Smale felt that Rodriguez might Jorn in. Althougr1 Rodriguez 
11ad been a staunch friend and supporter of General Ca 11 es, he 
mlgr:t not oppo·3e efforts to bring about Calles retirement if 
opposition to such a movement should threaten his private 
bus mess i nteres.ts. He had continuously expressed a desire to 
retire from public life and devote himself to his industrial 
enterprises. 12 Wr1en he returneCJ to Baja California r1e would 
nee1J Cardenas's support to maintain his local hegemony and 
protect his national economic interests. 
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Shortly tr1ereaf ter, on October 7, the Excels/or published 
an article in1Jicating a visit had been made by President 
Rodriguez and his Cabinet to Ca 11 es at Tehuacan to confer with 
Ca 11 es regard rng the Six Year Pl an. A.n agreement was reached 
to create an "I ntersecretari al Committee" and that General 
1 :2t\JAUS 812 00/29937, Smale, October 1933, Reel 2. 
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Miguel M .. Acosta, Minister of Communications, was appointed 
p1~esidng officer of this new committee. Its functions \Nere to 
gather a 11 data that has been compiled by the various 
ministries and have it incorporated in a general report whicr1 
was to be submitted to the President for· r1is approval. 13 
.A.pparent 1 y, Ca 11 es thought with the implementation of this 
Committee, r1e r1ad reined in Rodrf guez and Cardenas and 
involved him=,e1f more directly in the formulation of the Six 
Year Plan. 
The presentation of tr1e six Year Pl an created a heated 
aet)ate from December 3 to December 16 during which the 
"agrarians" introduced substantial modifications and 
projected a political program more in accord with the desires 
of Car•jenas and 1 ess accept ab 1 e in tr1e eyes of the originator 
Ca11es. 14 It was approved by trie Pf\JR at the Convention of 
Oueretaro in December 1933, the same Convention wr1ich 
officially nominated Cardenas as its Presidential candidate. 
Pres.ident Rodrlguez used the Si.x Year Plan as the 
program of the last year of his administration, and he issued a 
cir-cu 1 ar· te 11 rng his co 11 aborators to be gu i de,j by it. 1 ::. Because 
it vvas a plan created by compromise of varying ideologies, 
·::.ome as.pects \Nere not procapital istic enough for his tastes. 
1 :.'N,L-,IJ5 812 00/29938, J. Daniels, October 12, 1933, Reel 2 
14Lorenzo 11eyer, Historia De La Revo Jue ion Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol 
12 Los lnic10s De La lnstitucionalizacion La Politica Del Maxirnato (Mexico City 
El Colegio De Me>'.iCO, 1978), p 234 
1 SJohn V/.FOulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961), p 598 
He supported agrarian reform but vvith private land 0\11.mership 
and \vitr1in f1-=;ca1 rneans, and he backed labor reform but 
tempered w i tr1 capita 1 interests. Rod1-1 guez was strongly 
-=,upportive of developing national interests in the extractive 
in1justri es. He promoted access to pub 1 ic education but 
11\/1 thout the socialist connotation. 
Frorn the beginning of his presidency, President 
Rorjriguez was atJle to move forward with social and economic 
reconstruction in Me;x;:ico which had stalled during Rubia's 
adm in 1st ration. Un 1 ike his predecessor, caught up in po 1itica1 
upheaval and a Worl1j Depression, he had a stronger national 
economy and greater control over his cabinet members. 
HO\/v'ever, tr1e momentum of his reform efforts increased 
rapi1jly 1.A1ith the implementation of the Six Year Plan in 
.January 1934. RocJriguez la1a tr1e groundwork for Cardenas' 
reforms, inter J ect i ng his own interpretation as he proceeded 
an entire year before Cardenas took office. This increased 
level of federal involvement in economic and social 
reconstruction was due 1arge1 y to Rodriguez's expanding 
personal power, distinct from both the Maximato and 
Carden i smo. 
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Chapter VI: Public Hae i enda and tl1e U.S. Foreign Debt 
Tri e s u c c es s of Pres i dent Rod r i g u e z ' s ad m rn i st rat i on 
depended largely on the success of the Ministry of Hacienda. 
Rodriguez and r1is finance ministers, first Alberto Pani and 
later Marte Gomez, establisr1ed national finance, prosperity 
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and confidence rn Mexico after the Rubio political crisis and 
the continuing ·world economic depression. Since Mexico did 
not partake to any great extent in World War I and post-war 
eras of prosperity, it did not reach the same heights of 
inflation and therefore, did not have to pass through the depths 
of depression tr1at tr1e U.S. experienced. 1 However, tr1e Wor·ld 
Depr-ession r1ad fo1-ced tr1e Rodriguez administration to create 
mterna l markets and credit to f i 11 the void created by tr1e 1 oss 
of e :>< t er- n a 1 1-r1 a 1-k et s. I n add i t i on, tr-1 e stab i 1 i ty the Rod,~ i g u e z 
A.drnrn1strat1on brought to the country restored confidence in 
tr1e government which translated into an improving economic 
:.ituation. Change in political leadership from Rubio to 
Ro(jri guez pro(juced a recovered nat i ona 1 opt i rn i srn. A new 
president in power l lf ted the psycho log i ca 1 effects of the 
Depression 2 
1 ~Jl.,US 8 1 2 00/29904, Ramsde 11 S Lasher, March 28, 1 933, Reel 3 
::?"'1avie1- F. Ga:x:iola, El Presiderite Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
fjJt·x1al Cultura, 1938), p 345. 
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Pani Legacy 
Finance Minister Alberto Pani must be credited with 
laying tr1e financial groundwork for Podrfguez before r1e 
assumed office. Vlr1i1e President Pubio was sti11 in office, 
Pani implemented pol icy in 1932 which, along with improving 
w·or 1 d economic c oncJit ions, he 1 ped reverse the negative 
financial state of Mexico. The financial policies of the 
government pr1 or- to .January 1 932 and the 'Wor 1 d economic 
crisis ha1J been adverse to Me>< i co. These po 1 ic i es inc 1 uded the 
1-ene\Nal of tr1e service of the external debt when Finance 
f"1in1ster Luis de Oca \Nitr1 29.5 million pesos in the Treasury, 
·s1(Jr·.e1J the Montes de Oca-Lamont .Agreement on July 31, 1930. 
A ne'vv monetary law ca11 ed The Plan Ca 11es, issued on June 25, 
1931, Vv'3'=· also tr1e work of fv1ontes de Oca. It demonetarized 
iJ01cJ and limited silver coinage in an attempt to maintain the 
peso at its legal parity and reestabl isr1 itself in the 
international exchange after July 23, 1931 wr1en Mexico went 
off tlw qold standard. Policies also included the imposition of 
ne'vv and ex tr aorlj i nary taxes, and re duet ion in F edera 1 
salaries. :: 
Pani oppose(j these policies. From a diplomatic post in 
Par1s, r1e wrote to President Rubio advising against the foreign 
lJebt agreement and later wrote to Ca11es against the 
3~u .. us 81~.5111943, ~~o 609, J. Daniels, September 19, 1933, Reel 
70 
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1Jef lat i onary measures. Ca 11 es asked Rubio to replace Montes 
de Oca w1H"1 Pan1 and r1e agreed.4 Pan1 arrived in Mexico in 
February 1 932 and wrote the f o 11 o·w i ng i rnpress ion of the 
economy as a result of tr1ese financial policies: 
"The i 11 ness of the public treasury at the start of 1 932, 
I repeat, vvas incomparably more serious and difficult to 
cure tr1an that of 1923 ... acute monetary deflation; 
i nternat i ona l instability of our exchange and total 
1j 1 sappearance of credit; progressive paralysis of 
indu:=.try and commerce; lowering of salaries and 
increase in the number of unemployed; and as a 
consequence of all this, a precipituous decline in the 
federal income and an incr·easing deficit in Hacienda":. 
Pan i went to work to reverse a 11 of r1 is predecessor's 
deflationary policies. He initiated the Monetary Lavv of Marc1-1 
9, 1932 which replaced The Plan Calles. Control of coinage 
vv as taken from the Bank of ~1ex i co and pl aced in the hands of 
trw Finance l'1inistry. The Lavv· of April 12 amended the Law 
Constituting the Bank of Me xi co, restricting its functions to 
tr1at of a Central Institution. This amending act reduced the 
Bank's capital from 100 million to 50 million pesos and at the 
sarne time confirmed provisions established in the previous 
year to the effect that tr1e Bank vvas no longer to carry on 
dire ct bus mess w i tr1 the pub 1 i c6 
4John WF Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A. Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 ( ,A,ustin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 506. 
::lbid,p515. 
CltJld, p 515. 
63 
In a(j1ji ti on, Pan i es tab 1 i shed the Lavv of May 19th, whi cr1 
·:;pec1f 1e1j private institutions as the sole organ for tr·1e 
creat 1 on of money and for the contra 1 of money and credit. It 
constituted tr1e commercial banking system that required 
branches of foreign banks or banking institutions to be 
incorporated rnt o th 1 s system, and defined the regulations 
governing such branches. The Genera 1 Law of Institutions of 
Creijit of .June 28 related the commercial banking system to 
tr1e system for genera 1 contra 1 of credit in the Repub 1 i c. 
Frnaliy, tr1e Lavv Regulating Securities and Credit Operations 
was decr-eed Au,~ust 26, 1932.7 
.As a result of these lavvs, the Bank of Mexico, novv a 
Centra 1 Bank, operated as the so 1 e bank of issue s i mi 1 ar to the 
U.S. Fe1jeral Reserve Systern. Restrictions were placed upon 
tr,e operations of a11 foreign tiank tiranches requiring their 
capital to t)e represented by Mexican money, credits payable 111 
r·1e><1co, Me><ican real estate, ana Mexican secur1tes and all 
triese plus their reserves and investments ·were to be held at 
311 t1rnes in the Pepubl1c of 11e~·:ico. Insurance companies VI/ere 
r-e·:;tr1cte1j 111 the same manner to maintain certain investments 
1 n Me:x i can properties or secur~it 1 es.::. 
Pef 1 ect rng tJack on Pan i's accomp 1 i shments, Li c. Eduardo 
:Suarez e:x:plained in a speec1-1 on July 15, 1935: "Me:x:ico, in 
/It·. d c::: 1 c::: ' 11._ • p ~) ·-' 
8r1..:.u::: s 12 00/29904, Ramsdell:::, Lasr1er, 1"1arc1-1 28 .. 1933, Reel 3 
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seeking to solve its crisis, turned first, in July, 1931, to 
deflationary steps, but later, in March, 1932, it corrected this, 
reversing the policy, and this, put into action with decision, is 
tr·1e pr·rnc1pa1 cause of the good condition of the nation.9 
However, once Rodriguez took office, he orcriestrated the 
country's economic po 1 i c i es and coordinated them with the 
~1in1ster of the Hacienda. A year after control of coinage had 
been taken from tr1e Bank of Mexico and p 1 aced in the hands of 
Finance Minister Pani, the Monetary Reserve Decree of March 
22, 1933, returned the control to the Bank once it r1ad been 
restructured. Under provisions of these decrees, a monetary 
re~.erve of approximate 1y forty mi 11 ion pesos was es tab 11 shed, 
the spec i a 1 authority for the coinage of silver pesos by the 
flin1ster of Finance was repealed, and the Bank of Mexico again 
t)ecarne the coordinator of red i scount operations and protector 
of tr,e va 1 ue of tr·1e nat i ona 1 currency i o The monetary stock 
\Nas increased by the issue of bank notes by the Bank of Mexico 
as a resu 1t of discount operations.ii In addition to the 
conso 1 i cJat ion of the Bank of Mexico, the constitution of a 
monetary reserve, the establ isr1rnent of a standard of 
excr1ange, and the poss i bi 1 i ty to mint corns, indirect measures 
9Javier F.Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
E,j1tor1al Cultura, 193cn, p 517. 
70. 
1 CNAUS 812.51/1923, No. 29, J. Daniels, May 4, 1933, Reel 70. 
11 ~~AUS 812.51/19~3, No.609, J. Daniels, September 19, 1933, Reel 
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\Nere established to prohibit tr1e exportation of capital and to 
r·eestat) 11 sr1 confidence. 1 ~ 
Ro1jriguez also initiated rnore sopr1isticated metr1ods on 
\Nhich to base national financial policies. Although the 
statutes of 1925 a1ready required an office of economic 
research, the Bank of Mexico did not create one unti 1 after 
Rodriguez took office in October 1932. It was similar to triose 
rnarntained by rnost large banks in foreign centers. The off ice 
studied econorn ic factors and activities to aid the bank in 
ccordrnat ion and deve 1 opment of commerce and industry, study 
of balance of payments, and cost of living index. 13 
Funding Me>< i co: Credit Institutions 
One of trie central goals of trie Rodriguez government was 
to replace trie externa1 credit exhausted by the Wor1d 
Depression vv i tr1 the expansion of i nterna 1 credit in the nation. 
Once the 1avvs were in p1ace to fac11itate the use of credit, a 
new 1 oan provided the capita 1. On November 1 1, 1 932, short 1 y 
after Rodriguez took office, an agreement was signed tletween 
tr1e Huasteca Company ($3 million), tr1e Agui1a Company ($3 
million) and Hw Pierce Oil Company ($1 million) to advance to 
1 '.'.'Javier F Gaxiola, El Presidente Po,jr\guez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
Editorial Cultura. 1938), p 367 
1 3~~.A_US 812.51I1893, Tr1ornas J. f'1aleady, America1·1 Vice Consul, 
Se~·terr:t'er 30, 1932, Reel 69 
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the Mexican Government the sum of seven mi 11 ion do 11 ars, as a 
tax advance loan, to tie repaid within forty months, from 
December 1 932 unt i 1 March 1936. The rate of interest vvas 
4.787fo annually.14 Seven million dollars was tr1e disputed 
amount of Mexican funds held by the International Bankers 
Committee for purposes of paying the external debt. The o i 1 
companies, in an attempt to mitigate the tension between the 
Bankers and tr1e Mexican gover·nrnent, 1 s were trying to bolster 
their ovvn position during this period against renewed interest 
1 n nationalization of the petroleum industry in Me xi co. 
The purpose of the 7 mi 11 ion do 11 ars was not to cover 
bucjc:;ietary neecJs. First, it was to cover the deficit of 4.8 
mi 111 on pesos from the 1 931 budget carried over to 1 932 and 
r1alf a million pesos for cyclone victims. Second, rather than 
recjuce salaries of public officials and employees and increase 
taxes on commerce, industry and agriculture, it ·would meet 
current expenses of the Public Administration and pay all civil 
and military personnel which provided needed political 
·::.tat!illty. The rest \Nould be used to expand availability of 
credit. 1e. 
14~1A.U~· 812.51I1897, ~,Jo. 4259, Robert E. Cummings, .Acting Military 
Attache .. ~Jovember 1 5, 1 932, Ree 1 69. 
1 SLorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Revoluci6n Me.xicana 1928-1934 Vol 
12. Los ln1cios De La lnstituc10nalizac10n La Politica Del Maximato (Mexico City 
El Colegio De ~1e;, ico, 1978), p 234 
1 lNAUS 812 51/1 898, r~o. 2085, El Umversal, December 1932, Ree 1 
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A.mong the proposed investments, first pl ace ·was given 
to tr1e renevvel of activity among institutions of agricultural 
67 
c red i t. Pan i f l aw l es s 1 y v o i c e d Rod r i g u e z econ om i c p ri 11 o sop r1 y 
vvhen lw declared: 
"In fact, in view of the fundamental importance wr1ich 
this popu 1 at ion has in Mexico as a productive force and 
as a market for consumption, it is not possible to hope 
that tr1ere may be a norrna 1 deve 1 opment in industry, in 
commerce, and in trw other economic acitivities for the 
country, if the position of tr1e farmers is not bettered 
ancJ tlieir- ·::;tandard of living considerably raised .... A.ny 
Economic plan runs tr1e risk of being a disaster 1f it 
forgets or ignores the essent i a 1 point of seeing that 
agr~i cu ltura 1 production is encouraged, and of providing 
trierefore the indispensable technical and financial 
means. S rnce the resources of the State w i 11 a 1 ways be 
smal 1 in comparison vvitr1 the magnitude of the problem, 
the sums can be usefully employed only if they are used 
ma rational manner, as the initial support for the 
norm a 1 1Jeve 1 opment of the credit which agri cul tu re 
nee,js." 11 
Secor11j after agriculture, vvas the organization of the 
Nat 1ona1 Urban r·1ortga(~e Bank (Banco Nae i ona 1 Hi potecari o 
Urbano) to el1rnmate tr1e scarcity of long term credit with its 
resultant usury, and put back into circulation the enormous 
vvealtr1 tied up in mortgage investments. This permitted the 
f 1nanc1 ng of the reestab 1 i shment or organization of numerous 
171b1d 
rndustri es, as we 11 as the rea 1 i zat ion of urban programs such 
2s tr:e assurance of minimum sanitary con 1jit1ons 12 
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.Another f rnanci a 1 institution estab 1 i shed by the 
government was the Nat 1ona1 Fi nanc i era, S.A, which though not 
properly appreciated at the time, turned out to be the greatest 
1 ever for the i ndustri a 1 deve 1 opment of the country. I ts 
function was the purcr1ase an 1j sa 1 e of securit 1es.19 The 
~~ational Financiera, S.A operated in a buy-sel1 of stocks and 
ton 1jS, exp 1 orrn 1~ virgin territory rn l"lex i co. 20 
Th1r1J, tr1e completion of the national credit system \Nas 
t r1 e est ab l i sh men t of a Pop u 1 a r Bank ( Pe op 1 e · s Bank ) as t r1 e 
gu:ae and techt11ca1 agent for the organization and financing of 
cooperatives and small rn 1justr1es.21 Tr·1e Minister· of Finance 
created a f una of t vvo mi 11 ion pesos for the organization and 
(jeve 1 opment of a Popular Credit. This a 11 owed transactions of 
bus 1 ness. \/\/ i th members up to 2000 pesos vv i thout property as 
security, up to 8000 pesos with property as security, up to 
SOOC pesos with urban mortgages, and up to 3000 pesos under 
av10 contracts. Membership was to include workmen, smal 1 
rn 1justr·1 es or mercJ1ants, prof ess1 on al men an,j emp 1 oyees.22 
1 ·31 bid. 
1".:lJorin W.F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico. A 0-1ronicle of the Revolution 
19 i 9-1936 (Austin. Un1vers1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 592. 
20Javier F.Gax1ola, El Pr'esidente Rodr\guez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
Ed1tor1al Cultura, 1938), p 397. 
2 l ~JAUS 812.S1/1 898, No. 2085, Ei Uni\/ers211, December 1 932, Pee 1 
69. 
22i\JAU5812.51/1938, ~~o 564, J. Daniels, 5eptemt)er 8, 1933, Reel 
7(! 
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Among others, it was use1j in the case of the Electrical 
Cooperatives. 
The expansion of cre1j tt institutions was as f o 11 ows:23 
1931 1932 1933 1934 
lns.t1tut1ons; of Credits 65 53 68 77 
.A.u>: 111 ary Ins.ti tut ions. 10 21 29 
Tota1s 65 63 89 106 
Fund ir: g 1·1 e ~' 1 c o: I n tern a 1 Lo ans 
Under Rodriguez, tr1e service of tr1e internal debt took 
prececJence over the external det)t as another means of 
stren1Jtl1en i ng i nterna 1 cre1jit In order to p 1 ace their f i nanc i a 1 
~.,~1·c,:::: 'r· crr1Pr t"'~ Rnr1ria1 1 ,::::~ Adrr11ni·-=tr·d~t'on a·e·,~·ted o\1er 1nn I ' _, ,J ~ ' I I I _, ,. ) I I t: ' ' _, ' j " ' L ' ' ' ~' I ' ' v u ' ,, ~· 
m1111on pesos to amortizing 1jomestic obligations. On 
Decemt)er 31, 1 932 a decree authorized the issuance of bonds 
in tl-,e amount of 60 mi 11 ion pesos to be paid over 40 years for 
tr1e re,jernption of the Internal Debt.24 f<nown as "Bon,js of the 
Internal Put1l1c Debt of the United Mexican States," they \Nere 
non-interest bearing but redeemable at the rate of 21 /2% per 
annum over a period of forty years. The bonds vvere dated 
. January 1, 1933. Tr1e first coupon was due December 31, 1933, 
23"..lavier F.Ga:-:101a, El Pres1dente Roc:lr1guez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
Ed:tcria1 Cu1tura, 1938), p 399 
·;'4~1' ILJC 81" c 1 11 '""()~ N ,,,,..,,,.,0 R ('] 1,, I "8 1 C)77 R~ 1 '('' - 1n"I ._! L ._;, I '::' -.,.;., 0. LLL 1 , ·arr,, vanuary L , ~ . ._;•.), ee1 / j, 
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and holders of Mexican Internal bonds or bonds of the external 
oebt in the 1922 and 1925 .A.greements vvere to be given the 
option to exchange their securities into this nevv loan. Special 
features included making thes.e bonds acceptable at par value 
in payment of Government properties offered for sa 1 e at 
auction. Tr1ey offered a way of con sol i dating most of the 
\.iar1 ous credits r1e l d against the government in a \Nay to permit 
amortization over a period of years without unduly ta>:ing tr1e 
r·.Jat 1ona1 Treasury 2s 
Prov1s1ons were also made for the two years overdue 
interest announced on December 30, 1932 on the Public 
.A.r;irar1 an Debt. This action 1 eft pending only the coupons due 
Decernber 31, 1932 which were being bid for in Mexico City at 
9016 of their face value. The expectation of ear1)1 cash payment 
V•iOU l c1 tiring thes.e i nterna 1 bonds up to date as to botr1 interest 
pa'/mer:ts and sinking fund since about 44% of these 20-year 
bein,js r·1a1j been retired dur rng the past five years 26 
Tr1e e:1 traor~dinary Income Tax La\v of .July 31, 1931, 
vvh1ch VI/as only in effect that one year, placed a ta:x of one to 
t'vvo percent on tr1e gross receipts of commerce, industry and 
agriculture. The taxes had been resented and a large portion 
\Vere never pa 1 d. In order to gain some monetary returns, a 
circular 'v\1as issued by the Mexican Ministry of the Treasury on 
A.pril 17, 1934 authorizin1;i tax offices to accept in pa'y'ment 
2'::1 r·~.AUS e 12.00/29904, Ramsdel 1 S. Lasher, March 22>, 1933, Reel 3. 
26Jbld 
bonds of the Agrarian Pu ti l i c Debt and bonds of the Internal 
Pu ti 11 c Debt up to 70% of tr1e taxes due. 27 
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One of the most impressive examples of success ·with 
internal funding Vv'ithout relying on IJS. capital was the 
construction of the Mexico City-Nuevo Laredo highway, a must 
for deve 1 oping i nterna 1 markets and increasing the econom 1 c 
boom from the expanding tourist trade. A previous contract to 
complete the highvvay had been cancelled because an .A.merican 
contractor vvas di ssat i sf i ed with the method of payment. It 
1,.va5 r1oped, througr1 the a1Nard of contract-=; to engineers, 
foremen an1j masons who were formerly employed by this U.S. 
cor:tractor, to accompi i5h 1.N1th the same amount of money 
\A/hat 1Nou l d have been accomplished had the contract not been 
cancel led The goal wa5; to finish this road first, then the road 
from Veracruz-Mexico Ci ty-Guada l aJ ara to Puerta Va 11 art a, 
an 1j trien tr1e Matamoros-Mazatlan r1i 1~r1ways.2e 
The government arrange1j to borrow 20 mi 11 ion pesos to 
te u5e 1j in 1934 and 1935 to complete the \A/Ork on the Laredo-
Me:x:ican City r11gl11Nay. This roa(j building loan was guaranteed 
by tr1e Banco Nati ona 1 Hi potecar1 o Urbano y de Pub 1 icas, 
establishe1j in1933, largely by government capital, to promote 
27~~AUS 812 51I1 998, t'-lo 1 376, R Henry Norweb, Charge d'affaires ad 
rnterim, May 2, 1934, Reel 70 
23~·JAUS 812.51I1893, Tr1omas .J Maleady, American Vice Con~ul. 
Seotember 30, 1932, Reel 69 
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the bui1ding of pavements, market p1aces, sewages, and \Nater 
1 rnes 1 n smal 1 towns.29 
The ne\N contract cal1ed for 1'.2 mi11ion pesos in 1934and 4 
mil1ion in 1935. The remaining 4 mi11ion wou1d be spent in 
1935 on other trunk highways. The 1oan 1.Nas p1aced with eight 
1 oca1 bank mg organizations and American Vi ce-Consu1 Wi 11 i am 
P. Cochran, Jr. noted "that none of the 1oca1 branches of 
.Arner1can banking rnstitut1ons appears on the 1ist." The bonds 
1Nere amortizab1e in five years, and were guaranteed by the 
rncome of tr1e F edera 1 Government from gaso 1 rne tax. 30 
.A.nother 25mi11 ion peso bond was issued by the Federa1 
oistr1ct for 1.A/ater d1str1but1on, drainage works and rep1acrng 
of streets rn August 1933. 31 The Mexican government proved 
to itself tr1at it cou1c successful1y provide interna1 funding for 
national pro J ects \ii/ i thout depending on U.S. capita 1. When the 
u S. denied funding, it no longer meant that Mexico cou1d not go 
forvvard with its economic development. Likewise, U.S. 
businessmen were 1jismayed that Mexico cou1d proceed with 
1nterna1 deve 1 opment independently of tr1em. 
2·;iJorm Vff Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
191 9-1936 ( Aust m University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 592 
30~4AUS 81251/1979, wiil1am P Cochran, American Vice Consul, 
Jariu::-:ir-v 29, 1934, Ree 1 70. 
31~MUS 81251/1935, v/11l1am P Cochran, American Vice Consul, 
Lu:just 31, 1933, Reel 70 
F avorab 1 e Traije, Favor ab 1 e Budget 
Me::.:ico continued to report a favorab1e trade ba1ance as 
rn 1j1cated by the fo11owing figures: (rn m111ion pesos)32 
1932 1931 1930 
E\ports 304 400 459 
I m12ort~ 180 217 350 
Balance 124 183 109 
1-Z 
I -' 
T1-1e ne\t tv·/O years \A/ere even better with the Jump in va1ue of 
f'!e>-:ican e><ports in 1934 to 645 mi11ion pesos over a figure of 
36S in 1 ~f33 ::;::: 
From the stanrjpoint of trade 1.Nith the U.S., figures on 
e~~port~. and imports indicated that Mexico stood second in 
importance among Latin .American nations. In 1932, on1y 
E.raz11, Columbia and Cuba shipped more goods than Mexico to 
the U.S. an(j Mexico was the best U.S. customer among the 
nations tc the Scutr·i.34 
Tr1e budget for 1 934, in accordance with the suggestions 
of President Rodriguez as stipu1ated in the Six Year P1an, 
stated that a11otments to Education, Commun1cat1ons and 
.A.gr1cu1ture \A/OU1d be increased if receipts permitted, and the 
32~.JAUS e 12.00.129904, Ramsdell S Lasher, March 28, 1933, Reel 3 
33Jc;r1n \A/F. Dulles, Yesterday ir1 f'1exico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919- 1936 (Aust in University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 591 
34NAUS 812.00/29904, Ramsdell 5. Lasr1er, 1"1arch 28, 1933, Reel 3 
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Ministries of Gobernac1on, War and Marine, Foreign Affairs, 
~~at i ona 1 Economy and the Treasury \Nou1 d not be increased. It 
al so increase1j a 11 otments to carry out ob 1 igat ions to the 
pub11c debt:.''=· 
The summary of the Budget for 1 933 and 1934 a11ocat ion 
to departments in a statement by Undersecretary of Finance, 
Ing. !'1arte R Gomez was as fo11o\NS: 
Leg1slat1ve Po"Ner 
E:x:ecut ive 
.Ju1j1 c i al 
Interior· 
Relations 
Finance 
\•/ar 
.A.gricu1ture 
Commun1 cations 
Economy 
Education 
Pubiic Health 
f't1nuf acturrng Pl ants 
Labor 
.A.ttorney General's Off ice 
.A.grari an Department 
Put:i1c Detit 
Total E:x:penditures 
Tota 1 Revenues 
1933 
5,303,021.47 
1,644, 905.20 
2,88 1 ,303.56 
2,442,576.60 
4, 344,294.23 
37,461,919.96 
5 s' 3 44' 9 0 2. 2 2 
15,474,596.27 
31, 167,699.30 
5, 778, 750. 16 
31,628,789.34 
6,540,834.48 
6, 15S,230.34 
963,440.72 
1, 170,998.24 
25.468.709.61 
233, 771, 970.70 
239,473,921.00 
1934 
4,957,684.66 
1, 999,615.32 
3,000,000.00 
2,818, 148.69 
4,523' 999.42 
27,6S7,894.19 
SS, 1 18, 189.0S 
14,694,512.04 
30,420,9S4.32 
5,773,9S4.88 
31,235,183.28 
7,523, 945.81 
6,000,000.00 
1 ,220,863.20 
1' 170, 998.24 
4,276, 160.64 
40.669. 1 B9.72 
243,061 ,293.46 
242, 750,000.00 
Frorn statements that appeared in the local press and 
base1j on information obtained from the Minister of the 
35t·MU5 2'1251/1964, ~~o 814, '-J Daniels, November 1933, Peel 70 
Hae i enda, it in1j i cated that a 11 outstanding government 
Gt:1igations for tr·1e period 1926-1932, 1.Nith one or t1.No 
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e;.,:cept ions, an1j which had remained un liquidated in the Federal 
Treasury, were paid or prescr1 bed during the ca 1 endar year 
1933 . .A.1so, practically all of the 1933 obligations had been 
met on time or wouM be liquidated early in 1933.36 
Foreign Debt 
E.ecause the service of the internal debt took precedence 
c·v'er tr1e service of tr1e external detit, President Rodriguez 
rna,je no prov1 s ions to meet payments due from ob 1 igat i on·s of 
tr·1e e><ter·na1 ,jebt.37 He state 1j in his messa 1Je to Ct'.)n 1Jress on 
September 1, 1934 tr,at put:11c oprn1on rn Mexico \·Vas opposed to 
the 1,jea of pay in1;i ob 11 gat ions in e;.,:cess of Me xi co 's capacity to 
pay, add rng that: 
/(1 
"V·/r1ate-./er movement of funds rn 1 arge amount from 
[vl e :.: l C 0, Vv't-1 i Ch \N 0 U 11j 0 f n e Ce SS i t y take p 1 a Ce, \;\/ 0 U 1 d 
great iy affect tr1e carrying out of Mexico's economic 
program for road bui 1 ding, agri cul tura 1 and i ndustri a 1 
development and other projects undertaken by the 
Executive, but also because it would upset the 
equi 1 ibrium of r"'1e><1co's trade balances, since they 
3t.r·~/\IJS. 212.51'1971, i~o 966, J Dar1iels, ,January 3, 1934, Reel 70 
37r·J,A,IJS 81251/1943, No. 609,..J Daniels, September 19, 1933, Reel 
w o u 1 d be a rn o u n t s def rn it e 1 y taken fr o rn trl e domes t i c 
mar·ket. "3E 
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Throu1~hout the ens.tence of Me1~ico as a nation, defau1ts 
on the foreign debt ha(j occurred from October 1827 to 1931, 
on ry to be f o 11 O\A/ed rn each case by negotiations for the 
resumption of debt service. 0\Ning to the intervals until 
interest payTnents \"lere resumed, the maJor part of Mexico's 
debt consisted of accumulated interest It was estimated that 
as mucr1 a·= 20% of rviex1co's revenues \A/ere needed to cover 
both internal and international obligations. Therefore, certain 
.Americans believed the bonded debt of Mexico could be 
·:;erv1ce1j vv·ithout placing an un1jue burden on the finances of 
trie countr'/ at peace. 39 Tr1e r"ie>< i cans ,j id not agree. 
On May 21, 1934, trie Mexican goverment officially broke 
off relations w itr1 the I nternat 10na 1 Bankers Comm it tee. Not 
only dicJ f"1e:x-ico reject the idea of seeking to pay beyond her 
capac1t·y- by means. of one refunding operation after another rn a 
·:;eries of "capitalizations" vvt1ich were believed to hide reality 
temporar1 ly, but r~1ex i co ma i ntarned that the I nternat i ona l 
Banker's Committee acted i 11ega11 y an1j was unfriendly to 
!v1e~1 i CO. Me~<1 co ref erred to the Committee's "i 11 ega l and 
unjust" retention of about 7 million dollars which Mexico had 
paid under the Pan1-Lamont .Amendment of 1925 but \A/hich the 
Comm 1 ttee had not d1 stri buted to the bondho 1 de rs. Thomas 
33t•LA.US 812 =:.1 /2020, No. 1807, J. Daniels, September 25, 1934, Reel 
70 
391 bid 
II 
I I 
Lamont tried to negotiate a compromise with the Mexicans, but 
Pres 1.jent Rodr1 guez rnade it c 1 ear triat nothing shou 1 d be a one 
that might be interpreted s a renewal of relations with the 
Banker's Committee and that nothing less than the entire 7 
rn 111 ion do 11 ars sr .. 1ou 1 ·j be accepted. 40 
Rodr1 guez made the break with tr1e Banker's Committee 
at a moment when tr1e internal i ona 1 bankers were practically' 
e>-:cornmunicated by the U.S. Government which clearly 
e/pressed th.e opinion that the force of the .A.meri can 
C3overnment was not at the disposal of the Bankers for the 
co i 1ect1 on of tr1e i r .jebts. 41 Tr1eref ore, Podri ·;iuez knevv he was 
not J eopardi zing his re 1 at ion ship with the U.S. government. At 
the sarne time, tr11s was a drastically independent step, unlike 
any policy Calles. had followed with the U.S. This was another 
reflect1cn of Poari·;iuez's cr·1ange in loyalty from Calles to 
Cardena·3. 
Tr:e showdo\Nn began in September 1932, when the 
Eanker's Committee brougrit suit before the Suprerne Court of 
the State of New York to determine the method of distribution 
tr'1ey believe·j srHJU1·j be autr:orize.j by the Court.4:? Tr:e 
fie xi can Government maintained the funds be 1 onged to the 
rv1exican Go·v'ernment and decl med to appear in the case 
4C1John W.F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 ( Aust in University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 593. 
41 ~JAUS 812.51/2014, Exselsior, September 8, 1934, Reel 70. 
4r1 
~~~.AUS 8 12.51/1889, To Henry St 1mson from Banker's Cor-nn11 ttee, 
::eotember 14, 1932, Reel 69 
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c 1 a i rn mg its rights to i mm unity. Henry St i rnson requested that 
a U.S. attorney be appointed to represent the Mexican 
Government without argument or comment before the Supreme 
Court of ~,Jew York on January 9, 1933 43 Tr1e decisicm of tr1e 
Nevv York Supreme Court on January 30, 1933 dec1 ined the 
action f i 1 ed by Thomas W. Larnont regarding the disposition and 
accounting of funds received frorn the Mexican Government. A.n 
El Universal editoria1 reported 1ega1 victory for Mexico and the 
Committee of eankers \·Vas e;<coriated for cornmittmg acts 
" v e rv s 1 rn i 1 a r to s i rn p l e an ,j p 1 a in s po 1 i at i on. "44 
President Rodriguez wisr1ed in no way to become rnvo1ved 
; n an/ cornprorn i ses that rn i ght hamper the new adrn in i st rat 1 on 
vv·r1ich \Nas about to take off ice. Foreign Minister Puig 
informed .Josept"iUS Danie1s that Rodriguez had to1d hirn that he 
vvouid not take this rnatter up 1juring his term of office; that 
the Mini st er of Finance had recornrnended a bi 11 be introduced 
to Congress with reference to the foreign debt; but that it \A/as 
Po 1Jriguez's intention to 1eave this matter to the incornmg 
a1jrn in i strati on. 4:.:; 
Ttw U.S. government took the initative in October 1933 to 
ca 11 togetr1er in Washington a group of pub 1 ic-sp i rited citizens 
to con~.1der the formation of the Foreign Bondho1ders 
43r·~.A.US 812.51I1900, To Attorney General from Henry Stimson, 
'"'January 3, 1933, Reel 70. 
44~~AUS· 812.:,111907, ~~o 2282 .. R Clark, February 11, 1933, Reel 
4'=·~J1\US 812.51/2022, No 1829, J. Daniels, October 6, 1934, Reel 71. 
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Protective Council w lth offices in New York to assist 
ind ivi dua 1 bondholders. The organ1 zing committee of the 
Council r1ad met as ear·ly as December 18, 1932.46 Tr1e r1olders 
cf r~1exico's foreign bonds came to be represented by this new 
organization. 
V/ith s,uch a favorable climate, at the same ti me, the 
Fourth Congress of the Rai hvay V/orkers of Mexico sent a 
communication to the President, General Cal Jes, and tr1e 
Executive of the Nati ona: Ra1 l ways requesting a moratorium or 
tr1e debt ovved by the National Rail ways to the New York 
bankers in order that the funds could be used for the 
,jeve 1 opment of tr1e ra 1 l v,;ay rnc1ustry. 47 
Claims Commission 
Pres1oent Rooriguez made significant pro,~ress in tr1e 
vvork of the United States-Mexican Claims Commissions, set up 
as a result of the Bucarel1 Conferences of 1923, during his 
term in office. Progress had been very slow and costly and 
botr, President Rodriguez and Foreign Minister Puig were 
concerne(j about the matter. Both President Rodr1guez and 
A.mbassador Daniels liked the idea of a lump-sum settlement 
to take care of the United States claims. Two agreements of 
46~~AUS 812 5112027, \//ill iam Pr1i 11 ips, Acting Secretary, November 
6, 1934, Ree 1 71 
47~~.AUS e 1 2 '.5 1 I 1 90'.:'> See 8 12.504/ 1 371 ) No 2207, R c 1 ark' 
.Jzrnu2ir'.v· 25, 1 933, Reel 54 
.Apri 1 24, 1934 were signed. One of these revised the 
rrocedure of the United 5tates-Mexican Genera1 C1aims 
Comm l ss l on in order to s imp 1 ify and speed up the \Nork. Each 
'Jovernment was to choose one commissioner, and each 
comm1ss1oner was to appraise claims rndividua11y. Then the 
commiss.1oners \Nere to get together and try to sett1e the 
d 1 ff erences. There was then to be a Jo int report to the two 
CJ•)\:' erT1rnents. 42 
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The other agreement of .Apr11 24, 1934, took care of trie 
Un1te1j States spec1a1 c1a1ms for damages resu1ting from the 
Pev'O 1 ut ~on. The amount was to bear the same proportion to 
total c1a1ms as the European a'Nards. But in making this 
computation, de1juctions from the total US c1aims were made-
deouct ions in the amounts corresponding to dup 11 cations vvh i ch 
inf1atecJ the claims figures and c1aims that had already been 
cec 1 oed. It V·/aS agreed that Mex1 co would pay ha 1 f a mi 11 ion 
do 11 ars yearly start mg on .January 1, 1 935. The tot a 1 to be 
paid 1Nas. ca1cu1ated to be seven mil11on do11ars, or 2.65 
percent of the spec i a 1 c 1 aims 1 ess the above mentioned 
ceauct1ons. In th1·:: \Nay, more than ten years after the 
ratification of treat l es worked out at the Burcare 1 i
Conferences, new agreements f ina 11y sett 1 ed the comp 11 cated 
matter of U.S. c 1 al ms arising out of damages caused by the 
4.:\Johrr \'/F Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Pevolutiorr 
~ g 19-1936 ( Austirr Urr1vers1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 597 
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!'1ex i can Pevo l ut ion. 49 Ca 11 es was completely absent from 
tr1ese important negotiations .A.s \i\/lth the Banker's Committee 
dea 1 in gs, Ro(jri guez acted independently of Ca 11 es in re solving 
another critical issue vvlth the United States. 
Economic Evaluation of Rodriguez's Presidency 
n~,e p~,JP had cr1argeo President Roarf guez w itr1 creating 
po1it1ca1 and financial stab1l1ty in or1jer to establish the 
Pevo 1ut1 onary party on a permanent f oundat l on, ana his 
aijm in i strati on \Nas cred lted VI/ i th successfully handling the 
nation's affairs.. Conservative government spending res.u l ted in 
ba 1 anc ing the budget for 1 933 with even a sma 11 surplus, an(j 
aft er earmarking 25. 5 m 1111 on pesos for interest payment or 
trie pub 11 c debt The Rodriguez a(jrn 1 n i strati on financed cre(j it 
ano amortized more than 1 00 rn 111 ion pesos of the I nterna 1 
Put; 11 c Det:)t It created a monetar;,r reserve of $ 1 16. 1 77 ,000 00 
pesos Tr1e consolidation of the Bank of r1exico assured the 
fl ej:1b11 lty of the monetclr'y' system with in the credit 
organization, trie e\istence of a banking system in a l 1quid 
state perrn1tte!j the ability to pa')" its obligations, and Me~<1co 
es.tab 1 i sr1e1j an e:;..;change rate \Ni thin the i nternat i ona 1 market 
rvios t importantly, Rodriguez left Me xi co with a r1ea lthy 
economy, by e 11 mi nat rng the prob 1 ems of def 1 at ion \N lthout 
4 9 : bi cJ , r, 5 9 7 
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falling into vicious inflation. He left the Treasury vvith 
$ 1 .413,.861 .00 pesos and the pub 11 c treasury w i tr1 a 
confidential fund of $8.625,853.34 pesos that was reserved to 
be delivered to the Treasury and vvhich the public domain did 
not knovv about, as an act of solidarity with the next 
a·jm 1 ni st rat 1 on. ::.o 
Rodriguez supported Pani and r1is policies until 
September 1 933, \Nhen his shift in al 1 egi ance from Ca 11 es to 
c ardenas, enaed the rel at 1 onshi p. Ca 11 es had been rnv1 s i bl e in 
financial policy decisions, leaving policy making in the 
profess i ona 1 hands of Pan1. By e 11 m mating Pan1 from the 
process, Rodriguez shut out Ca 11 es from the f i nanc i a 1 sector. 
It came at a time \·Vhen Calles \Vas less influential on 
Rodriguez and could not save Pani's job for him. President 
Poor 1 guez and h 1 s new Finance Min 1 ster, Marte Gomez, who had 
serve1j under Gil and was more pro-Cardenas, did not change 
their f inane i a 1 goa 1 s for the country. They continued to focus 
on i nterna 1 economic gro\Nth st i mu 1 ated by expande1j 
a"/a1lab1lity of credit over concern about the external debt. In 
other words, Rodriguez's policies remained in force from one 
Finance Minister to the next. 
.As President, Rodriguez indirectly continued to improve 
the internal economy and credit position of Mexico as a nation 
with peaceful elections, educational programs to further 
SCiJavier F.Gaxiola, El Pre21dente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
Editorial Cultura. 1938), p 400-401. 
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reduce illiteracy (which was at about 47% down from 853). He 
created greater demands b'y' the masses, continued agri cultura1 
an1j i ndustri a 1 1jeve l opment, an1j gradual exploitation of the 
natura 1 resources. In addition, V/orl d povvers had taken 
favorable act 10n regar1jing silver, a rec i pro cal tariff 
agreement with the U.S. had been negotiated and a sufficient 
comp 1et1 on of the international highway permitted tourist 
trade from the U.S. an1j Canada to boost the economy. I ncrease1j 
1 nfrastructure trwougr, road bui 1 ding had a 1 ready aided f"1ex1 can 
nat1onal1srn.='·1 In addition, by finally settling trie U.S claims 
1ssues wltr1 !'1ex1co, Pooriguez contributed to stronger 
re1at10ns 1Nitr1 the us. 
51 tV,l_J:=:, 81 2 001299'.)4, Pamsde 11 S Lasher, March 22,, 1 933, Ree 1 3 
Chapter VI I: A.grarian Reform 
Sriortly after assuming office, President Rodriguez 
·stated in a press intervie\Ai on September 30 that he 
cons 1 dered the problem of the peasant to be the f undamenta 1 
one of Me;<ico and he discussed his plan for the division of 
communal e11dos into rndividual parcels for families.1 From 
tr::s pcrnt on he acted quickly to open up the floodgates of 
a1Jr ari an reform. Ro1jrf guez believed large property ownersri i p 
create,] povert}1 and ignorance among the rural masses 1Nhi le 
inc11·v·11jua1 private land 01Nnership \AJithin the security of the 
ei1ao. 1f exploited by rational, modern methods 1Nould benefit 
the ent 1 re economy. Therefore, he saw agrarian reform as one 
of tr<e ke\1 elements of his plan for economic stabillt)1. 
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One of the most important aspects of Rodriguez's 
agr.;r1an reform 1.vas his belief in creating individual 1ana 
ovvners.h 1 p in the e 1 i do, rather than communal possession. His 
reform revo; ved around respect for the i ndi vi dual property 
ov1mer's rights and the rights of the creditors. By providing 
:oca1 credit and modern technology to individual ownership, 
Ro1jrfguez believed it would assure that productivity would 
benefit o·wners ,j1rectly and the country as a whole.2 Trns form 
of redistribution \A/as a mixture between Calles' plan which 
1 t~.AUS 2>12.00/29799, No 1959, R Clark, General Political Report, 
O::tober '.20, 1932. Reel 2. 
'.::Javier F Ga><iola, El Pres1dente Ro,jr1guez ( 1932-34l (Mexico 
Ed 1 t 1:.r- 1 a l C u l t u r a, 1 9 3 8 ) , p 46 2-46 4 
ernp1-1as i zed private capitalist agriculture and Cardenas' 
commitment to the communa1 e1ido system as a means of 
economic recovery for Mexico. 
Beginning Legis1ation 
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Pres i rjent Podr1 guez's first task was to expropriate 1 and·3 
from large property owners. He began by imp1ementing 
legislation \Nh1ch increased parce1ation of large properties. By 
193'.2, 1oca1 .A.grarian Commissions in seven states had ceased 
to receive ne\N petitions for e ii dos and they interpreted this 
as havrng sett1ed tr·1e agrarian prob1em. Ho\Never, the 
re9ulatory iavv of the Division of EJida1 Lands and the 
Const 1tut10n of tlw Paree 1 ary EJ i da 1 Patrimony of December 
19,19:25 had been amende1j in .August 25, 1927. The 1927 
amenament a11 owed the Nati ona 1 .A.grari an Commission w 1th 
the President to fix the minimum area of the parcel, vvhich 
cou 1 d not be reduced even if the number of parce 1 s did not 
correspond to the total number of agriculturists entitled to 
r·ece i ve 1 ands. Th 1 s ne'vv 1 avv of e j i da l patrimony meant that 
trie National A.grarian Commission cou1d decide that the size of 
thee j ido was be1ovv the minimum requirement and cou1d 
expropriate add it i ona 1 1 ands from adj oi ni ng private 1y owned 
property. This new reform of tr1e 1aw could 1ega11y reopen the 
\A/hole agrarian question and grant new or additiona1 ejidos in 
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these seven states. 3 Rodriguez employed this law in his 
rnit1al steps toward reform. 
In addition to the lavv of patrimony, the most important 
changes of another law, the Law of Dotat ions and Restitutions 
of Lands and Vlaters of March 21, 1 929, stated that preference 
of grant rng of dot at ions wou1 d be given to lands under 
cultivation by means of investments of capital or labor. Where 
such ;and 'vvas not available, other lands would be given, but 
never a lari]e amount of poor quality land as compensation for 
lack of arat,le lands. :=,econa, tr1e provision stated that if there 
vvas a shortage of parcels in the e j i do. the campes i no could add 
parce15. vvhen available. This provision amended Article 130 
an1j 1 31 \Nh 1 ch had stated that a petition to amplify could not 
be made unt 11 ten years after the grant rng of the orig rnal 
dotat10n and then only to persons not receiving an original 
ijotat 1 on .::i 
Po 11t1 cal Maneuvers and .A.grari an Reform 
Pres 1 dent Rodriguez first invoked the Law of EJ i cal 
Patrimony for political reasons, not agrar1 an reform, when he 
·sent a number of army engineers to the State of Veracruz in 
or1jer to carry out the parcelation of ejidos which had already 
~t.J.AU'.:· 8125211785, ~~o. 2171, R Clark, January 17, 1933, Reel 82 
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been granted. He was not trying to increase e j i do 1 ands but 
seize control of existing ejidos from his political enemy 
Alberto Tejeda, ex-governor of the State. Tejeda, who had 
expropriated private companies and 1 and, was a mi 1 i tary, 
po1itica1, electoral and ideological threat to the PNR 
A.ccording to the press, the President wanted to bring about 
increased production in the e j i dos s i nee if the campesino d1 d 
not cu 1t1vate the e 1 ido parcel given to him, then the parcel 
'11vou1d be taken away from hlm. However, the League of 
A.gr1cu1tura1 Communities in Veracruz, incited by Tejeda, 
provoked the campesinos to ref use to a 11 ow the army engineers 
to parce 1 out triese e 1 i dos.=· Therefore, Rodriguez's effort to 
divide tr1e parce1s to individual families as a means of 
economic pro1juction was largely a political move in opposition 
to TeJeda'·3 collective vision of using the communal e1idos as 
t\oth a social and m 1 l i tary base. 6 
Tr1e Federal Government wanted to disarm the agrarian 
forces in the State numbering up to 30,000 in order to prevent 
Te J eda from mak mg use of them as a mi 1 ltary force during tr1e 
corning pres1dent1al campa1gn.7 In response to TeJeda's 
oppos lt ion, Rodriguez ordered Genera 1 Acosta and 6,000 
f eijera 1 so 1 di ers to accompany the engineers and disarm the 
=N.AUS 812 5211 771, ~~o 2052, R Cl ark, December 1, 1932 .. Reel 82 
0Tzvi Medin, El l1m1rnato Presidenc1al. Histor1a Pollt1ca Del 11a.>\irnatci 
1928-1935 (Mexico C1t1i Ed1ciones Era, 1972), p 129. 
7~~.A.U'.::> 812 00129828, RGbert E Cummings, .Actrng 1"'11l 1tary .A.ttache, 
G-2 Report, January 1 933, Reel 2. 
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a·~rarians:: On January 1 O, 1933 about 10,000 of tr1e organized 
'Juer111 as 'vvere peacef u 1 ly disarmed \A/hen they were ca il ed for 
rev i evv in the various pl aces vvhere they were organized, their 
arms stacked in the presence of federal troops, and the arms 
taken into possession. However, a large number of unorganized 
a·~rarians remaine 0j arme 0j 9 
Po 11 ti cs v,.1ere a 1 ways a mot i vat rng factor in promot mg 
agrarian reform and were not 1 imi ted to contro 11 i ng the 1oca1 
cauc;11 !c 1ri Veracruz. Senator Elp1d10 Rodriguez, f ormeriy 
Off~ca1 rv1ayor of the National .A.grarian Commission, told 
Stanley Havvks of the U.S. Embassy that Congress passed the 
1 avvs of patrimony reforms for pol it i ca 1 reasons. The goa 1 \Alas 
not to actually f o 11 ow through on expanding tr1e e ii dos but to 
appea~e political adversaries in the 1934 presidential 
election. Tr1e mini mum area of a parce 1 vvas yet to be dee i ded 
t·1• tr,e ~~at1onal .A.grar1an Commission. Because it had to be 
approveo by the President, it possibly could result in no 
'1r·,1r.:i-;;c,;:::-=- i·,r· -;;,j11·,t·1•J·nc: ,.,y- ar:·1/ i,·1r,,'i 10 
'- '-' C..-~ .,_, .,_,, '-' (_) .,_,, ..,_,. -..,.) 11 t',' '-"· 
However, PresicJent Rodriguez's motives were more tr1an 
po 1lt1ca1 He a1~gress ive 1 y sought 1 and reform as a means to 
economic recovery and in doing so made a clear break vvith the 
~,la;.: i mato. ~1any of the off i c i a 1 s in his government changed as 
agrarian reform accelerated. He chose new· off i c i a 1 s more 
a:b1d 
91b1d 
101b1d 
a 11 gned w itr1 tr1e G i 1-Cardenas' agrari st as who supported 
increased 1 and confiscations, as he moved away from the 
conservative element vvhich inc1uded the novv reactionary 
Ca11es. L icend1ado .Alfonso Pomania Ferreira, Of icial Mayor of 
the Ministry of Agricu1ture resigned his position effective 
.January 15, 1933. His resignation had been forced by certain 
members of Congress due to his opposition to the reforms 
vv't"'11ch r1e declared had been put through Congress by radical 
elements. These radical elements included two Federal 
Deput 1 es, I ngen i ero Luis L. Lecrn, Edi tor of El Nacional and 
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f orrner 1'·1rnister of Agriculture, and lngeniero Marte R Gomez, 
former Minister of .Agriculture during the presidency of Portes 
Gi1 \Nhen the Nationa1 Agrarian Commission had been more 
active than at any other t 1 me in granting of e j i dos to rura 1 
cornrn unities. 1 1 
Pef orm Leg 1s1 at ion Stepped IJp 
President Rodriguez and his new co 11 aborators 
accelerated 1egislation of 1and reform. On January 9, 1933, El 
Nacfonal reported that the Supreme Court had handed down a 
decision that amended .Article 1 O of the .Agrarian Lavv of 
.January 6, 1915. The ref arms of this lavv made binding that 
propr1 et ors. affected by re so 1 ut ions of do tat ions or 
11~,JAUS 81252/1785, ~~o.2171, R Clark, ~January 17, 1933, Reel 82 
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restitutions of e Ji dos or vvaters would ho 1 d no r1 ght for either 
ordinary iegal recourse or for the extraordinary legal recourse 
of amparo against such re solutions. Therefore, owners had no 
1ega1 recourse beyond making ob J ect ions to the Nati ona 1 
.Agrarian Commission. Since such a decree could not be put 
as 1 de by a dee is.ion of tr1e Court, neither the owners nor the 
campesinos couM 1-1ave any doubt as to its val idity.12 
On !'1arcr1 31, 1 933 President Podr1 guez signed an 
ex.ecut ive order revoking the President i a 1 Order of August 
31, 1932 granting the ~~at1onal .Agrarian Commission authority 
in matters connected to the establishment of agri cultural 
settlernents.13 Then on July 26, 1933, a PresMential decree 
'Nas pub 11 shed in the Diario O.ficial in 1Nh i ch he revoked a 11 
decrees previously issue1j by President Ortiz Rubio which ha1j 
granted to the population of various states certain periods of 
time in vvhich to present petitions for· the restitution or 
do tat ion of e 11 dos and at the end of such periods, the .Agrar1 an 
Commissions could be dissolved. The states were to revert 
back to the law of .January 6, 1915. The Federal Government 
r:a1j been receiving requests from communities in the states 
that the .Agrarian Commissions resume their function mg and 
accept nevv petitions for restitutions and dotations of lands 
an1j waters. Again, to minimize concern by the landowners, 
Undersecretary of .A.gr1culture, Parras said this did not mean 
12r,LA.IJS· 812. 52/ 1784, r·~o. 21 94, R Cl ark, January 20, 1 933, Reel 82 
13NAUS 81252/1797, No.6, J. Daniels, April 20, 1933, Reel 8'.2. 
the F edera 1 Government had embarked on a po 1 icy of increased 
activity \Nlth regard to dotations but simply that it did not 
fee 1 it had the 1ega1 right to deny agrarians communities the 
ri 1~r1t to petition. 14 
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.An editorial in the El Universal of .July 28, 1933, pointed 
out that from 1915 to 1932, 13,019 applications for ejidos 
had been presented to the ~~ational Agrarian Commission, but 
that only 5,334 vvere definitely sett1ed up to 1932, leaving 
7,6.:35 cases unsettled. The editor1al further added that in 18 
years, the agrarian question had cost the F edera 1 Government 
40,079,605pesos.1 s After laying tr'1is groundwork, El 1Vac10nal 
putl1ished an article on July 29, 1933, reporting an interview· 
vv 1 n, r·1in is t er of .A 1~r 1 cul tu re, Francisco S. E 1 ias. He stated that 
tr1e entire National Agrarian Commission had been completely 
reorganize1J to expedite business by the Commission so that it 
vv·oul1J be possitile to decide upon more than a thousan1J cases 
per year eartolome Vargas Lugo, vvas appointed Official 1"1ay'Or 
of the Comm1s·31on. As Governor of Hidalgo, Lugo ha1J the 
reputation of being proactive in granting a great many 
dotat1ons of eJ1dos.1e. 
President Pedri guez cont rnuecJ to step up his program of 
aggressive parcelation of land. On October 11, 1933, r1e issued 
instructions to the National .A.grar1an Commission to direct the 
14NA.U~· t1252/1809, ~Jo 419. J. Daniels, July 29, 1933, Reel 82 
15~tAUS 812.52/1313, r~o 439,,.J Daniels, August 4, 1933, Reel 82. 
1CNAUS 812.52/1810, ~~o 424,J. Daniels, August 1, 1933, Reel 82. 
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local agrar1an commisssions to expedite al 1 cases pending 
tlefore tr1ern. Undersecretary of Finance, 1'1arte R Gomez issuecJ 
orijers placing at the disposal of tr1e Ministry of .Agriculture, 
propert1es nO\N r·,eld by the Federal Government be used to 
sat 1 sfy the agrarian needs of the vi 11 ages adJ oi ni ng these 
propert1es.11 In accor,jance w1tr1 orders issued by the Minister 
of .Agr1culture, from October 20 to November 10, 1933, 54,091 
r,ectares of land \Nere distributed to 4,218 ejidatar1os. This 
1]1str1but1on of land was effecteij under 45 presidential 
r·eso1utions an 1J 17,000 per·sons benefite,j. lt 
The Grand .Agrarian Commission 
:v1eanvvr1i1 e, the Cham tier of Deputies named members to a 
Gran1J .A.1]rarian Commission in .A.ugust 1933 to study the 
ref orrn of the agrarian laws as they should apply to the 
ere at 10n cf a new .A.grari an Department and incorporate th i ·3 
proposal into the Six Year Plan. Members of the Commission 
rncluoec Deputy Gilberto Fab1la, Deput·; .Angel Posada, Marte 
G6mez, and Ga:x i o 1 a, w ltr1 tr1e 1 atter two members representing 
tr:e Rcdr·1guez viewpoint. Two distinct ideologies were 
r~epresented Deputy Fabila \A/anted collectives and socialized 
cre 1Jlt and transport. President Rodr1guez based r1is capitalist 
l'"''i'C: O•":\C::'>/1°"'" ~·'r "71'4 I Dan1·e1~ o~t'"lbe 1° 19'' n~e1 ° 0 :'1.·-·,.._).._;1._.1IL_,._)L..._/ V'-tL., 1-,,..,J,/\_J 1'-') '0, l. \._, _,r \)) ._).._),~,e UL 
1 Et.J.t..US E 1:=52/1 C.36. l'JC•. Ci 18, J. Danie ls, l~overnber 23, 1933, Ree 1 
~.,., 
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reform on the country's economy and budget limitations. The 
i:::;,utcome was a compromise t;,etween the two ideo1ogies19 and 
tr1is compromise was represented in the Six Year Plan. The 
rad1ca1s \,\/on the creation of an autonomous Agricultura1 
Department vvith mi~<ed commissions consisting of local and 
federal members, and the creation of a minimum fund of 50 
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mi 1i10n pesos to facilitate the deve 1 opment of the e 1 i ,jos 20 
Ro1jr1guez secured the dlv1sion of individual parcels witr1rn tr1e 
e Ji dos ratr1er than co 11 ect iv es and reform w lth in f i sea 1 means. 
The only limitation \/I/JS that agricultural product1on \/I/as 
requffe,j to satisfy rural population centers. 21 More 
importantly, Rodriguez put h1mse1f in charge of the new 
autonomous agri cu 1tura1 department. 
President Rodr 1 guez and trie agrari st as took 1 and ref orrn 
comp1ete1y out of the hands of the states and the Congress. 
The SD< Year· Plan ca11e1j for the renevval of land division under 
a more s1mp11fied system of greater federal admrnistrat1on 
ratrier tr1an state so that this division could proceed more 
rapid1y. Under the o1d system of loca1 Agrarian Commissions 
an1j a Nati ona 1 Agrarian Commission not much 1 and had been 
i·?-:-zvi Medin, El Mm1rnato Presidenc1a1. H1storia Politi ca Del Max1mato 
1928-1935 U1exico City Ediciones Era, 1972), p 141. 
='Ctorenzo Meyer, H1:.tor1a De La Pevoluc16n Mex1cana 19-::·s-1934 Vol 
12 Lo: lnicios De La lnst1tuc1onalizac1on La Polit1ca Del Max1mato (Mexico City 
El Coleg10 De Mexico, 1978l, p 96 
21Tzv1 Medin, El Mmimato Pres1dencial. H1stor1a Po11t1ca Del f1ax:imato 
1923-1935 (Mexico City. Ediciones Era, 1972), p 141. 
d1 str1 buted recently. Off i c i a 1 statistics showed merely 
196,000 hectares for 1933, the lowest point since 1922 and a 
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·srna11 fraction of tr1e averaide year fol1ovving 1922. A.n 
1rnportant reason for this s.lowdown had been tr1e refusal of the 
central t;iovernment to conf 1 rrn the "prov is 1 ona l" 
reo~ str~ but ions \Nh 1 cr·1 state governments had been continuing 
to rnake.== Pr-·iOr to U--1e ueation of tr1e Six Year Plan, 
Poer 1 guez r·,ad act rve 1y 1eg1s1 ated for agrar1 an ref orrn. t'Ww r1 is 
goal vvas to solve the agrarian problem, in so far as possible, 
our~n1J trie last year of his aamrn1strat1on by usurping al 1 
povver f rorn the states and the Congress. 
The Pres.1 dent's A.grar1 an Commission 
On December 13 1933, Pres11jent Podr1quez gave a 
r-:res'der·,t1a1 me·ssage to tr;e Congress regarding the creation of 
an A.grar1an Department of the Government to take over 
t-,ar-,,j 1 mg of the agrarian la1Ns from the Department of 
A1Jr1culture. Article 27 of the Constitution, wt11ch was 
arnen,jea by Congres.s before it adjourned on December 26, 
1 933 created this nevv independent department of the 
guv·E:rnrnent functioning under the direct orders of tr1e 
Pre·s i 1jent. The department \Nas assisted by an A.(jv i sory Body 
of five rnenbers appo rnted by the President and Deputy A.nge l 
22'-Jnr1r1 F 'd Dulle::., Yesterday In Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
19: 9-1936 ( Austir1 Uriivers1ty of Te>;as Press, 1961 ), p 599 
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Posaija was appointed c1-·11 ef of tl1 is department.23 The decr·ee 
publ is.r·1e1j 1n the O.ficfal D7ano of .January 12, 1934, granted the 
E;..ecut1ve special po'vvers until .August 31, 1934, to issue this 
~·~ev·/ Lav,/ of Organization for the Ministries of State and to 
arnen 1j tr1e existing agrarian legislation.24 The former· National 
A 1Jrar i an Comm 1 ss ion, function mg under the decree of .January 
6, 1915 and presided over by the Secretary of .A.griculture, 
cea:=;eij to exist.=~, 
F r· 1 ~ e 1' / 1 r· e t i.-1 P p ~d c: c: -::. q P r· r· t h e b i l 1 Pr P c: i de r· t P n a· r· i· g u P 7 .._i I ' .._I ./\,; ' I :J I '-' '-! '-) C..i ...,,; '-' ...) ' ' I ) ' ...... . _J ' , I \ '- .., L 
·=ubm1ttea to Congress a oraft of an organic la\11.1 governing the 
functrnns of tr1e .Agrarian Department. This lavv was in 
acccir,jance wltr1 the recommendations contained in the Six 
Year Plan. The work \Nr11cr1 in the past has been handled by 
1oca1 .A.grarian Commissions and private executive committees 
v .... :as. taken over by rn1xed commissions, by private executive 
C ornrn 1 t tees, and by commissariats representing the ovvners of 
e 11,jos State governors no longer had J ur1sd1 ct ion in agrarian 
rnatter·s .:=:c 
Pr· es i dent Pocw1 guez saw to it that a 11 the "provisional 
possessions" vvhich ha1j been held up in recent years, v-;ere 
automat i ca 11 \I confirmed wherever the 1 oca l re so 1 ut ions had 
0 ') 
c, ,..-
23~·1.A.u::. 812.52/ 12.53. Ho 1004, ..J Daniels, .January 17, 1934, Reel 
.24r•J.AUS f, 1252/18':<?, l~o 998, .J Daniels, . ..January 15, 1934, Peel 82 
r, c r. I ' ' ) r r ' ') C' ') .. C( C' 1 t . g a - J D . . 1 - J - . r ' a 7 4 R . . 1 8 ':' --,,.,...,1,~01_..J_/1-..,..J,,,'10 ,o ... ar11e::i, anuary lo, 1,.J, et,_ 
2·c r.Jt.US 81252 1 1532. 1 ~~0 597, J Daniels, December 15, 1933, Peel 
not been tr1e sub J ect of spec lf i c actions taken in oppos it i on.27 
He issued a decree of .January 8, 1 934 sett mg a term of th i rt·; 
1jays. f rorn .January 1, 1 934 during which owners of property 
affected by provisional decrees of dotat ion of e j i dos cou 1 d 
subm lt a 11 egat ions against such decrees. After thirty days 
these cases vvere considered closed and there was 
automat 1ca1 ly issued a president i a 1 re so 1 ut ion confirming the 
1jec is ion 1·en1jere 1j by the local autrwri ti es.2c. 
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A meet rng on February 1 6 discussed the regu 1 at ions to be 
used in which future dotations and restitutions of lands and 
\A/aters 1.A/ould be carrie1j out within the general outline of the 
Si:x Year Plan.29 The Commission determined that facilities 
\A/Ould be given to owners of haciendas. If land dotations were 
not cultivated, the lands would be given to others for 
cuit1vat1on. In addition, other facilities vvould be given to land 
O\Nners in order that they might cultivate the 1 ands and not 
211ovv tr·:ern to remain i 1jle as often had been the case.3o 
27John F.\fv' Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico .A Chronicle of trie Revolution 
1919-1936 (,A.ustrn University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 599. 
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2'3i'~.A.U5 81252/184'3, N·'.) 992, J. Daniels, January 12, 1934, Reel 
29NAUS 812.52/ 1857, ~Jo 1111, J Daniels, February 1934, Reel 82 
30N.A.US 812.52/ 1862, l\lo. 1i82 .. J. Daniels, March 2, 1934, Reel 82 
The promulgation of the first Agrarian Code of March 22, 
1934 fcwrnu1ated primarily by Fabila31 r·ecognized all the 
le1~1slation dispersed until then: The Law of Dotation and 
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Pest ltut ion of Lands and V/aters, the Repart lt ion of EJ i da 1 
Lands and of the Patrimony Paree 1 ari o EJ i da 1, New Centers of 
,A,gra1~i an Popu 1 at ions and the Nati ona 1 Agrarian Registry. 32 Tr1e 
.Agrar1 an Code introduced the concept of ind iv i dua 1 parce 1 s 
vvithin established population centers as a means of 
ma1ntaining the socia1 and econom1c strength of the 
communities already established around the ejidos including 
·::crwo1s and local financial institutions and to protect the 
campesinos from exploitation. However, the Code also allowed 
est at; 11 shment of nevv popu 1 at ion centers if it meant better 
ut 111 zat ion of tr1e natura 1 resources. 33 With this Code, 
Pres 1 dent Podri guez proceeded with r1 is goal of cap Ha 11 st 
production \A/ ith rn the e ii dos. 
The Department of .Agri cu 1 tu re arranged for the 
1j!str1bution of approximately forty million hectares of 
nat 1ona1 1 ands to he 1 p e><ped1 te the so 1 ut ion. It estab 11 shed the 
organization of techn i ca 1 br1 gades vvh i ch were charged with 
31Jav1e1- F Ga.\1ola, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (11exico: 
E·dltor1al Cultura, 1938), p. 449. 
32Lorenzo Meyer, Histor1a De La Revo 1uc16n Mexicana 19/8-1934. Vol. 
1:::· Lo'= lr:1cios De La lnstituc1onal17acion La Polit Ka Del Max1mato (Mexico City 
El Coleg10 De Mexico, 1978), p 163. NAUS 812.52/ 1867, ~~o 1257, March 
23, 1934 .. Reel 82. 
33,Javier F. Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodriouez ( 1932-34) (Mexico. 
E,d1tor1al Cultura, 1938), p 456 
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defining boundaries and dividing the lands. Once this was done, 
the Department entrusted the colonization division to take the 
necessary steps to distribute the population equally on the 
1 an 1js so di vi ,jed and estab 1 i sr1 a just economic equi 11 i br1 um.34 
The Department increased personne 1 and mi 1 i tary engineers to 
speed up distribution. In addition, the law stipulated that 
tr1ere was a maximum of 180 days for land division grants to 
conform to the nevv Code. 
Pres i aent Rodriguez sougr1t to provide the Banco Nae i ona 1 
de Credito .A.grari o \Al ith enough money to enab 1 e the many who 
\A/ere receiving parcels of land to get them into production. In 
spite of the Worl1j Depression's effect on official resources, he 
maintained irrigation works, construction of roads and 
provided local credit organizations, although regional 
difference= e~<isted. The Banco created agencies in Campeche, 
Durani]O, Morelia, NavaJoa and Pachuca; multiplied operations 
in .A.guasca1 ientes, Ciudad .A.nahuac, Celaya, Cordoba, Chihuahua, 
.Ja 1 apa, .Ja 11 sco, Mexico, More 1 os, Oaxaca, Pueb 1 a, Oueretaro, 
Tarn au 11 pas ana Va 11 e de Mexico. At the end of Rodrl guez's 
term in office, there were 1491 credit es tab 1 i shments with 
103,444 members of which 85, 155 were eJidatarios and 
1 8 ,286 vvere srna 11 agri cultura 1 i sts. The agri cultura 1 credit 
1Nas an operat10n that was essentially local . .A.s compl irnent to 
34~JAU5 812.52/ 1865, t~o. 1240, Stanley Hawks, Embassy Secretary, 
f'1arch 20, 1 934, Ree 1 82 
the vvork of cre1jit, the Banco initiated the establisr1ment of 
some soc1a1 services sucr1 as rural medicrne.3:::. 
Tr1e Cuerpo Consultivo A.grario of the new Agrarian 
Department met at least twice vveekly to act quickly on all 
accumulated appl icat1ons, vvitr1 the result that land 
distribution vvent ahead at a rate which even exceeded that of 
n·,e heyday of Portes Gil. The President's report of September 
1, 1934 a1jvise1j that between February 20, 1934 and A.ugust 
31, 1934, 1 ,281,000 r1ectares had gone to 97,000 heads of 
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f am i l 1es.36 Tr1e A.grari an Department reported it had 
distributed more than a m1111on hectares of land in the period 
from February 20 to .July 31, 1934. There had not been a single 
Pres11jent1a1 Decree published in the Diario Oficial denying a 
petition for the dotat ion or restitution of e 1 idos. The total 
numt;er of presidential re solutions was 904, \A/hi ch covered an 
area of 1,045,707.22 hectatres of land and benefitted 81 ,928 
families .. 
rv1 c:.r1 t h Pr es 1 dent i a l Pe s 
February 1 03 
rv1arch 65 
.April 357 
Hectares 
135,707.32 
77,528.61 
445,722.59 
Heads of 
Family 
8,818 
5,563 
34, 170 
-:75Javier F Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-341 (Mexico 
Ed;tcJrial Cultura, 1938), p 473-477 
36Jor1n F.W. Dulles, Yesterdav In Mexico .A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austrn University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 599. Javier F. 
1:Ja".10la, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico Editorial Cultura. 
1 9: 8 ) ' [i 46 7. 
Ma'/ 96 79,722.75 7,263 
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June 109 120,550.74 10,660 
.Ju1y 174 185890.?1 15 454 
Tota1=· 904 1.045, 122.22 81 ,928 
These tota1 figures, presented in relation to the states 
favored, are made up as f o 11 ovvs: 
State Presidential Res. Hectares Families 
Campeche '7 8,568.00 226 ~ I 
co11ma 3 1 ,992.62 150 
Ch1apas 74 82,470.42 8,629 
Ch1huar1ua 46 95,036.75 3,589 
Durango 15 26,659.36 939 
GuanaJuato 39 24,043.24 2,745 
C3uerrero 49 81} 128.36 5, 127 
Hi (ja 1 go 40 32,369.80 3,800 
._)311 =·CC 26 23,322.97 2,745 
r·1e:x i co 45 24,004.21 6, 111 
;v11 cr·1oac an 60 53,725.54 6,930 
Na\/ar1 t 
- I 1 1 23,544.77 1 ,405 
~·~uevo Leon '7 10,776.09 284 -! 
·:Ja:x.aca 10 6, 109.70 732 
Pueb 1 a 34 33,507.37 2,760 
:Jueretaro 15 19, 125.98 979 
San Lu1s Potosi 48 66,201.27 3, 194 
Srna1oa 24 23,050.85 2,054 
Sonora 9 28,871.63 1,018 
Tamau1 ipas 20 14,201.82 -,893 
Veracruz 270 213,390.70 -,830 
Yucatan 1 1 46,636.91 -, 132 
Zacateca=· 49 106,383.86 4,656 
--;; --; 
37 t·J.AUS 81252/1885, ~Jo 1715, . ..J Dariiel::., .August 25. 1934, Reel 8'.::' 
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Despite the pos.it1ve numbers, political motives alvvays played 
a role. Veracruz had the largest number of hectares 
1j1·3tr1buted vvh1le reform in Lovver California, where President 
Roori guez o\vne 1j mucr1 agr1 cu aural 1 and hi mse 1 f, was 
none~ l stent. St i 11 Rodriguez can be credited with mak mg the 
break \/\/ 1 tr, the i"1a;: 1 ma to, taking contro 1 away from the states. 
and Congress an1j personally laying the groundwork for 
Cardenas rn tr1e realm of agrar1an reform. 
1 n·-) 
0··1apter VI 11: Labor Reform, Me><ican Capita1 and Nationa1 ~L 
Economic Deve 1 opment 
President Rodriguez's goal was to meet the demands of 
both lab or interests and Mexican capita 1 in order to f aci 1 i tate 
national economic growth. His 1abor reform was guided by the 
Feoera1 Labor Law of 1931 and the principles of the Six Year 
Plan which he developed with the PNP between July and 
December 1 933. One goal of the Six Year Plan was to put 
.Art i c 1e1 23 into practice and contra l 1 ab or by it but a 1 so raise 
tr:ew standard of living with minimum wage leg1slat1on. On 
tr1e side of f'lex1can capital, President Rodriguez wanted to 
oeve 1 op nat i ona 1 com pan 1 es and create a semi off 1cia1 
regulatory and protective agency to defend the Mexican middle 
class from foreign interests. Thus, he wanted to intervene and 
re13u 1 ate the re 1 at ions bet ween a 11 the different sectors but 
re·~pect the actions of the same as he supported cautious 
rntervent ion in 1 ab or re 1 at ions. 1 Rodriguez provided Mexican 
c2pitai vvith a stable, procap1tal1st government and a uniform 
nat 10na 1 1 ab or code which offered the poss i bi 1 i ty of a 
I ega 1 is tic re so 1 ut ion to 1 abor-cap lta 1 re 1 at ions and 1 essened 
the authority of state off i c i a 1 s to intervene with Podr1 guez 's 
re 1~1Jlat1on of labor.=-
1
TZ\il Medin, El Min1rnato Pres1denc1al. Historia Pol1tica Del Maxirnato 
1923-1935 0·1ex1co City Ed1cior1es E1-a, 1972), p 14:2 
.:::Ale;x r·i Saragoza, Tr1e r1onterrey Elite & trie 11exican State. 1880-
; 940. 1Au::.tm Univers1t'/ of Texas Press, 1988), p 135. 
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On August 28, 1931, one year prior to Rodr1 guez taking 
office, the Federal Labor Law gave legislative form to the 
provisions of .Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution. This 
article included a call for a minimum wage, an eight hour day, 
a six day week and double pay for overtime. It also stipulated 
that emp I oyers wou 1 d be 1 iable for ace i dents and occupat i ona 1 
diseases and would at their own expense provide comfortable 
ano sanitary dvve 11 ings and compu 1 sory school mg. It 
proc 1 aimed the legality of strikes, and addressed how disputes 
betvveen 1 at) or and capital would be arbitrated. 
The Labor Coae offered concessions to labor in return 
for closer Federal regulation of industrial relations. 
Labor disputes \Nould be submitted to a board of conciliation 
an\J art)itration. This board would consist of equal numbers of 
representat1ves of both lat;or and capital and one 
representative of the government. Tr1is was signlf icant in that 
it a 11 ovved the government to have the contra 11 mg vote in a 
iabor cJispute and was used as a key mechanism for contro1 ling 
labor. Article 576 of this law gave very broad powers to the 
tJoaras. of cone i l i at ion and arbltrat ion so that they cou 1 d, in the 
case of each dispute, order the institution of a 11 sorts of 
conaitions of work, among them wage scales, hours of work, 
and tr1e increase or aecrease of personne 1. Among the F edera 1 
Labor Law's approximately 700 articles were important 
provisions leading to compulsory trade unionism.= 
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As one of former President Rubia's Ministers of Industry, 
Commerce, and Labor in 1932, General Rodriguez had been 
interested in plans to reorganize that Ministry. The 
equi 1 ibrium between the organic development and the 
integration of nat i ona 1 industry and commerce on one hand, and 
the solution of the problems of the workers on the other, was 
very aifficult to realize. This was amplified because both 
basic aspects of the economic and soc i a 1 life were under the 
charge of one ministry. .As President he qui ck ly acted to sp 1 it 
the fv1 in i stry into the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of 
t~at iona 1 Economy.4 The new autonomous Labor Department, 
which now reported directly to the President, could devote 
itse1f to the accumulating and increasing number of cases 
vvh1ch, with the new labor legislation, were coming before the 
Boards of Cone i l i at ion and Arbitration. With this department 
unaer riis control, Rodriguez commanded the decisions of the 
arb 1 trat ion board. 
3John F.\tl.Dulles, Yesterdav In Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austin Univers 1 ty of Texas Pr-ess, 1 961 ), p 514 
-'iJav1er F.Gax1ola, El Pres1dente Rodriquez ( 1932-3L.J) u~ie:x1co 
E01tor1al Cultura, 1938), p 496 
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Labor Re 1 at ions and Nati ona 1 Capita 1 
During Rodriguez's tenure, he tried to obtain unity with 
the Camara Nati ona 1 de 1 TrabaJ o but its 1 eadersh i p was out for 
its own se1f-interest, not that of the workers, and riva1ry 
between leaders prevented this unification. In the power void 
1 ef t aft er the CROM monopoly during the Ca 11 es presidency, ana 
1.11nth tr1e passage of the labor code, the new strength given to 
i ab or organizations caused cons i derab 1 e bickering among their 
lea1jers. None of the worker syndications - the surviving 
CRO l'1, C.C3.T and others- represented hegemony of the 
problems of the worker, much less represented the interests 
of a national movement.= Gaxio-ia wrote that the directors of 
the 1 aborrng masses 1 ost their character as 1 eaders and became 
irresponsit1 ie agitators. c· 
Tr1e President himse1f intervened to 1ay' down the basis 
of settlement in a number of important labor disputes. His 
a\Nard of December 10, 1933sett1 ing a bus strike, was the 
first award to place in a 1abor contract the clause making it 
obi igatory for the company to use exclusively workers 
belonging to the union. Rodriguez announced his arbitra1 
decision in a dispute between the National Railways of Mexico 
'=1t1id) p 487 
5Jc1!-11-1 F.'vV.Dul1es, YestE-1-,jay lr1 l-1f\iC0 .. A_ G1ron1cle of ti-1e Revolut1or1 
1 9 1 ;- 1 '.? 3 6 ( Aust i n Un i v f 1- s 1 t y of Tex: a s P 1- es s, 1 9 6 1 ) , p 6 O O. 
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and the Union of Ra1 lroad Workers on June 14, 19347 When he 
intervened he not only helpea this union obtain the recognition 
of the Pai lways, but ordered that the contracts include the 
union's exclusive rights in the case of hiring and f iring.e 
President Rodriguez took steps in these disputes to see 
to it triat contracts between labor and companies included 
clauses which made the unions exc 1 us i ve bargaining agents 
vvith r1grits to say whom the companies should employ and 
s~-:ou!d fire. This was a privi iege of the unions which tr1e 
Presi1jent wanted to be use(j in a manner which would not 
a11ow tr1e labor leaders to make reprisals harmful to the 
workers themselves, and he sought means of limiting it to 
cases \Nhere there were legal reasons why a worker should be 
removed. The goal of the exclusionary clause was to maintain 
tr1e 'v' i gor of trie synd1 cation and at the same ti me, protect the 
ind1v1dua1 1.Norkers from the opression and abuses of their 
leaders. He included tr11s as an essential point of tr1e Six Year 
Plan.9 
Strike movements became prevalent in June 1934 as 
reporteij in the Mexico City press and inc 1 uded such di verse 
interests as the National Railways of Mexico, El Aguila Oil 
Company, and fourteen other potential strikes in the San 
7~iAUS 312.5045/ 171, Johr1 S. Littell, Americar1 Vice Cori::,ul, Jul'/ 3, 
1934 .. Ree 1 58. 
:o·.Jc;rm F V/Dul1es .. Yesterday ln Mexico. A crwonicle of trie Revolutior1 
1 9 1 9 - : 9 3 6 \ Au =· t i n U rFv er- s i t y of Te :,.; a s Press, 1 9 6 1 ) , p 6 O 1 
?Javier- F.Gaxioia, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) ll"lexico 
Editorial Cultura, 1938), p 499-503. 
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CristotJal sugar mi11, El Oro Mining, Atlas factory, Mexican silk 
factory, E1 A.gui1a Textile factory, Parke Davis drug company, 
bus 1 ine str1 kes, E 1 Progresso factory, YMCA, S inc 1 air gaso 1 ine 
st at ion, /\Zarco l'1in ing Company, Centra 1 Nati ona 1 hat factory, 
Coahu1la and Zacatecas Railway, Sabinas Coal Companies and 
tr'1e Mexican Zinc Company.1c, 
The strike of the Union of Oi 1 Workers of Soutr1ern 
Veracruz against Me><ico·s largest oi 1 company, El Aguila 
['1ex i can Petro 1 eum Company, and its subsidiary, I ngeni eros. y 
Constuctores Martin, SA. started on May 9, 1934 On '-June 6 it 
\Nas learned that, at the suggestion of Labor Minister 
Bo J (Jrquez, President Podri guez had been named arb lter. The E 1 
.i:\gu i 1 a str1 ke enaea soon afterward, although lt was not until 
earl·y in July that tr1e details of Rodriguez's awar(j became 
knc'vvr:. Tr1e presidential decision established regional 
commissions to consider grievances and make awar1js. Each 
commission consisted of three members- a f edera 1 inspector, 
a representative of the interested labor organizations and a 
representative of the company concerned. The Presi1Jent's 
dee is ion a 1 so est ab 1 i shed the uni on·s exc 1 us i ve rights in the 
aeterrninat1on of company employees; it reduced the work 
vveek to 46 1 /2 hours, cal led for obligatory payments on the 
weekly rest day, established numerous worker tieneflts, 
increase1J the number of holidays w lth pay, revised vacation 
1 '~l4AUS 81:::'5045/171, '-John S Littell, Arner1car1 Vice Cori::.ul, ,_July 3, 
193~. Reel 52. 
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and retirement po 11 cy, and increased workers' vvages. 
Furthermore, it est ab 1 i shed the methods to be used in grant mg 
promotions, based on year·s of service and competence.11 
.A.s a resu 1t of the settlement with E 1 Agui 1 a, the workers 
uni on of the Hu as tee a Petroleum Company asked for contract 
changes in accord vv ith the principles estab 11 sr1ed for the El 
.A.gu i 1 a workers. .A. strike notice was issued to take pl ace on 
October 6 but the conflict mg parties agreed to submit the case 
to president i a 1 arbitration. Huasteca had a 1 ready vol untar·i 1 y 
offereo tr1ese concessions, and this was seen as a ploy by ttw 
\Norkers for more concess10ns, which could then be demanded, 
in turn, by the El .A, 1~u11a workers.12 ~Jonetr1eless, on October 2, 
Ro(jriguez was accepted as arbiter, and his decision on OctotJer 
1 ~\~/as that there vvas an inequity and the labor contract 
vvoul1j tie modified benefiting the workers of the Huasteca 
Pi::tr('.-1i::1Jm ,-nmpar111:: ~-V~ ,_J 11. 
1 1Jc1:·,r, F.V.'.Dul1es, Yes.terdai :n i1exico A Chronicle of the Re'-1oiut1on 
1913-1 ?3t· ( Austm University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 601 
1 :=:r ~.t-.u::;. 8 1 2. '.:/J45/ 185, Jo1·1r1 S Lit te 11, .Ameri car1 Vice Cor1::.u 1, 
~Jo.-ember 12, 1934, Reel 58 
13John F1t/Dulles. Yesterday In Mexico ,A, Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-193'6 (,A,ust1r,: University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 601. 
14~i.A.US 812.S04S/ 185, John S Lit tel 1, American Vice Consul, 
~!0vember 1 '.:'.'., 1934, Reel 58. 
1 5 I ti 1 rJ 
Toward the end of 1934 which also marked the end of 
the Rodriguez aamrnistration, a number of strikes wer·e 
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1jec la red void by the Central or Federal Boards of Cone i l i at ion 
ano Arbitration in Me:<i co City as a reaction against continual 
1 ab or agitation. In 1 i ne with continued government interest in 
the danger of strikes- a number which were to be general 
strikes- \Alas the appointment, in several cases, of the chief of 
the Department of Labor and in one case of President Rodriguez 
as arbiter. Practica11y a11 of the strikes appeared to have been 
averted or terminated, at least for the time being, although the 
1 ong st and mg disputes on the important Nati ona 1 and Mexican 
Pa: 1 wa;/s r1a•j not been sett ·1 e·j 14 Tr1e ·~overnment owned 
Nati ona 1 Ra i 1 ways and its workers had signed an agreement on 
Octot;er 6, and on October 17, the President designated an 
arb lter to preside over a spec i a 1 commission to so 1 ve pend mg 
rn sputes ~ .. jevertr.e 1 ess, a strike was st i 11 tr1reatene 1j 1 :. 
President Rodriguez, recognized that the future wou 1 d 
·:ee 1mpGrtant labor problems in the field of public services, 
(jue in part to professional agitators, and personally favored 
ot)1igatory arbitration. In a meeting with Vasconcelos, Michel, 
Gil, Saenz, BorJ 6rquez, Gaxiola, the pres1 dents of the Boards of 
A.rt-itration and Conciliation, and a consulting labor la\Nyer it 
was decided that obligatory arbitration was constitutional. It 
was. felt that obligatory arbitration would not limit the 
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const i tut i ona 1 right to strike but wou 1 d f o 11 ow the strike 
aec 1 a ration. 1 e:. Tri is a 11 owe 1J the federal government to contra l 
both capital and labor and above all promote profitability, the 
primary ob J ect i ve of the Rodriguez adm i ni strati on. 
i"'lini mum v/age: Centerpiece of Development 
Estab1 ishing a minimum wage was the centerpiece of 
Pres, 1 dent Rodriguez's economic deve 1 opment for Mexico as he 
be 11 eved generalized consumption vvas the only means capab 1 e 
of assuring the success of production, thus harm on i zing lab or 
and capital. "The success of the entire economic process now 
depends, in the f ina1 analysis, on the capacity of consumption 
of the great masses of trie people "11 
.Address mg the need for a hi gr1er standard of 1 iv mg, 
Rodriguez stated on August 18, 1933 in his circular to trie 
QOvernors: 
"As the Executive of the Nati on, I have been deep 1y and 
constantly preoccupied by the impoverished condition of 
our working c 1 asses. It is on the nat i ona 1 conscience, 
that the peasant masses main 1 y, 1 ack the most essentl a 1 
e 1 em en t s of cont em po r a ry c i v i l i z at i on s, as the i r 1 eve 1 of 
living can be considered inferior to the one enjoyed in 
the maJ or1 ty of the educated nations. The fie 1 d and town 
1 '\Jc,t-ir, F \'/.Dulle;:., Ye;:,terda/ In Mexico. A Chronicle of trie Revolution 
1919-: 936 (Aust1r1 University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 602 
17r,MUS 812.5041 /58, Circular to Governors, August 18, 1933, Reel 
58 
vvorkers continue to be underfed; the qua1ity of the 
1 11 
c. l o t r1 rn g used does not eve r1 ans w er c l i rn at i c needs; v e 1~y 
rare 1 y is there a sma 11 surplus for modest diversions, 
vvr1i1e the sum vvh1ch should be had for emergencies, 
savings and culture does not even exist. .. Our 
people have bare1y emerged from the 1amentable position 
to wr1ich they were relegated during the colonial 
per1od."1 E 
President Rodriguez linked the standard of living to the 
need for more purchasing pow·er in order to stimulate 
pro duet ion: 
"A.t the present time it is not possible to accept the 
ttwory of the separation of capital and labor ... The 
impoverished state of the work mg masses re-echoes 
throughout bus mess, making it sma 11 and reducing its 
volume to such a degree that techn i ca 1 organization of 
t:us iness 1 s rendered i mposs i b 1 e; thus i so 1 at ing 
pros,perity wh1cr1 is the result of large scale production." 
By exp 1 o it ing man and pay 1 ng a wage of 0.25 centavos or even 
iess so tr1at peas,ants could compete with tractors, and mule 
(jr1vers vv1th railroads, only then was less technology seen as 
rnore prcf1tab1e19 
In Rodriguez's appeai a fevv' days later to all 
industrialists and agr1 cul turi sts through the press, he pointed 
out that by increasing worker's purchasing power, industries 
in Mex 1 co would increase production and bring these industries 
~ nt o further techni ca 1 advancement. If Mex 1 co can improve 
12>1 bid 
191b1d. 
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technology, the increased wages would be compensated for by 
better pr·oduct iv i ty b;1 tr1e workers.20 "Tri is Executive does not 
lijnore the complexity of the problem and the innumerable 
factors thereof which must be considered if we are to solve it 
... but we must resolutely attack the problem." 21 The wage 
increase was to be compensated for by an increase in the 
productivity of the laborer through rationalization of industry, 
oeve 1 opment of technique, rotation of crops, use of machinery, 
anci scientific fertilizat1on.22 
Minimum Wage: .Aggressive Legislation 
A.s governor of the northern part of Baj a California, 
Podr1 guez had succeeded in having municipal commissions 
there set a four peso daily minimum wage. Because minimum 
\ 1·/age vva~ successful for the economy in the Northern District, 
Roar1guez wanted to implement it nationwide as President 
One of his first steps as President of Mexico was to create a 
commission to study Mexican wages. The President then 
carried on a personal campaign to establish minimum vvages in 
the entire country, virtually dictating legislation to the State 
governors. Opposition to minimum wage was not an option. 
c: 0 
,,,_.'i.....' 
2 1~lJAU5e12.5041 /57, i·Jo. 541, J. Daniels, September 1933, Reel 58. 
2 1iJAUS 312.5041/6i, Letter to Industrialists, August 2e, 1933, Ree1 
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The Commission determined that in accordance with the 
F edera 1 Latior La\AJ, at the end of 1 932, the mini mum wage 
shou1d r1ave t)een f1x.ed in the 2,664 municipa1lties of the 
country, but according to information from the Department of 
Labor, on1y 197 Commissions had rendered their decisions. The 
r\Jorthern Territory of Lower Cal lf orn1a, where Rodriguez r1ad 
initiated the minimum wage as governor, led with a minimum 
\.vage of 3.00 pe=.os and the State of Sonora with one of 1.50 
pesos. This r1igher wage kept northern Mexico more 
competitive \~nth their ~~orth .American counterparts. 
Podr 1 guez 010 not vvant to wait until 1934, the date on which, 
in compliance with .Article 415 of the law cited, the 
comm1·ss1on entrusted \Nlth the fixing of the minimum vvage 
vvas suppose,j to ho 1 d another meet i ng.23 He proposed to amend 
.Article 415 of the Labor Lavv' to enable special committees in 
eacr1 State vvr1ich study the question of salaries to revise their 
minimum saiary sca1e every year, instead of every two years, 
as provided for in the Labor· Law.24 
PocJr1 1Juez sent a circu1ar to the governors urging triem to 
enact 1eg1slation immediately and simultaneous1y authorizing 
a minimum vvage in their districts. The President provided a 
table showing the minimum salary to be fixed in each State 
and Territory. ~~ineteen s.tates were to have a minimum salary 
~:::r-~AUS 812 5041 /58, Circular to Go·.;ernors, Augu::.t 13, 1933, Reel 
Sc 
='L11~AUS 81250411'.:»7, r~c' 541, .J Danie ls, Septeml)er 1933, Reel 58 
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of 1.00 peso, eleven states of 1.50 pesos and the Northern 
District of 3 00 pesos.2::. Tr1is was quite a distance frorn tr·1e 
4.00 peso rninirnurn wage Rodriguez r1acJ envisioned but he saw 
it on 1 >' as a first step. The next step in the seal e should be 
fixed at a rn in i mum of 2.00, the next at 3.00, and the next at 
4.00 pesos vvlth the firm conviction that wages shou1d never 
be stationary and much less, shou1 d never be reduced. The 
Comm1·ss10n could a1so fix the minimum wage for 1arger 
amounts in any municipalities where economic or geographic 
cond1t1ons indicated a need for higher wages. He also 
indicated that the actual minimum wage should be for 
unc 1 ass if i ed peasants and work rngmen, a 11 owing a speedy rise 
in tr1e fix.mg of wages for classified workingmen, miners, 
etc.=c Rodriguez wanted to fix a minimum wage 
simultaneously, as any omission would cause an economic 1ack 
of equi 11t;riurn which couid be taken advantage of by certain 
enterprises in order to make disloyal competition 27 
On .August 29, 1933, the .American Vice Consul, William 
P. Cochran vvrote 
C: C• 
~·<..,· 
"Tr1e enormous unofficial power of the Mexican 
President, and the assurance that so important a step 
\A/as taken only after approval by General Calles and other 
povvers. in the dominant National Revolutionary Party, 
251t1id. 
2GrJAUS 8125041/58, Circular to Governors, August 18, 1933, Reel 
271b1d. 
rnd1cate a fairly high probab11ity that tr1e wage scales 
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1~ecommended will t)e made effective." 20 
On September 7, 1933 Rodriguez issued an acuerdo 
express mg h 1 s sat 1 sf action that consi derab 1 e approva 1 had 
backed the idea of establishing 1.50 pesos and 1.00 peso as 
minimum wages in different states. He formed a special 
commission to coordinate all efforts to establish minimum 
·salaries. On September 12, 1933 Congress amended the Labor 
Law so as to include minimum wages.29 
In accordance with the reform of the Mexican Labor Law 
reported on November 3, 1933, the Central Boards of 
Cone 111 at ion and .Arbitration tried to convene the employers 
and vvorkers of the municipalities under their Jurisdiction to 
designate their representatives on the Special Mini mum Wage 
Commissions in order to begin their duties on November 10. 
F ai 1 i ng to do so, the Boards were to appoint the miss mg 
members \Nlthin five days and were to complete their studies 
within t1.Nenty days. The Central Boards 1.Nere to fix the 
minimum 1Nages lf the Special Commissions failed to do so, 
and \111ages were to go into effect on January 1, 1 934. The 
Board stated only unionized workers could participate in 
elect 1 on of Spec i a 1 Commissions. President Rodriguez had 
covered all of the bases in order that minimum wages would be 
22., bid. 
2·;iJor1r1 F.W.Dul1es, Yesterday In f1exico A Chronicle of trie Revolutwn 
1919-1936 (Austir1 University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 553. 
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set 1N i thout fail by January. When neither the emp 1 oyers or the 
workers appeared for regi strati on, back up procedures were 
put in place and the Special Commissions were formed. The 
Organization of Emp 1 oyers recommended among other th in gs 
that trie minimum wage be based on farming not industrial 
v11a·~es but this was not trie criteria used.30 
After the Federal Department of Labor received 
mformat1on from nearly a majority of the States that the 
Special Minimum Wage Commissions had been insta11ed, the 
National Minimum \'/age Commission formed by the President 
sent a circular directing them to establish a single minimum 
\·vage rn each municipai 1ty. They were instructed to conform 
as much as possible to the rates suggested by the President. 
The est ab 1 i sried rates cou 1 d not 1 ead to a reduction by the 
employers of wages now above the minimum. In addition, 
·vvorkers were expected to put in a full day's work, and they 
were directed to strengthen their organ i zat 1 ons, especially on 
tr1e farms, so as to obtain the benefits granted to them by 
minimum wage legislation.31 For the municipalities in most of 
the s.tates minimums higher than the 1.50 pesos were 
est ab 11 sr1ec1 :::: Tr1e F e1jera 1 Government a 1 so put into effect tr1e 
3C1r·JAUS 812.5041 /68, John S. Lit tell, American Vice Consul, ~Jovemt1 er 
27, 1933 .. R<:-el 58 
3 1 Ibid. 
32Jot-ir1 F.W.Dulles, Vester-day In Mexico A Chronicle of H1e Revolutwn 
1919-1936 (Austm University of Texas Press, 1961), p 554 
President ·s rn i ni mum wage suggestions as regarded its own 
emp 1 oyees wr1 i ch effected 2,032 emp 1 oyees. :::::: 
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Eight rnontr1s later on August 17, 1934 President 
Podriguez addressed a nationwide chain of Mexican 
broadcasting stations in which he urged the observance of the 
mini mum wage 1 avv. The message was f avorab 1 y commented 
upon in the press, but it \Vas the general be 1 ief in we 11-
inf ormed c ire 1 es that because of the divergence of the daily 
1.1/age scale rn trie various States of the Republic, its 
app 1 ication on such a sea 1 e as the President proposed 
trwougrwut the entire country' would be quite aifficult to 
real 1ze.::4 There was strong resistance by Mexican Capital 
influenced by regional competition in spite of Ro\jiguez's 
attempts to tie consumption to increased productivity. 
Nonetr1eless, Po\jriguez rnade national minimum wage laws a 
rea 11 ty in rviex i co before the rad i ca 1 and pro-1 ab or President 
Car-<Jenas used the State to support workers. 
Genera1 Economic Plan for Mexico 
In addition to minimum wage to increase consumption, 
President Rodr1 guez supported soci a 1 reforms which inc 1 uded 
::,e 
3:3~1,.;u;:. 812.5041 /58, Circular to Governors, Augu:.t 18. 1933, Reel 
c ,, 
_:·c 
34~j,AUS 81 :?.~·041 /88, ~~o 1726, J. Daniels, September 1934, Reel 
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public education and an aggressive land distribution policy, 
modern i zat 10n of agri cul tu re and an expanded industr1a1 base 
to provide the underlying economic base. He believed increased 
·::tandard of J 1ving, increased purchasing power to st i mu 1 ate 
production, improved techno 1 ogy to increase prof it ab i 1 ity of 
production and expanded industry to increase exports and 
decrease imports were a 11 i nterre 1 ated. 
In a speecr, to r,is industrialists, President Rodriguez 
e.xpandecJ upon his economic plan for Mexico. He cited 
stat1st1cs showing the capital invested in the various 
moustr1 es of Mexico ana po mted out the ab i 1 i ty of Mexico to 
become an export instead of an import country. He showed 
comr=:arative tables of imports into Mexico during 1929 
compared to those of 1932, which declined from 382 million 
pes.os to 180 m1111on pesos, the largest single import being 
ma ch mery. Imports dropped in text i 1 es, canned fish, fruits, 
corn ana eijgs, and advancements vvere made m agriculture in 
cotton, tobacco, wheat and vegetab 1 e production. 3'.::· 
Rodriguez pointed out that the value of the industrial and 
agri cu 1tura1 productions offered a marked contrast. The 
ma J orlty of the economy Vv'as based in agri cul tura 1 production 
Four-fifths of the population were agriculturists, and only a 
t er, th vvere in industry. However, tr1e gross amount of the 
aijri cul tura 1 production barely reached a figure of 722,500,000 
c~ 
._; \J 
3Sr·~.AUS 812.5041 /61, Letter to Industrialists. Auqu::.t 28, 1933, Reel 
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pesos, vvhereas the so 1 e gross production of the 
transformation industries reached a figure of 900,332,923 
pe:;os. Subtracting the sum of 351 ,222,521 pesos, the amount 
u=ed for ravv materials, plus fuel and electricity, from the 
value of the industrial production, the sum in industry's favor 
\N as 549, 1 1 0,402 pesos, equ iva 1 ent to 76% of tr1e agri cu 1tura1 
production. ::c 
But rn=tea1j of trying to rapidly become an industrial 
nation to improve the economic situation, Rodriguez knew it 
'..·'-12= more f ea= i C· 1 e to i mpro\1e the techni ca 1 organization of 
es tab 11 she1j industries, inst a 11 new ones and introduce the 
=c i ent ! f i c method to secure greater agri cu 1tura1 production 
throu1;:ih se 1 ect ion of seed, use of fertilizers, and a rotating 
S/= t em of crops, and system at 1 zed exper1menta1 p 1 ant in gs in 
tr1e tr op i ca 1 and sem i-trop i ca 1 reg1 ons. Rodriguez believed tr1e 
'.:::tate needed to cooperate in the solution by' =:upporting 
a1~ir1 cult ura 1 experiments and agri cultura 1 credit. The 
go\1ernment also needed to give protection to agricultural 
e:xport2. to increase tr1e annua 1 amounts exported 37 President 
Rocw1 1Juez imp 1 emented this po 1 icy and Cardenas acce 1 erated it 
vvr·:en he took off ice. 
361bEJ 
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National Economic Development: Mixed Economy 
The ne\v rv1rnistry of National Economy devoted its attention to 
the ideas of State economic intervention.36 As a result of the 
Ca11es-Morro\v accord, there were more U.S. investments rn 
1926 in Mexico than at the end of the Porf iriato.39 However, 
the World Depression had caused foreign investments to dry up 
ard rnt ernat i ona 1 trade to contract w 1th in the i nternat i ona 1 
economic system. Mexican economic development could 
cortinue only lf the State took up the slack by regulating and 
st i mu 1 at ing nat i ona 1 deve 1 opment. This State intervent l on i st 
pr11 losophy \A/as in sharp contrast to Calles' laissez-faire 
economic 1ibera1 ism and represented the very foundation of 
Carden1smo. 
In his f i gr1t for mini mum wages, Rodriguez pointed out 
that natura 1 resources should be rat i ona 11 y exp 1 oited to 1 eave 
an equitable profit to the country, not giving prosperit}1 to the 
absentee capita 11 st and poverty for the 1 aborers because of 
mi serab 1 e wa·~es earned. 40 "Tr1e F edera 1 Executive is disposed 
to lend a11 its moral support to negotiations exploiting the 
subsoil, endeavoring mere 1 y to have this exp 1 o ltat ion 1 eave to 
32'.John F.V/.Dulles, Yesterday In Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 600 
:::;iLorenzo ['lever, Historia De La Revolucion Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol. 
12 Los inicios De La lnstitucionalizacion La Polit1ca Del Ma.x1mato. (Mexico 
Citv El Colegio De 1·1ex1co, 1978), p 265. 
4D~JAUS 812 5041 /58, Circular to Governors, August 18, 1933, Reel 
c. ~ 
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our people at least the fair wages which people employed in 
sucr1 r1ar 1j 1abors sr1ould receive. "41 Rodriguez put this 
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phi 1 osophy to practice when he acted as arbiter in 1 ab or 
disputes w ltr1 the o i 1 industry in 1 934 But he wanted more 
tr1an higher wages for Mexican 1abor from the petro1eum 
companies; r1e wanted gains for national economic development 
as \·Ve1 l. 
In October 1932, President Rodriguez dictated an accord 
vvr1 i ch 1jec 1 ared the nat i ona 1 reserves of the free 1 ands to form 
part of the inheritance of the State and estatl1ished the 
poss i b1 l lty to cr·eate nat i ona 1 petroleum reserves.42 
".Attention must be given, in my opinion, to the fomenting 
of i ndustr1 es re 1 at mg to raw materi a 1 s and to the 
uti1ization of the natura1 resources of the country. 
Especia1 ly mining is one of our sources of wealth \A/hi ch 
has not attained the development or the technical 
aovance it should have, working a1so, toward the 
coordination of a 11 the factors contributing to the 
proouct1on of Mexico, in order duly to organize the 
nat i ona 1 econonw "43 
f 
Pedri gu1 zmo was most evident in economic po 1 icy. 
President Rodriguez adopted his own policy which was unlike 
t1oth Cardenas' co 11 ect ive vision and Ca 11 es' nonintervention i st 
mode 1: the mixed economy. Pep lacing the predominant be 1 ief 
41 r·jAUS 812 5041 /61, Letter to I ndustriaii sts, August 28, 1 933, Reel 
co 
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42~:av1er F Ga><iola, El Presidente Rodrigue? ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
E,j 1t01- 1 a i Cui ti_Wa, 1 938), p 242-246. 
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in the interests of the co 11 ect i ve over the rights of the 
ind1vi dual, he promoted the inlt i at ive of the ind iv i dua 1 under 
tr1e vigilance and regulation of the State.4.::i He modlf ied his 
i\mer1 can capita 1 i st phi 1 osophy to fit the 1 i mi ted amount of 
private Mexican capital available as a resource. 
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President Rodriguez used the pr inc i p 1 e of mixed economy 
to increase national production. He implemented two diverse 
proceijures: the development of cooperatives and the direct 
organization of production under the control and subs 1 dy of the 
5 tate. In ttw second s1 tu at 1 on, organizations were deve 1 oped 
reg i ona 11 y to distribute products and they 11 mi ted production 
to serve the consumers in each zone.4:. 
In August 1 933 Rodr1 guez stated to the press that the 
exploitation of extractive industries must be carried on by 
nat i ona 1 enterprise and capital, and again posed the question of 
\Vr:at is the best method, if by "the State in Joint contracts 
with private individuals, or by means of labor cooperatives 
f 1 nanced by 1 oans " 
"The most expedient form of exploitation must be 
determ med and therefore, the Commission must study 
the different systems used in other countries. There 
should be included in the Budget of Expenditures an item 
de st med exclusively for the exp l oi tat ion of the nat i ona 1 
min era 1 reserves with shared ownership between the 
5 tate and the shareholders. It is expedient al so that 
44.Ja·,ier F. Gaxiola, El Presider1te Rodriquez ( 1932-34) (Mexico 
Editorial Cultura, 1938), p 238. 
4:·1t1id, p 250. 
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triis Commission study whether the system inf orce at 
rw es en t, i n w 1-1 i c 1-1 c onces s i on s a r e granted to pr 1 vat e 
individuals or stock companies organized for the 
purpose of exploiting the mineral resources, should be 
continued, or whether the est ab 1 i shment of cooperative 
societies of miners on a small scale should be 
est ab l 1 sr1ed, under the superv 1 s ion of the State and w 1th 
subsidies decreed by the State to render possible the 
exploitation of our mineral resources. I consider of vital 
importance the solution of the problems which I have set 
forth with respect to the mining industry of Mexico. "46 
Ttw Pres 1 dent then ref erred to the nat i ona 11zat1 on of 
e 1 ectr1ca1 energy, stating that a p 1 an for the nat 1ona11 zat ion of 
al 1 free resources of electrical energy was now before the 
Mexican Senate for approval.47 He resolved U-1e problem by 
creating the Federal Commission of Electricity which had two 
basic goa 1 s: that e 1 ectri city cou 1 d be supp 1 i ed at an af f ordab 1 e 
rate to promote industrial activity, and that the system of 
distribution was in such a manner as to develop new regional 
production centers. In a letter written to Josephus Dan1eis 
cJated A.ugust 30, 1933 Rodriguez said he was "seeking U-1e 
soi ut 1 on of tr1e economic and 1 ab or prob 1 ems which I have 
devoted my greatest attention and thought. "4E 
On December 20, 1933, President Rodriguez asked 
Congress to authorize a society of mixed economy to assure 
the supplying of the country in general and especi a 11 y meet the 
necessities of the Government and the Nati ona 1 Ra i 1 roads of 
4F.,1,uc o]"()0,"9o'"'c: ''o 'q7 f"-6'-'~r Ju]···"C: 19'' Ree]" ~l'lh VI....; L •. _IL v··:J,_;.' I,_, ..)_ > ,i\lli,:ij{_1/, Y LJ, ..• .)._), \... L 
47!,LAUS812 00/29906, f,\ct-lsior, .August 9, 1933, Reel 2 
-'+Ei,JAUS 8 12 00/ 29915, !\Jo 547, Ree I 2 
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Mexico. He tried to organize the Compania Petroleos de Mexico, 
S.A (Petromex), witr1 private investments and it constituted 
an important step in the nationalization of the subsoil and 
exp101tation by a semiofficia1 business.49 Mexico first sougr1t 
a partnership with foreign companies for their techno1ogy and 
capt i al but there were no takers. Petro 1 eos de Mexico then 
tried to organize exc 1 us i ve 1 y with Mexican investors but on a 
much smaller scale than first envisioned. Because national 
w,vestors did not come forward, a11 capita1 was subscribea by 
gc.vernment 1nst1 tut ions :.c, 
President Rodr\ guez al so sought protection for the 
cc: n sumer, seek rn g to k e e p pr i c es 1 ow for necessary i t em s, 
particu1ar1y e1ectricty, medicines and gaso1ine. He revised the 
tariffs of thirty two e1ectrica1 companies that operated in the 
country. On March 16, 1 934 he ordered the creat 1 on of the 
Pegulatory Commission of the Meaica1 Market. The 
Investigative Com1ssion of the Petro1eum Market and its 
derivatives. made a study vvhich in 1ater years 1ed to the 
Federal Government fixing gaso 1 me prices.::;, i 
49Jav1er F. Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodriquez ( 1932-34) (11exico 
Edi to1-ia l Cu 1tu1-a. 1 938 ), p 248. 
SDLorenzc1 Meyer, Historia De La RevoluciC>n Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol. 
12 Los lnicios De La lnst1tucional1zac1on La Po11tica Del Maxirnato 1 (Me1.1co 
C 1ty El Colegio De rv1ex1co, 1978), p 233. 
: 1Jav1er F. Gaxiola, El Pres1aente Rodriquez ( 1932-34) (l'1ex1co 
Ed1tor1a1 Cultura, 1938), p 253-254 
Cr1apter IX: Educat i ona 1 Reform and the Catho 11 c Cr1urcr1 
125 
Educ at mg the masses was a primary objective of 
Pres 1 dent Rodr1 guez 's soc 1a1 reform p 1 atf orm. He favored 1 ay 
education and an emphasis on capitalist individualism modeled 
after the U.S In regard to religious issues, President 
Roar1guez himself never demonstrated much interest in the 
conf11 ct with the Church. The Church had never been an issue 
in Baja Ca11fornia and he did not believe it needed to be an 
issue at the f eijera 1 1eve1. i The Cr·i stero Rebe 11 ion had 
cc;nciudea ana neither he nor Cardenas wanted to reopen it. 
Hovvever, his r'1ln i st er of Education, Narciso Basso 1 s, guided by 
General Calles, vvho haa a pathoiogical hatred of the Catrwlic 
CJ1urch, reignited the religious issue during the Rodriguez 
/\1jmin1strat1on by stepping up restrictive legislation on the 
Church and promoting educat i ona 1 reform using the 1abe1 s 
soc i a ii sm ar:a se><Ua 1 education as inf 1 ammatory rhetoric. The 
rea 1 reason for the imp 1 ementat ion of the reform was to 
create a po 11tica1 cr1 sis at the precise moment that Genera 1 
Car(jenas ·was to come to power, the instabi 1 lty maneuvered by 
Calles. This reform became a major political problem for 
Rodriguez with a power struggle played out on three fronts in 
pub 1 i c education, the uni verslt i es and the Church. 
1Lorenzo Meyer, H1~.toria De La Revoluci6n Mexicana 19~3-1934 \101. 
1~ Los 1r·1ic.ios De La lnstituc.ional1zacwn La Politic.a Del Max1mato (Mexico City 
E1 Colegio De ~1e~\ico, 1978), p 181 
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Rodriguez made every effort to temper the movement 
through moderation so as not to destab i 1 i ze his government, 
Jeopardize his economic and socia1 advances, and a11ow him to 
provide Cardenas with a peacefu1 transition to power. 
A1though Rodr1guez went along with Calles and his 
co11aborators and endorsed restrictive 1egis1ation rnitia11y, by 
May 1934 he had rid himself of Basso1s and sided with Gil and 
Cardenas in an attempt to keep Ca 11 es in check. This was in 
keeping \Nith his overa11 shift in a11egiance from Calles to 
Cardenas during triis period of time. 
Educ at i ona l Reform 
Ca1les supported Basso1s in the ro1e of Secretary of 
Education to carry out his brand of educat i ona 1 reform in 1933. 
E'as·::o is proposed to have a const i tut i ona 1 amendment proclaim 
tr1at in all schools the point of view would be that of 
soci211sm ~ Tr1e amendment would exc1ude from both pub1ic 
and private schoo 1 s any instruction of a religious nature and 
give tr1e state ab so 1 ute contro 1 over a 11 of the educ at i ona 1 
activities 3 In addition to federa1 rural schoo1s, schools which 
r1ad been under the contro 1 of the states were p 1 aced under 
2"John F.vl Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 ( A.ustin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 5·61. 
7 
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federal control. Basso ls increased teacher's salaries but got 
mto disfavor with their leaders when he sought to reduce 
teacher inf 1 uence in curriculum matters. 
In response to the proposed reform, middle class 
f am i 1 ies, the press and the c 1 ergy attacked Basso 1 s 
throughout 1933 and in the final months of the year the 
conf 11 ct spread to inc 1 ude the universities. The press gave 
passionate opinions for and against educationa1 reform. El 
1V3cional, organ of the PNR, admonished the newspapers 
Exc~elsior. El Universal, La Prensa, and La Palabra for 
pub 1 i~h mg fa 1 se reports regarding the educational program of 
the Government. These newspapers responded by reaffirming 
their campaign against the Secretary of Education. 
A.rnbassador Josephus Daniels reported:" It would seem to me 
tr·, at the educ at i ona l problems ana effects have been greatly 
exag 1~erate 1j 1 n the controversy carri e,j on by the press. "4 
The attacks against Basso 1 s became so vigorous that in 
December 1 933 the President 1 ssued a statement def end mg the 
Secretary an,j stat rng that Basso ls had his support.=· A 1tr1ough 
Poor i guez pub 11 c ly def ended E.asso ls and 11 ke him, wanted to 
keep religious beliefs out of education, he was strongly 
opposed tc soc 1a11 st education. At the precise moment he \A/as 
4~MLJ'.::, 812.404/ 1263,No. 11 19, J. Daniels, February 16, 1934, Reel 
4('1 
St'1AUS 81200/29826, No 2293, General Pol 1t1 cal Report, February 
16, 1934. Reel 2 
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def ending Basso ls, Rodriguez was simultaneously involved in 
formulating tr1e Six Year Plan \l\1here he proposed a system of 
i ay educ at 1 on based on scientific reason. In opposition to his 
'v' 18\·V, according to Gaxiola, was the radical Veracruz 
delegation who proposed instituting socialist education. 
Ho1.vever, it \A/as. Calles' support of social ism, felt through 
Basso ls and other collaborators, which was even more 
influential. Within the PNR it was Rodriguez and Calles wr10 
t1acJ opposing v1e1Npoints. The final outcome was a decision for 
\·Vr;at 1Nas termed 's.c1ent1f1c socialism' in the Six Year P1an, a 
compromise between the two sides. 
President Rodriguez did not give up eas11y. On December 
L 1, 1933 after~ tl1e Oueretaro Convention, he wrote to Carlos 
P:va Palacio, Pr·es1dent of the PNR, and tried to change the 
aec1s1c:r t·y expr·es:.ing r11s point of view in support of 1ay 
eijucat ion. He stated triat pub 11 c education contr1 buted 
strong 1 / to tr1e permanent system of po 1 lt i cs, and therefore, 
Mexico needed a more f lex1ble educational system with 
f reeaom ana rn it 1 at i ve ana room for spontaneous development 
of cu1ture c He sald tr1e institute of education interpreted all 
a·3pects of 11fe and it must be based in reality, as scientific 
principle. Then ind1v1duals could form their mvn ideas and 
cone 1 us ions in an atmosphere of liberty and tolerance. This 
form of lay education corresponded to the educational system 
'\)a·v'iff F Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodriquez ( 193:2-34) (Mexico 
E·d1t0r1ci~ Cultui·a, 1938), p 309-311 
in tr1e U.S., a country ruled by a political constitution which 
\A/3S 11t;era1 and democratic. Rodriguez opposed socialistic 
education as a system abundant with sectarian and radical 
aoctr·ine vvhich meant Mexico had only substituted religious 
f anat1cism with another form of fanaticism.7 
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The first months of 1934fo11 owing the passage of the 
Six Year Plan were relatively calm, until in April, Bassols 
rntroouced a plan to include sexual education in the last two 
years of primary school and al 1 of secondary school. Attacks 
t;/ the press and the clergy accelerated and parents' 
associations started a strike by their chi l dren.t· The public 
aQ 1 tat1or became so great that on May 9, 1934, President 
Rodriguez reassigned Basso ls to the higher ranking post of 
r·-1in1ster of Gobernacion and Vasconcelos, a conservat1ve, 
t)ecame the f''1rn1ster of Education. However, Bassols, after 
conferrrng with Calles ana Cardenas who were both more anti-
c l er-1 cal than Rodriguez, urged Rodriguez at a Cab met meet mg 
to take rnore drastic measures against the clergy. Rodriguez 
ref used because he felt that such strong steps advocated by 
Bassols wouid provoke difficulties for the incoming President 
Basso ls resigned, forced out by Rodriguez for his disloyalty.9 
.An educational reform bill to amend Article 3 was 
introduced during the September 1 934 Congress i ona 1 session 
/Ibid. p 314-316 
3.Jc·l-1n F.\lv' Dul Jes, Yesterday ir1 !-1ex1cc·. A 0-1ror1icle of ti-1e Revc)lut ion 
1 919-193c· i: .A.ustm Univer·s1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 561 
?toi.j. p 561 
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as a result of the Six Year Plan. It stated that education was 
to be s.ecuiar and sociaiistic. It immediately drew fire not 
only from the Cathol 1cs, the non-government press, and by 
various groups of parents, but aiso the university students, for 
reasons dea 1 rng \IV' 1th their autonomy. Pub 11 c demonstrations 
agarns.t 1t took place in various parts of Mexico. A number of 
these demonstrations were broken up by force and there were 
~.ever·a 1 f ata 1 lt i es and a 1 arge number of casua 1 ti es. 
Demonstrations by severa 1 student bod1 es resulted in, or were 
used as a pretext for, the closing of the universities of 
Monterrey and GuadalaJara, and of the Atheneum at Saltillo.10 
Outside of dee 1 arat ions by Government 1 eaders, such as 
General Calles, that the agitation was due exclusively to the 
subversive activities of capitalists (Jews) and clerics, these 
protests received 1itt1 e consideration by authorities. In 
several states the local governments, notably Sonora and 
Co 11ma, app 1 ied further repressive measures closing more 
churches an,j expe 111 n 1~ tr1e priests.ii In spite of the increasing 
\/C ·: ume of opposition t c the proposea amendment, the b111 to 
amend Article 3 of the Constitution was approved by the 
Chamber of Deputies on October 12, 1934, and by the Senate 
one vveek 1 at er. 
V/r1y did the government risk amending Article 3 given 
tr1e resistance of the Church, the universities, the middle 
1 ':1iJAUS 812.404/ 1301, Edward L. Reed, October 24, 1934, Ree 1 41 
11 i t·i·j 
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c 1 asses and otr1er conservative sectors? It was Ca 11 es who 
pushed th 1 s 1egis1at1 on rn oppos it i or to President Rodriguez 
an1j Cardenas. In June 1934, President-elect Cardenas said his 
1Jovernrnent opposed c 1 ergy intervention in popu 1 ar education 
but it was Calles who was most radical in his pronouncements 
\"11th his famous "Grlto de Guadalajara" speech on July 
20, 1 934 and the demonstration he organized by tr1e 1 00 ,000 
un1on V·/Orkers on October 28 to confirm the amendment was a 
popular 1jec1s1on. Nonetr1eless, the riots rn Puebla, Jalisco, 
1,.11 chc:acan, 11cwe 1 os and Zacatecas, \N 1th many wounded and 
oead indicated that it was not a popular refor·m. Rumor~s were 
strong tr1at tr,e real reason for the implementation of the 
reform was Calles' desire to create a political cr1s1s at the 
precise moment triat Genera 1 Cardenas was to come to power. 1.? 
f'leanwh1le, President Rodriguez was committed to keeprng 
Ca 1 ·1 es in cr1eck and to avert a crisis. 
University Agitation 
Issues of educat i ona 1 reform which had p 1 ayed center 
stage througr1 much of 1933 spread to the universities rn 
October where concerns revolved around issues of autonomy. 
The autonomy of the Univer-slty of Mexico established rn 1929 
12Lorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Revoluci6n Mexicana 192-5-1934, Vol. 
1~ Los lnicios De La lnstitucionalizacion La Poiitica Del 1'1aximato (Mexico City 
E1 Coleg10 De Me~.ico, 1978), p 180. 
w·as not absolute because it depended on financial support 
f rem the federal government. There were al so internal 
conflicts bet ween conservative faculty, the Rector Roberto 
:'iede: 1 'n, and v1 cente Lombardo Toledano, the d1 rector of the 
t~at i ona l Preparatory School, who as a member of the more 
racnca1 element of the university, favored socialism.1:: 
A. strike by the law students at the University grew to 
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inc 1 ude most of the students of the other co 11 eges and tr1e 
re·311;;nat1on of a large number of the faculty. The agitation and 
disturbances, \"Jr11ch culminated wltr1 the expulsion of U-1e 
Peet or from his office ana serious damages to build in gs, 
~wovoked President Rodriguez to issue a statement to the press 
on Octot)er 14 stating triat tr1e magnitude of the disturbance 
had caused him to step rn. He also sent a cir-cular to the 
Federal Congress proposing an amendment to the present 
orgar·.; c 1 a\N of the A.utonomous National University. He stated 
triat a1though his purpose was not to dimrnisr1 the autonomy of 
the Un1versity, his goal was aimed at ridding the University of 
a 11 po 1it1 cs, which ha1j been one of the main causes of the 
1j1fficuH1es of tr1e rnst1tut1on in tr1e past.14 The bottom 1rne 
vvas if the University woul1j not follow the official political 
stance then funding woul1j be cut to the minimum and the 
government would create a new educational center, the 
1 'lt'd r 1--,r, ' -·· ) l ·' 1-j ( "-
1.cir·~.:...usc:12.414i 12:·2, J. Dar-11els, Pc·11tica1 Repoi-t, Octc1t1er- 1933 .. 
Pt-e 1 40 
t\Jat i ona l Pol itechn i c Institute to imp 1 ement goverment 
pro J ects; in education. This was in keeping with Rodriguez's 
tielief in the U.S. form of lay education based on scientific 
reason. Witr1 tr1ese threats, trie University gave in to the 
government 1::. Nonetr1eless, Gomez Morin, a defender of 
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Cano l i c freedom, vvas elected Rector in October 1933 and 
Tole1jano was expelled. However, later in August 1934, the 
Fir-st Congress of Socia1 ist Studies voted to censure Gomez 
i""1ori n and to imp 1 ement soc la list education in the University. 1 c 
President Rodriguez tiecame involved again in October 
1934, vvhen the Council of the National University appointed a 
committee cr1arged with ascertaining the attitude of the 
C3overnment toward the University whicr1 was seen in a 
negative 1 i grit In reply to this action, President Rodriguez 
issued a statement that the council's action was strange since 
tr1e President had on many occasions made clear his attitude to 
the University through the generous f inane i al assistance 
accorded it by the government at a ti me \Nhen the National 
Treasury could i 11 afford it. He quoted letters written by 
Rec tor Gc1mez l"'1orrn, expressing deep appreciation for tr1e 
Government's generous off er of aid. 11 
15Lorei-1Zc1 Meyer, Hi=,toria De La Revoluci6n Mex1cana 1928-193..:t Vol. 
12 Los lnic1os De La 11-1st1tucionalizac1or1 La Politica Del 11aximato (11e\1co City 
E~ Colegic, De llh ico, 1972>), p 174 
l 61b1d' p. 17....J-75 
1 7 :·~,A.LJ'.:, 81~4041 1298, No 1865, "1 Daniels, October 20, 1934, Reel 
~l 
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President Rodriguez ended his statement by dee 1 arrng 
tr·,at "it pained r11m deeply tr1at the attitude assumed by the 
Council rn suspending the work of the University could only be 
interpreted as a political move to support the clerical 
agitation now going on against the amendment of Article 3," 
and trien 1iv arned the Faculties, the council and the Rector that 
arast i c measures would be taken if they persisted in assuming 
an att ituije of rebe 111 on against the Government, as had been 
oemonstrate,j 1c: In response, on October 30, the Actin 1;J Rector 
of tr1e National University, (Gomez Morin had been granted a 
leave of absence of thirty days), addressed the faculty and 
stuijent s, and demanded a f u 11 comp 11 a nee by them of the 
statues of the institution, declaring that the University would 
function str·ictly within the law. 19 
Church Rest r1 ct ions 
In addition to minimizing Church participation in 
nat i ona 1 education at every 1eve1, increased restr1 ct i ve 
legislation involving all Church activity soon led to increasing 
,j 1ff1 cult i es and incidents during the Rodriguez Adm in i strati on. 
E\ack rn July 1929 at the culmination of the Cristero Rebellion, 
1' 
--t I 
1 c'1 tJ1d 
191,JAU=:· 812404/ 1329, l·Jc· 1903, J. Daniels, Novernt1er ::::, 193....f, Reel 
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President Portes G i 1 had bas i ca 11 y reached a truce bet ween the 
canw 1 ic Church and the Me xi can government. However, by 
September 29, 1932, shortly after Rodriguez took off ice, the 
lawmakers read an encyclical letter issued by Pope Pius XI, the 
A.cerba .Animi, which objected to the 11exican legislation 
affecting the Catholic clergy. As a result, the Pope was 
bitterly attacked in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. 
Pres 1 dent Rodriguez made a statement rev ea 1 ing his surprise 
at the Pope's remarks, which, he said, were f ul 1 of fa 1 sehoods 
ano wou 1 d incite the c 1 ergy to di so bey the Me xi can rul rngs. 
Rodriguez said the clergy "cannot resign themselves to losing 
dom mat ion of sou 1 s and the possession of worldly properties, 
by virtue of which the pro 1 etari an c 1 asses were he 1 d in 
comp 1 ete 1 etriargy and were 1mp10us 1 y exp 1 olted. ":?O 
The Church was not recognized by Mexican legislative 
prrnc i p 1 es vvr1 i ch provided for the comp 1 ete separation of 
Cr1urcr1 and State. President Rodriguez considered the Catholic 
Cr1urch to be a foreign power since the clergy considered 
themselves subjects of the Pope and not citizens of Mexico, 
and r1e said tr1e government would not tolerate the dominion of 
a foreign power to meddle in the affairs of the State. "I 
r1ereby dee 1 are that at the 1 east sign of disorder the 
Government wi 11 proceed with al 1 firmness and w111 bring 
about a definite solution to this problem which has cost the 
20John F.'vV. Dulle=,, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolutior1 
1919-1936 ( Austir1. u1-1iver-sity of Texas Pr-ess, 1961 ), p 56'.2 
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nation so much bloodshed. "21 Apostolic Delegate Leopoldo 
Pu1z y Flores, who had forbidden criticism of the arrangement 
made with Portes Gil and who had strongly forbidden the use of 
arms on ber1alf of the Church now stated that the Pope's 
message had been misunderstood by the Mexican government. 
He was quickly expelle1j from the country on October 3_22 
It was on Septmeber 9, 1933, a year later and Just prior 
tc tr"1e Oueretaro Convention, that restrictive legislation 
increased against the Catholic Church. The 11i n i st er of 
1:Jot1ernac ion Vasconce 1 os instructed the Cr1 i ef of the Federal 
Cnstr1ct to see that there be permitted only the number of 
priests and churches authorized by the existing law, and that 
trie r11gh officials of the Church in turn were given instructions 
that tr1e 1 aw be complied with. Up to this point there had 
existed marked tolerance of the law and corresponding 
gov'ernment regulations issued on December 31, 1 931, which 
permitted twenty-five Catho 11 c priests for the twenty-five 
Catr·10 I 1 c churches author1 zed in the Federal District. Si nee the 
passing of this re 11 g1 ous law, the Government had not enf arced 
it to its f u 11 extent, but a 11 owed the Church to keep open many 
more churches and many more pries ts to function than were 
registered under the law. 
2 l t·~AU5812,404/11SSn~o.1929, El Nacfonal, October 3, 193'.2, Reel 
40. 
22John F.W. Dulles. Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 (Austin University of Te><as Press, 1961 ), p 563. 
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Subsequent to the opening of Congress on September 1, 
1933, certarn memt1ers fe1t that the provisions of ttw 
relig10us. law were being violated. As a result of 
representations made by these members, the 11inister of 
Gobernac i 6n Vasconce 1 os, with the approval of President 
Rodriquez, issued tr1e instructions.23 On November 16, he 
cal led Archbishop Pascual Diaz into conf erenceto carry out tr1e 
regulations.24 
This \Nas Just the beginning of the federal legislation 
ai~a inst the Church. The annual Presidential message to 
Congress on September 1, 1933 contained the report of the 
11 in i st er of Education in the f o 11 owing passage: 
40 
40 
"The Executive under my charge is firmly determined to 
further the campaign of compliance by private primary 
scr1ools with the provisions of Article 3 of the 
Constitution, which prescribes secular instruction. To 
eliminate from the instruction all religous influence is a 
task that requires tenacity and daily' watch. To marntain 
it there has been organized a corps of inspectors to 
assist in the definite extirpation from the primary 
schoo 1 s in the District of the 1 ong continued cl eri ca 1 
influence. "2'.: 
23t·JAUS s i 2 404/ i 249, ~~o. 587, J. Daniels, September 12, 1933, Reel 
.24~JAUS 81:::: 404 / 1 ::::54, No. 81 3, J Danie ls, November 1 7, 1933, Ree 1 
25!tJld. 
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The Chamber of Deputies gave speeches on November 21, 
1933 in favor of action against the alleged political activities 
of the clergy in tr1e student conflicts at Guada l aJ ara. The 
Congress adopted resolutions to take immediate steps 1) 
toward the amendment of Article 3 of the Constitution, 2) to 
1jemand the Ministries of Gobernaci 6n and Public Education, the 
Governors of Stat es, and the Municipal Authorities the strict 
comp ii a nee of the l a1.N in matters of worship, the number of 
priests to be permitted, lay instruction etc., 3) To off er to 
Governor A. i l ende of the State of Jal i sco the absolute support 
of the Chief Executive and a vote of applause of the Chamber of 
Deputies for his bold attltute to\"lards the reactionary 
elements in his State, 4) to uncover the maneuvers of the 
clergy as instigators of disorder and conflict, precisely at the 
ti me of the presidential elect i ons.2c These speeches wer·e 
reported by El Nac10nal and in response the sympathetic 
Cathol 1c nevvspapers La Prensa and La Palabra prominently 
published a statement by the Uni vers lty Students Federation, 
conaemning the speeches which implied they were being 
melted by the clergy in Guadalajara, and stating that the only 
des ire of the students was to eliminate the schools entirely 
from politics, autonomy from the government being a main 
issue.27 
26t·JAUS 812 00/29956, No. 820, J. Daniels, ~~ovember 24, 1933, Reel 
7 
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139 
In February 1934, the Attorney General Portes Gil filed 
cr1arges with the Supreme Court against Judge Antonio 
.Alcocer, of the Second Circuit Court, which included tr1e States 
of GuanaJuato, M1choacan and Aguascalientes in which there 
w·ere large Catho 11 c interests. The Judge's dee is ions on the 
nat 1 ona l i zat ion of re 11 g i ous property, favored the interests of 
the Church in 28 actions brought by the Government for the 
nationalization of religious owned property under provision of 
.Art1c·1e 27 an,j 130 of the Constltut1on.2c. 
Some of the state governors sided with the Ca 11 es 
faction and persecuted the Church far more than President 
Podr1guez and the federal legislators. In May 1934, the 
authorities of the State of Sonora cance 11 ed a 11 author1 zat ions 
given to Catholic priests to exercise their functions and the}1 
were expelled from tr1e State. Such action was taken because 
t~w clergy r1ad aav1sed parents not to send their children to 
nat rnr,a i 1~t1 c schools. General Ro do l pho Eli as Ca 11 es had sent 
out a circular to a 11 State officers ask mg them to report tr1e i r 
attitude on the State's program because Sonora wanted to be 
purged of a 11 off i c i a 1 s who were not in sympathy with the 
1 aeas of tr1e Government. Governor Ca 11 es stated that his order 
for al 1 priests to leave Sonora was only carrying out the 
provisions of the Constitution; that no churches had been 
c 1 osed; and that the suspension of rel i g1 ous services was due 
28~JAU'.': e, 12.40411264, ~~o 1124, J. Daniels, February 16, 1934, Reel 
4(, 
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to the fact the priests had refused to comply with the laws 
\Nt"1 i ch state that they must not imp art doctrina 1 instruct i on.29 
Basso ls, wr10 had resigned as Minister of Education on May 9 
and was then appointed Minister of Gobernac16n stopped to see 
General Calles on his way to the United States. Again, the 
act 1 on of Governor Ca 11 es may have been inf 1 uenced by 
conferences between General Calles and Minister Bassols.30 
Be~ ides Sonora, Cat ho 1 i c serv 1 ces were proh i ti ited in 
Tabasco, Chiapas and Veracruz. The anticlerical excesses of 
Te J eda or .A 11 en de were never equa 1 ed by the Rodriguez 
Aomrn1stration. The state of Veracruz led the way, where 
Governor Te J eda had been fight mg the Catho 1 i c Church for a 
number of years in the name of socialism. In 1933, priests in 
the state of Ja1isco were limited to one for every 25,000 
persons, ano tr1e state government had turned over twenty-
seven church build rngs to non re 1 i gi ous functions. Governor 
Set)ast 1 an A 11 enije p 1 aced restrictions on students at the 
University of Guadalajara. In addition, the police in 
Guada 1 aJ ara c 1 osed a 11 the city's churches unt i 1 the Ca tho 1 i cs 
appealed to the President to resume some services. The 
Governor of Nuevo Leon abo 1 i shed a 11 aid to the University in 
his state and the state of Chi a pas reduced to four the number 
29~J.t\US 812.404/ 1277, ~Jo 1443, R Henry Norweb, Charged' Affaires 
ad rnteri m, May 22, 1 934, Pee 1 40 
30 Ibid 
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of priests who could officiate in that state.31 In an update on 
conditions in 1934, it was reported that on 11arch 24, tr1e state 
of Cr1 i huahua enacted 1egis1 at ion authorizing one mini st er per 
100,000 inhabitants, instead of one per 45,000 as formerly; on 
1v1ay 3, 1 934, the state of S ma 1 oa authorized 20 ministers C 1 0 
Catha 11 c and 1 O Protestant) for the entire State, instead of 45 
ministers as formerly; and that on January 31, 1934, the 
r1oldrng of rel ig1ous services was suspended in certain 
municipalities in the state of Chiapas 32 The official opinion 
espressed by Genera 1 Ca 11 es was to b 1 ame tr1e c 1 ergy and 
reactionaries and congratu 1 ate the governors for their 
energies. '33 
By October 1934, as trie Rodriguez term was coming to an 
end, the re 1 i gi ous issue had heated up at the f edera 1 1eve1 as 
\Veil. Pr1 or to the session of the Senate which passed the 
education reform amendment, the PNR b 1 oc in the Lower House 
he id a meeting on October 19, 1934 at which a bill was 
discussed and passed by a vote of 36 to 13. The PNR b 1 oc 
session began "a systematic and concrete campaign against 
the clergy, the principle exploiters of the forces and the riches 
31Jc,hn F.'v'I. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution 
1919-1936 ( Austir1 University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 563. 
32r\J.AUS 812404/1277, No 1443, R Henry Norweb, 0-1arge d' Affa1res 
a1j 11-1ter-irn, r1ay 22, 1934, Reel 40. 
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of f''lex1co from tr1e times of discovery and co1onizat1on to the 
Revo ! ut ion." The Bloc passed six re so 1 ut ions: 
1. To expel def intely from the country a11 priests, bishops, and 
archb 1 shops. 
2. To g 1ve a vote of sol i darlty and confidence to General Ca 11 es, 
(mentioned f 1rsU, President Rodriguez, President-elect 
Cardenas and the Governors of Tabasco, Sonora, Chiapas and 
Colima. 
3. To organize strong centers of works and peasants which, in 
the City of Mexico, as \/\!ell as throughout the Republic, are to 
combat the organizations formed by the clergy. 
4 To form a Com i ttee of Public Safety to weed out employees 
of the Federa1 and local Governments, members of the PNR, and 
tr1e iists of pensioners of the State, among whom are persons 
descending from ind iv i duals who opposed the Revolution. 
s .. :o sponsor and stimulate the production of revolutionar;/ 
rntel lectuais. 
6. To s.uppress the newspapers La Prensa, La Palabra, El 
Hombre Libre, and Omega, as being beyond the guarantees 
provided by the Constitution, and within the sanctions 
established thereby. 34 
34~MU5812.404/1298, No 1865, J. Dar1iels, October 20, 1934, Reel 
41 
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The Committee of Public Safety of the Chamber of 
Deputies ca 11 ed on President Rodriguez on Oct ob er 29, to 
rnf orm ri1m of its proposed procedures. El Nacfonal stated that 
tr:e Government vvould have to risk being considered an 
rnquisltioner in its efforts to rid itself of enemies who would 
not resign even though their convictions were opposed to the 
Government. Excelsior pointed out that more than half a 
m 111 ion persons in Me xi co \A/ere f mane i ally dependent upon the 
Government and that, if the Committee's work were legally and 
imp art 1a11 y carried out, no pub 1 i c servant from members of trie 
Cabinet to the lowest Government employee would be free of 
suspicion and 1iab1 e to di scr1arge. 35 A. 1 so on October 31, the 
f'ie><ican Senate had met in secret session and had passed a bi 11 
~;rov1ding for the 01sarming of all so-called "White Guards" 
(po 1 ice private 1 y emp 1 oyed to guard factories, p 1 antat ions, 
etc. l t)ecause of the danger of their provoking encounters with 
anned agrarians. 36 
Tr1e increas mg 1y tense situation e 1 i c lted this 
ct1·::ervat~on from .Ambassador Daniels: 
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"The s ltuat ion has deve 1 oped cons i derab 1 e heat in the 
1 ast few weeks. It 1 oaks as lf the Government and the 
PNP, which amount to the same thing, have determined to 
have a f ma 1 "showdown" w 1th the Church. However, it 
may be that tr1e Government (Calles) is merely 
enaeavorrng, in a \Vay that has become traditional in 
3'=r·~.t..U;=: 2124(14/1329, r·Jo. 1903, J. Daniels, ~~ovember 2. 1934, Reel 
361t•J\j 
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Mexican politics, to divert public attention from other 
t 1-1 in ~1 s w r1 o s e i mp o rt an c e i t w i s r1 es to m i n i rn i z e. w r1 at 
these th in gs may be, I do not know, but there have been 
persistent rumors of dissent ion between Genera 1 
Calles and President-elect Cardenas and there r1as also 
been a good deal of criticism directed against the 
affluent condition of certain political leaders. "37 
Calles got his wish when all of the restrictions finally 
caused Puiz y Flores to speak out against the government and 
called on all Catholics to organize. In October 1934, 
President Roari guez received through Genera 1 Cardenas and 
Colonel Carlos Riva Palacio, a message from General Calles 
which suggested that Monsignor Ruiz y Flores and the 
Arcr1bisrwp of Mexico, Pascual Diaz, be thrown out of the 
country at once. But by this ti me, President Rodriguez was on 
the offensive against Calles and he replied that he could not 
act in sucr1 an arbitrary manner. Instead, he turned tr1e matter 
over to ,AJtorney General Portes Gi 1.3C. 
On October 31, the Mexico City press published the text 
of a letter addressed by Presiaent Rodriguez to Attorney 
General Portes Gi 1 which consigned him to prosecute the 
Governmnent 's case of sedition charged against the Ca tho 1 i c 
c 1 ergy of r1ex i co. The President stated that under pretext of 
tr1e educ at i ona 1 reform approved by the Congress, the c 1 ergy 
37~J.AUS e 12.404/ 1301, Edward L. Peed, October 24, 1934, Peel 41 
38i·JAUS 812.404/ 1338, No. 1921, J. Daniels, November 13, 1934, 
Ree 1 41. 
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had initiated an open campaign of sedition clearly revealing 
trie 1 r purpose to go as far as rebe 11 ion. A 1 though, it did not 
menace tr1e stabi 1 ity of his Government, he wanted the 
A.ttorney General to investigate the case and to punish those 
persons found respons i b 1 e. On the same day, La Prensa, quoted 
lvions1gnor Puiz y Flores from San Antonio, Texas as having 
asserte1J that the Catholic Church did not propose armed 
r-e s i stance nor had lt so 1 i c i t e d the int e rv en ti on of the Uni t e d 
States rn this regard.::9 
Portes G1 l's moaerate response to the crisis was 
f avorat1 ly report ea by a 1 i of the Me xi co City press. He a 11 owed 
triat tr1e Mexican Episcopate had broken the law by counsel mg 
dis.obedience to the 1v1ex i can 1 aws, carrying on propaganda rn 
the United States and inc it mg armed rebe 11 ion. At the 1 east 
sign of disorder, the government would firmly respond because 
lt hao the rigr1t to demand that the Church comply fu11y with 
tr"1e 1aws of tr1e countrv'-1'~' Tr1e E':<cels1or of November 11 
I 
stressed tr1e fact that the Government was not attempting to 
persecute re 1 igi ous be 1 ief s nor to deny' peop 1 e the right to 
vvorship as they pleased, but it was demanding compliance 
vv1tr1 tr1e laws of Mexico. It praised President Rodriguez for 
r1 av in g a c t e 1J in a 1 e 1J a 1 manner by sub m i tt i n g the case to the 
i~.ttorney Genera 1, ana not having acted arbitrarily as had many 
~ 1 
-t I 
~ 0~iAUS 812.404/ 13:::'9, ~io 1903, J Daniels, ~~o·;ernber 2, 1934, Reel 
¥N.A.IJS 812 404/ 1338, r~o 1 921, J.Dariiels, ~~overntJer 1 3. 1934, 
Reel 41 
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other authorities who had expe 11 ed pries ts and c 1 osed 
churcr·1es. 41 
Gi 1 's report recommended the arrest of the two men, but 
since they were a1ready outside of the country, he 
recommended triat they be seized shou 1 d they endeavor to enter 
Mexico. Rodriguez authorized Gi 1 to take the 1ega1 steps 
against the two pre 1ates.42 He a 1 so authorized G i 1 to read his 
report to Ca 11 es. Thus Rodr1 guez and G i 1 ended tr1e maJ ority of 
the controversy without having to take any radica1 action 
agarns t the c 1 er·gy. More important 1y, President Rodriguez 
accomp1ished his goa1 of keeping the re1igious issue 
smo 1 de ring despite Ca 11 es efforts to create a poi it i ca 1 crisis 
for Caraenas. 
4 1 Ibid. 
42Jotrn F.W. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolutwn 
1919-1936 ( Austm University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 564 
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Conclusion 
Atle 1 ardo Rodriguez rode to tr1e Mexican Presidency as a 
protege of tr1e Sonoran Dynasty w i tr1 its goal of party 
conso 11 dat ion and aggress 1ve soc 1a1 reform in Mexico f o 11 owing 
the Revolution. Rodriguez was chosen by Calles to be third 
President of the Max 1 ma to with the goal of providing party 
unity and po 11t1ca1 stability leading the country into peacef u 1 
elections in 1934 He began his administration cautious1y in 
1932, but with Ca11es frequent1y unavai1able because of hea1tr1 
and farni 1y reasons and because Rodriguez had proven rie was 
capab1e of administering w1tr1 1ess scrutiny, Rodriguez was 
ab1e to take more and more contro1 of the government. In 
addition, Ca11es ovvn institutionalization of politics through 
trie format 1 on of the PNR d 1 d not 1 end i tse 1f to strong man 
ccntro 1. 
After Calles became reactionary and backpeddled on 
soc i a 1 reform, G 11 and other agrarian 1 eaders sought new 
1eadersr11p in Caraenas to reignite the movement. By mid 1933, 
Caraenas-G1l-G6mez became more of a factor within the PNR 
and Cal 1es-Pan1 less so. While in office, Rodriguez gradually 
shifted his allegiance, replacing Calles collaborators in his 
adm in 1st rat 10n w itr1 Cardenas proponents. From that 
perspective, the Rodriguez administration became a 
trans1tiona1 government wh 1 ch peacefu 1 ly shifted power from 
trie Max1mato to Carden1smo. 
The Rodriguez presidency, however, represented rnore 
than a shlft from a puppet leader under Calles to a puppet 
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1 eader under Cardenas. President Rodriguez was a very capab 1 e 
administrator in his own right with his own distinct political 
ideology and his own brand of social reform. He was a Sonoran 
capitalist educated in the A.meri can ways, adopt mg both 
capitalism and Roosevelt's New Deal policies as his own 
phi l osoph·y during his years as Governor and entrepreneur in 
BaJa California and later as President. 
Unlike Rubio 's adm in i strati on, which had been troub 1 ed 
by i nterna 1 po 1itica1 turmo i 1 and the World Depression, 
Rodriguez achieved political stabi 1 i ty in the aftermath of the 
Depression and was able to move forward with the Country's 
economic and soc i a 1 reconstruction-- something totally 
creaitea to Cardenas, when Rodriguez initiated much of it 
himself. The Six Year Plan, which became the basis for 
reconstruction, reflected the new shift in power from the 
Maxi ma to to Carden i smo. Rodriguez aggressive 1 y pursued 
implementing the Six Year Plan during 1934 but applied his 
own interpretation. With his finance ministers, he put the 
pub 1 i c hacienda in order, ba 1 anced the budget and estab 1 i shed 
internal credit, and then built his social reforms within fiscal 
respons i bi l ty. He expanded the domestic market w 1th 
programs to educate the masses and improve living standards 
emphasizing minimum wage and labor arbitration yet 
supported a mixed economy' and national capital. He tried to 
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increase agri cul tura 1 and industri a 1 production with 1 and 
reform, expanded credit, modern techno 1 ogy, and an increased 
infrastructure with in the country. He supported 1 ay education 
and separation of Cr1urch and State. 
Rodriguez accomp 1 ished these feats through sheer 
persona 1 force. He f ormu 1 ated f i sea 1 po 1 icy in c 1 ose 
conjunction with his finance ministers, first with Pani, until 
tr1ey c 1 asr1ed on po 1 icy issues and then with Gomez who was 
more agreeatiie to his economic plans. By 1934, Rodr1guez 
dictated agrarian pol icy as head of the Autonomous Agrarian 
Commission and regu1 ated 1 ab or through persona 1 contro 1 of 
tr1e F edera 1 Arbitration Board r1aving usurped authority from 
the states and Congress. At the same time, he aggressively 
pushed minimum wage 1egislation through Congress over 
state's interests. In addition, he kept the mi 1 i tary neutra 1 i zed, 
maintained favorable relations with the U.S. government whi1e 
promoting Me xi can nat 1ona1 i st interests, and prevented Ca 11 es 
from reigniting the religious issue and causing a crisis for 
Cardenas. Rodriguezmo, far from being supplanted by the 
Maximato, c1ear1y was a force unto itself, and precursor to the 
Cardenas reforms in 1 935. 
Personal1y, Rodr1guez did not especia11y re1ish po1itics--
He was first and foremost a businessman desirous of 
accumu 1 at ing vast wea 1th. He continuously expressed a desire 
to retire from pub1ic 1ife ana confine himself to industria1 
enterprises. He wanted to be President to impact nat i ona 1 
economic reform which could only enhance his own business 
empire in Mexico. Otherwise he was ready to leave politics 
behind and return to Baja California where he was "King." 
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With entrenched political patronage being what it was, 
Rodrlguez played tr1e game as well as anyone. He was 
e><treme1y loyal to Calles because Calles gave him his power 
anCJ wealth. Yet as the power shifted toward Cardenas, 
Rodriguez was aware of Cardenas' increasing influence and 
\·Vanted to remain in favor vvlth the "powers that be." When he 
returned to Baja Cal lf ornia he would need Cardenas' support to 
maintain his local hegemony and protect his national economic 
1 nterest s. 
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